EUROsimA 2024

Foreign Affairs Council

1. Energy Trade and Cooperation with Partners within the Global Gateway Framework
2. EU Assistance to Post-War Rebuilding Efforts in Ukraine

Study Guide

Foreign Affairs Council Study Guide

European Union Simulation in Ankara (EUROsimA) 2024

Organized by
Foreign Policy and International Relations Society
Middle East Technical University
Üniversiteler Mah. Dumlupınar Bulvarı No: 1
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi B Binası Zemin Kat

06800, Çankaya, Ankara, Türkiye

EUROsimA 2024
Ankara - Türkiye 2024

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I. Letter from the Secretary-General

Esteemed participants,

I would like to welcome you all to EUROsimA 2024. My name is Alkım Özkazanç, and I am a third-year Political Science and Public Administration student at the Middle East Technical University. This year, I will be serving as the Secretary-General of this esteemed conference during its 20th annual session. EUROsimA has always held a special place for me since my first participation in the conference back in 2019; thus, being able to contribute to such a valuable session simply fills me with pride and excitement. An incredible amount of hard work has been dedicated to this conference, so I am confident that EUROsimA 2024 will not break the tradition and satisfy its participants as perhaps the most academically qualified Model European Union (MEU) simulation in Türkiye.

Our academic team, consisting of competent students who come from different departments and universities yet are definitely united by a strong team spirit, is the reason why I have been able to make the claim that stands just a few lines above. The Under-Secretaries-General and the Academic Assistants have been working hard for the last few months to produce a conference that is rich in content and educatory. I would like to thank every member of the academic team for their commitment.

Moreover, I would like to especially thank our Director-General, Miss Deren Ertan, whose support and company I can never disregard. I am quite grateful for her motivation, diligence, and solidarity, all of which she has exercised to an excellent degree. Seeing her and her team's efforts assures me that EUROsimA 2024 is going to be an unforgettable experience for all participants. Thus, I would like to thank every member of the organisation team for their commitment as well.

This year, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) will have debate on two agenda items, both of which have substantial implications for the EU's position within changing global dynamics. On this occasion, I would like to extend my gratitude to the Co-Under-Secretaries-General Mr. Burak Eren Ceyhan and Mr. Umut Barış Doğan for their work behind the scenes of the FAC.

I strongly advise the participants to read the study guides in detail in order to get a firm understanding of the agenda item and to fully immerse themselves in their committees. Only through that immersion could one get a full taste of the committee and accumulate good memories. After this short piece of advice, I would like to once again welcome you all to EUROsimA 2024, hoping that it will be a remarkable experience for you.

Kind Regards,

Alkım Özkazanç

Secretary-General of EUROsimA 2024

II. Letters from the Under-Secretaries-General

Dear participants, my name is Burak Eren Ceyhan, and it is my utmost pleasure to be serving you as the Under-Secretary General for the Foreign Affairs Council in EUROsimA'24. As an International Relations student at the Middle East Technical University, I have had the opportunity of taking courses from some of the best professors in the country and I wish to reflect the character and notion of diplomacy my professors taught me to all ministers within this meeting. As someone with a six-year long experience in many types of court and diplomacy simulations, I can testify that EUROsimA is unlike any other that you may have attended before; the history and the excellent team of EUROsimA never fails to provide an experience to remember for a lifetime. Therefore, I encourage all ministers to work hard and try their best in order to benefit from the wonderful atmosphere of EUROsimA.

During this meeting, the Foreign Affairs Council will discuss two crucial agenda items; Energy Trade and Cooperation with Partners within the Global Gateway Initiative and Helping Ukraine in their Post-War Rebuilding Efforts. Both of these agenda items are crucial for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union and require tremendous amount of knowledge to discuss fruitfully. This study guide was designed by myself and my partner, Under Secretary General Umut Barış Doğan, in order to give you the basis of the knowledge you will need during the discussions; it is crucial that all ministers read and study on this guide and conduct further research on their own.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to thank our Secretary General Alkım Özkazanç for his tremendous efforts and excellence during our preparations and Under Secretary General Umut Barış Doğan for all his help and impeccable work during the preparation of this guide. I wish all ministers fruitful debates and a great conference.

If you have any inquiries, you may always get in contact with me by emailing ceyhan@eurosima.org.

Burak Eren Ceyhan

Under-Secretary-General of the Foreign Affairs Council

Hello, my name is Umut Barış Doğan. I am delighted that I will be serving as the under-secretary-general for the Foreign Affairs Council this year. As a junior electrical-electronics engineering student, this year will be marking my fifth and most likely final time attending EUROsimA. Therefore, I hope to deliver a positive experience where you are able to use this conference as a basis for future conduct on delegateship.

This year in the Foreign Affairs Council, we will have two conjoint subject much related to and affected by each other, namely energy trade and the reconstruction efforts in Ukraine. I will be responsible for our agenda item regarding the reconstruction of Ukraine. I believe this conflict and the EU's attitude during and after the war represents a pivotal point in modern history where the current order built up in the West over last century is challenged under the greater threat that the Russian Federation has become for the sovereignty of post-Soviet Eastern European republics as the longest lasting military alliance, NATO, and the supranational entity connecting Europeans and their nations on a deeper level allowing for a sense of continental belonging, the EU, is tested. Especially now, as European nations slowly realise that the situation in Ukraine is not as positive as it seemed two or even one year ago, there remains much to discuss as to what approaches to take to prevent the return of a primitive diplomatic outlook that seeks territorial expansion.

Our objective is that delegates actively lead a discussion considering the benefits of their states and the Union's as a whole. You will have an opportunity to discuss subjects regarding the military, economy, and society as you try to mend this domestic European issue. Particularly in the environment of a committee room with equal representation, requiring two thirds majority to make any joint decision, you will have to find a common ground for the betterment of Europe as a whole.

With this opportunity, I would like to express my deep admiration for the incredible efforts and the great achievements of the Academic and Organization Teams. A necessary shoutout should be made to my colleague, Mr. Burak Eren Ceyhan, whom I had the luck to get to become closer to while preparing for the conference. I would also like to mention the Secretary-General of this year's conference, Alkım Özkazanç, who has been extremely patient with me during the process of the preparation of this conference and particularly this document and has given sound advice that I believe has enhanced my abilities to deliver a coherent experience in this conference.

Finally, we have you, our participants. I hope that you will find this study guide adequate and will be able to make good use of it as a means to begin your research efforts to form your own well-informed perspective. For further inquiries, you can contact me at dogan@eurosima.org. I hope to see you all at the conference in good health.

Umut Barış Doğan

Under-Secretary-General of the Foreign Affairs Council

2. INTRODUCTION TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL (FAC)

The **Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)** is the body responsible for the discussion of the European Union's (EU) foreign policy based on the EU's **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)** by gathering Foreign Ministers or other ministers of member states depending on the agenda item (European Commission, n.d.n.). Meetings of the FAC are chaired by the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Josep Borrell Fontelles; the High Representative is also assisted by the **European External Action Service (EEAS)** (European Commission, n.d.n).

Together with the **European Commission and** with the assistance of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the FAC's main role is to ensure the effectiveness, unity and consistency of the joint foreign affairs of the EU (European Commission, n.d.n.). The FAC also defines and implements the EU's CFSP, based on guidelines set by the European Council (European Commission, n.d.n.). As a particular example, FAC can launch EU crisis management actions, both civil and military, in the interests of the EU's objectives of peace and security (European Commission, n.d.n). The FAC can also adopt measures to implement the EU's CFSP, including possible sanctions (European Commission, n.d.n.).

With the exercise of foreign policy falling under its exclusive competence, the FAC adopts measures implementing the EU's common commercial policy together with the **European Parliament** (European Commission, n.d.n.). In trade policy, the European Commission is responsible for negotiating and managing trade agreements involving tariff amendments, customs and trade provisions and protective measures; however, the FAC plays a central role as it mandates the European Commission to open negotiations and gives negotiating directives to the European Commission (European Commission, n.d.n.).

3. AGENDA ITEM A: ENERGY TRADE AND COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS WITHIN THE GLOBAL GATEWAY FRAMEWORK

I. Importance of Energy Safety and Energy Politics

a. Definitions

Before going into a thorough analysis, it is crucial to define the terms **energy politics, energy policy** and **energy security**. The terms **energy policy** and **energy politics** are used interchangeably due to the fact that **energy politics** is the exercise of **energy policy** (Tosun, 2022)**.** According to the definition of Tosun (2022), **energy policy** is composed of some rules concerning the resources, efficiency, prices, infrastructure, utilization, and transportation of energy, along with the climatic and environmental implications of energy production. Energy policy is a cross-sector policy domain, meaning that it is affected by decisions taken in other policy domains and it affects other policy domains at the same time (Tosun 2022). Currently, the main debate in the domain of energy policy (especially in Europe) is concerned with the methods through which affordable, secure, and clean energy could be secured (Tosun 2022).

Energy security, as Deese (1979) defines, is a condition in which a nation accomplishes a high probability that it will have adequate energy supplies at affordable prices. In his definition, prices are recognized as affordable if they do not cause severe disruption of normal social and economic activity. In the modern sense, energy security can be seen as a sub-field of energy politics which is concerned with ensuring the general safety of energy trade routes and establishing a high probability of stable future resource flow into a country.

b. Economic Aspects

It can be said that any discussion regarding energy safety and energy politics must take into account the economic aspects of affairs before all others. Everything, from the nature of the trade deal itself to the planning of the logistics, is deeply connected to economics in the field of energy politics. Without sufficient funding and comprehensive planning, an energy policy cannot be sustained. Due to the importance of energy resources for the global economy, there exists a reciprocal relationship between economic welfare and efficient energy politics.

In order to get a good understanding of the place of economics in the field of energy politics, an analysis of energy markets is essential. Analysis of energy markets must consider external factors such as political circumstances, general economic welfare and the situation of comparable markets in order to yield meaningful results. Since the focus of this document is the analysis and further improvement of the European Union's (international) energy policy, the analysis will focus on the situation in Europe, its neighbours and the global markets in order to provide a holistic approach.

As with any other market, energy production within the EU decreased due to the effects of COVID-19. Even though annual energy production saw a 4.3% increase in 2021, it still totalled less than that of the pre-pandemic period annual production rates (European Commission, 2023a). An exception of this trend could be observed in production sourced from renewables and biofuels, which showed a steadily uprising trend and accounted for 40.8% of all European energy production; the rest followed as nuclear heat (31.2 %), solid fossil fuels (15.2 %), natural gas (6.4 %), oil and petroleum products (3.4 %), and non-renewable waste (2.3 %) (European Commission, 2023a). The policies outlined by the EU Green Deal have contributed to this upward trend associated with the renewables and biofuels category, as will be explained later.

The statistics above provide valuable insights on the landscape of European energy policies since different types of energy resources have uses in different fields. For instance, heating still relies on fossil fuels, the production of which faced a significant downward trend over the last years. Not only the end user, but the suppliers of heat resources use fossil fuels. To better comprehend the importance of fossil fuels for an economy, it would be appropriate to pinpoint some crucial industries that consume fossil fuels; fuel consumption made during land transportation, air transportation, and manufacturing processes contribute significantly to the demand for fossil fuels. In 2021, more than two-thirds (76%) of Europe's energy was produced burning such fossil fuels, with gas accounting for 34%, oil 31% and coal 11% respectively (Haddad, 2022). A grand cleavage between the amount of energy demanded by the Europeans and the amount of energy production made in Europe necessitates energy trade with other nations, which essentially gives way to the flow of major capital outside of Europe. Still, it can be said that a more efficient deal, which will either increase the amount of energy obtained for the same price or secure the same amount of energy supply at a cheaper cost, could be achieved if correct steps are taken.

Between 2021 and 2022, the expenditure made on the imports of petroleum products (oil and natural gas in particular) increased due to the rising prices; imports from Russia went up by €600 million and imports from other extra-EU partners went up by €10.9 billion. In the first three quarters of 2023, the trend reversed with total average expenditures falling by 19% in comparison to 2022. Imports totalled at €22.4 billion in 2023 during the first three quarters of 2023, compared to €27.6 billion recorded during the first three quarters of 2023 (European Commission, 2024a). Petroleum oil imports from Russia decreased remarkably in this period due to EU sanctions[1] and averaged €700 million per month in 2023 compared to €4.6 billion in 2022, amounting to a drop of 84 %. Meanwhile, the imports from the extra-EU partners except Russia decreased by a mere 6% in the same period. (European Commission, 2024a). The ban on Russian petroleum products,

[1] The reasons and results of those sanctions will be covered in the "Political Aspects" section.

coupled with the imposition of other types of trade restrictions such as tariffs, placed a significant burden on the European economy.



(European Commission 2024a)

The large volume of capital invested in energy trade is not a specialty of Europe. According to The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2021), Saudi Arabia was the top exporter of petroleum products in the world with a total of USD 138 billion coming from export gains, China was the largest importer with a grand total of USD 208 billion spent for import expenditures, and the entire petroleum energy resource market accounted for 4.52% of all world trade. Bearing in mind that all state policies in all fields require substantial capital[2], the importance of maintaining economically viable energy policies become more evident.

Seeing the recent trends in the energy market, it is easier to make conclusions about the centrality of economics in the formulation and implementation of contemporary European energy politics.

[2] Here, the term "capital" does not solely refer to financial resources, but it encompasses technological infrastructure and know-how as well.

All energy resources are crucial and sought after, therefore the economic efficiency of energy policies is crucial both for the sustainability of energy policies but also the general well-being of any country.

c. Political Aspects

After an analysis of the economic aspects of energy politics, analysing the political aspects would be the most sensible since it is the policies of states and trade partners, along with the general regional or global political landscape, that determine which respective state or alliance comes out with an advantage. Important political elements that interact with energy politics include international agreements, short-term and long-term policy plans, spillover effects caused by conflicts, and other local governmental affairs.

One can easily observe that the Russo-Ukrainian War is one of the best examples of a political crisis that disrupts the flow of an efficient energy market. Particularly in the case of Europe, with the statistics regarding the European-Russian energy trade, it is evident that this political conflict has not only affected the policies of states; the conflict also took its toll on all citizens due to the rising prices of consumer-end products, observable in heating utilities and vehicle gas prices.

The EU has since adopted policies to come up with alternative ways of meeting its energy needs. Since electricity is one of the most vital forms of energy, it would be appropriate to conduct an analysis of the electricity production and consumption trends in Europe. According to the reports prepared by the European Council (2023a), the EU produced 2.641 Terawatt-hours of electricity in 2022; in the same year, 3.3 Petawatt-hours of electricity (almost 8 times of the amount produced) was consumed in the EU (Statista, 2024a). Approximately 40% of this production came from renewable sources. Gas was still the main fossil fuel used to generate electricity with 19.6%, followed by coal (another fossil fuel) with 15.8%. These numbers point to both remarkable accomplishments and shortcomings of European energy politics. The large concentration of renewables in European energy production shows the know-how of European states in maintaining sustainable energy practices. On the other hand, the almost 1/8 ratio of production to consumption shows the insufficiency of production in Europe. It is also an indicator that points to the vulnerability of Europe in face of political crises that have intense implications for energy, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The fragile energy situation in Europe calls for a very well-planned energy policy doctrine. Relevant planning processes should indisputably include the consideration of the general political landscape, possible implications for other policy fields (such as environmental policies, which will be discussed in the next chapter), and the fiscal and logistic feasibility of policies.

Interstate relations and political conflicts are not the only political factors that have implications for the field of energy. The outlook of states towards future planning, changes in technology, and market tendencies can significantly alter production and consumption trends as well. According to Statista (2024b), global fossil fuel consumption saw a steady uprise from 1965 until 2015, rising from 40.440 terawatt-hours to 129,421 terawatt-hours. However, the increase between 2015 and 2016 was only about 1.000 Terawatt-hours, 8 times less than the increase recorded in the 2010-2015 period. Furthermore, reports also show that fossil fuel consumption worldwide decreased by 7.000 Terawatt-hours from 2019 to 2020 (Statista, 2024b). These trends were not only a result of COVID-19 pandemic since the decrease can be attributed to the policies authorized by the Paris Agreement as well; the effect of the latter shows that the collective efforts of states can alter the trends of energy markets.

Political factors are of course not limited to the actions undertaken by external actors; regional dynamics such as tax rates and investor motivations are also great determinants of the energy markets' direction, which consequently changes the requirements of a sufficient energy policy.

With these analyses in mind, it can be inferred that the demand for energy resources and energy prices are highly volatile since such indicators are prone to the shocks created by various phenomena. This volatility is not necessarily an evil force continuously harming society; the states and organizations that can implement secure and diverse energy policies can secure an advantageous position. It is also important to remember that the economic and political aspects of energy politics are perhaps those aspects that deserve the most attention and are inextricably linked to one another. Understanding the political and economic landscape in the field of energy is the foundation of drafting sustainable and efficient policies.

d. Environmental Aspects

Albeit it is perhaps a sub-field of the political aspects, the environmental aspects of energy politics clearly deserve a chapter of their own. This is not only due to the immediate effects of environmental policies on the market in the short run, but arguably even more so due to the imperative of maintaining sustainable energy policies that promote long-term social and economic welfare.

It would be inappropriate not to discuss the **EU Green Deal** when focusing on the environmental aspect of energy policies. The EU Green Deal is a document which outlines the plans for the future of the EU states' environmental policies, and it undoubtedly has several implications on energy policies as well. The European Council (2023b) states that the goal of the EU Green Deal is to cut carbon emissions by 55% by 2030 and transform Europe into a carbon-neutral continent by 2050, the latter being a significant goal that requires significant alterations to the energy consumption preferences of households and businesses. As approximately 75% of EU greenhouse gas emissions come from energy consumption and production, the elimination of carbon emissions in the energy sector is a crucial step toward building a climate-neutral EU (European Council, 2023b). With such a high concentration of the greenhouse gas emissions being caused by the energy sector, the EU Green Deal will undoubtedly bring significant changes to energy policies; the first steps of that change have already become visible in the EU's energy production statistics, as discussed in the last sub-chapter. The uprise in nuclear and renewable sources-based production is bound to continue with the EU's determined policy to realize its goals in the field of environmental policy.

For such a transition to take place, European states should refrain from expanding their fossil fuel-based production facilities but instead invest their capital in renewables and nuclear sources, at least for meeting the domestic energy demand. However, fossil fuel-based infrastructure (natural gas heated homes, gas powered vehicles, coal and fuel powered factories etc.) has exercised extensive **economies of scale**[3] for decades; therefore, transforming fuel powered machinery into ecologically viable machinery may not always be a viable option due to technological inabilities or high costs. Discarding old infrastructure and replacing it with new infrastructure is not an easy task in terms of resources, expertise, and time. Therefore, the EU predicts there should be a 55 billion Euro budget for achieving a just transition during the 2021-2027 period (European Council, 2023b). Even then, it should be noted that full transition away from fossil fuels is not expected in the upcoming years.

[3] Economies of scale is a term used in economics to explain how a firm faces lower production costs per unit as the scale of their production sites increases.

With these considerations, an appropriate EU (international) energy policy must find a common ground between environmental goals, politically safe actions, economically viable options, and the need to promote the development of national economies and economic well-being. Effective policies must also take into account the expectations for the future in order not to incur economic losses by investing capital to rather unimportant resources that will become obsolete in the future.

e. Social Welfare Aspects

The analysis of the social welfare aspects of energy politics proves quite crucial since essentially all policies ultimately aim at bringing improvements to society. After the analysis of economic, political, and environmental aspects, the analysis of the social welfare aspects becomes easier since all the previously discussed areas have significant effects on the social welfare of society. This is most evidently seen in the following statement made by the European Council (2023a): “Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the prices of fossil fuels in the EU – especially gas – and, consequently, on Europeans’ electricity bills. This is due to the fact that the price of electricity in the EU is linked to the price of natural gas used for power generation.”

First and foremost, it would be appropriate to connect economics and social welfare since financial well-being is the determinant of many life standards such as quality food consumption, housing, transportation, and healthcare. According to reports published by the European Commission (2024b), electricity prices for household consumers in the EU steadily increased after the first half of 2008; however, the report did not show any unexpected change in price until 2008.

The European Commission (2024b) also reported that the tax-included electricity price for households further increased in the first half of 2023, reaching a record high price of €0.2890 per

KWh. While a major increase, it did not cause a major crisis since energy was still affordable for the majority of households. Perhaps the most concerning data of which from the same European Commission (2024b) report was that the percentage of taxes in the total price increased by almost 10 percentage points from 31.2 % in the first half of 2008 to 41.0 % in the second half of 2019; it substantially decreased to 15.5% in the second half of 2022 but showed a slightly increased to 19.2% in the first semester 2023. This increase was due to the pandemic's and the Russo-Ukrainian War's effects on the European economy, which will be further discussed in detail later.



(European Commission 2024b)

As mentioned earlier, taxation decreased and the prices showed a more stable trend recently, though energy prices now measure higher compared to the pre-pandemic period. These signal that the intervention of the European Union met with an amount of success since the original outcome could have arguably been much worse; however, this experience has overall demonstrated both the fragile nature of energy policies and the effects of energy crises on the public.

Another crucial trend worth examining relates to the businesses and production sites, also know as **non-household consumers**. The European Commission (2024b), for the purpose of the analysis, defines non-household consumers as those consumers with an annual energy consumption rate between 500 MWh (megawatt hours) and 2000 MWh. The graph depicted by the same report is shown below.



(European Commission 2024b)

The European Commission (2024b) also reports that the price without taxes increased close to the overall inflation until 2012. Afterwards, it was on the decrease until 2020. In the second half of

2020, the prices increased but remained lower than the first half of 2008 price (European Commission 2024b). However, in the second half of 2022, there was a steep increase.

In order to draw conclusions from the statistics depicted above, we must consider the energy prices' effects on the end consumer. This data clearly reflects an unexpected yet remarkable increase in energy prices used by households. Every single household uses energy for basic needs such as heating, cooking, and lighting.

II. Important Energy and Climate Policy Documents

a. Paris Agreement

As far as the Foreign Affairs Council's current agenda item is concerned, environmental sustainability is an important factor to consider but not located at the centre of the agenda. Nevertheless, any framework and plan regarding the coordination of energy policies with external partners must keep in mind the global trends and political landscape (including the documents explained in this section) in order to be feasible and efficient. One such document is the **Paris Climate Agreement**, which was signed in 2015. Even though the Paris Agreement was not drafted by the EU, it has significant effects on the energy and environmental policies of all states. Therefore, it is beneficial to understand the key bringings of the Paris Agreement to better anticipate future energy consumption and production trends.

The Paris Agreement currently has 195 signatories: 194 states and the European Union, which signed the Agreement as a separate legal entity (United Nations n.d.). The Agreement essentially provides a pathway for developed nations to assist developing nations in their efforts to build a greener economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions while creating a framework for the transparent monitoring and reporting of the measures taken by all countries to reach predetermined climate goals (United Nations n.d.).

It would not be wrong to infer that the Paris Agreement strongly signals the transition towards a greener and more sustainable world energy consumption trend; it is thus a stepping stone in creating an international framework which the European Union zealously adheres to.

b. Related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN)

Unlike the Paris Agreement, the **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs) cover areas other than environmental goals and addresses energy policy as well. However, this chapter will only focus on the relevant SDGs after a brief introduction of what the SDGs are. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a series of goals that were adopted by the United Nations in 2015 as a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030 (UNDP n.d.). There is a total of 17 SDGs, all of which are intertwined in a sense that developments in one of the goals will build on a landscape in which progress is made with respect to other goals as well. Also, with the joint commitment of all parties to assist those who are furthest behind, international partnerships built on the basis of the SDGs are inclined to be quite successful (UNDP n.d.).

Three SDGs directly have implications for energy policies: *7 - Affordable and Clean Energy*, *9 - Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure*, and *13 - Climate Action*.

The 7th SDG (Affordable and Clean Energy) emphasizes the importance of investing in solar, thermal and wind power to ensure long term energy supply for all. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the proportion of the world population with access to electricity increased from 78 percent in 2000 to 90 percent in 2018 (UNDP n.d.). According to these statistics, it becomes clear that one of the most important goals of the SDGs is tackling the energy availability gap between countries by ensuring the energy production gap is also closed.

The 9th SDG (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) stresses the importance of investment in infrastructure and innovation since they are critical prerequisites for economic growth and development (UNDP n.d.). As the UNDP (n.d.) states, more than half of the world population now lives in cities; therefore, mass transport and renewable energy are becoming ever more important in a landscape characterized by urbanization and the growth of new industries, information technologies, and communication technologies. SDG 9 also points out the importance of technological progress since it is the key to finding lasting solutions for both economic and environmental challenges, such as providing new jobs and promoting energy efficiency (UNDP n.d.). According to the UNDP (n.d.), promoting sustainable industries and investing in scientific research and innovation are all important ways for facilitating sustainable development.

The 13th SDG (Climate Action) stresses the importance of climate action in order to improve the living conditions of and prolong the lifespan of humans, plants and animals. The following facts explain why climate action is crucial: the annual average economic loss from climate-related disasters is measured in hundreds of billions of dollars, while geo-physical disasters (91 percent of which was related to the climate) killed 1.3 million people and left 4.4 billion injured between 1998 and 2017 (UNDP n.d.).

It can be said that these pieces of international action framework demonstrate the momentum of the global political landscape toward fostering a cooperative approach to achieve economic and environmental sustainability. It would not be wrong to expect further changes in production consumption, and trade patterns across the globe since long-term investments and innovation will be following a new path guided by the international efforts to promote sustainability. Since those new patterns will be quite consequential on the conduct of states, businesses, and citizens, the European Union needs to be prepared well to assist the Europeans adjustment process to new patterns. To the keen observer, it is observable that the developed member states of the European Union could seize the unique opportunity to be pioneers of change and make remarkable contributions to the global efforts to achieve wholescale transition. Moreover, it should be noted that the actors that could successfully navigate through this transition would inevitably gain the opportunity to accomplish economic and diplomatic gains in the future. Thus, the Foreign Affairs Council should divert great attention to analysing the global political and economic landscape and discuss how the EU could simultaneously pioneer a global transition and promote the well-being of its members through engaging in energy partnerships.

III. Natural Gas-Petroleum Crisis within the EU caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War

a. Background and Immediate Effects on the EU

The shortage of energy resource access caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War had highly consequential effects on the European Union countries, perhaps the most pressing of which was problems with accessing petroleum products. Considering the graphs and statistics given before that show the usage amount of petroleum products, the immediate effects were rough. The immediate effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War on European energy trade and prices have already been elaborated in earlier chapters. However, there are other important aspects of the natural gas-petroleum crisis to consider.

Sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU and other states undoubtedly harmed the Russian economy and disrupted Russia’s agenda; however, it should be noted that Russia’s energy production did not simply disappear as a result of those sanctions.

The sanctions imposed by the EU towards Russia were strict. Before the start of the war, approximately half of Russian energy exports went to the EU yet the import ban on Russian oil covered 90% of all Russian exports into the EU (European Commission n.d.). In order for the Russian economy to continue functioning, unpurchased amount of oil had to be bought by some other state whose stance is not in support of Ukraine; the state in question became India. According to Verma and Tan (2024) Russia emerged as India's top oil supplier in 2023 and India imported about 1.66 million barrels per day of Russian oil in 2023 compared to an average 652,000 barrels per day in 2022. Considering the fact that India's demand for crude petroleum tripling over a year is highly unlikely, the keen observer can see that India had leveraged the cheap prices of Russian oil and its neutral position in the conflict in order to obtain a valuable commodity at a great deal.

It is also important to remember the fact that the EU's sanction on Russian oil has not decreased EU's demand for petroleum products. Therefore, EU members had to compensate for the forfeited Russian energy through other means. According to the Times of India (2024), the EU's import of refined energy products from India increased by 115% from 2022 to 2023; the EU imported 111.000 barrels per day in 2022 and 231.800 barrels per day in 2023. This jump in Russian oil export to India and Indian export to the EU shows that the same exact molecules from Russia, despite all efforts, make it to the EU and the payments for those energy resources eventually make their way into Russia. As shown in a Times of India (2024) article, the benefits of this situation to India have been two-fold; they have been able to get cheaper oil for their refineries and sell the refined product (such as fuel oil and jet fuel) at full price to European countries because of those countries dire need to forfeit Russia-sourced imports. This shows that the conflict has harmed both the EU countries and Russia even though both sides continue to be the part of the same trade network despite formal limitations.

b. Policy Interventions

Alarmed by the fact that Russian oil keeps finding its way into the global energy market, the EU, Australia and the G7 countries[4] (collectively called as the **G7+ Price Cap Coalition**) imposed a 60 US Dollar price cap[5] per barrel to Russian oil in an effect to decimate Russian export profits (Times of India 2024). However, Russian oil still found its way to India, which is clearly seen in the case of the Jamnagar Refinery processing 400,000 barrels of Russian oil per day (alongside 770,000 barrels from other sources that may possibly originate from Russia) and having 30% of its exports directed to Europe (Times of India 2024). Such exports from India were not bound by the price cap mentioned above. In this instance, we can see that the imposition of a price cap on Russian oil has not been as successful as wished because Russian oil still gets traded among different states and finds its way into the market at higher prices.

Despite these complexities, further measures to expel Russian oil out of the global market have been taken. European Commission (n.d.a) states that the G7+ Price Cap Coalition has started a close monitoring of all relevant energy tanker vessels in order to identify energy products originating from Russian resources. This monitoring policy has yielded some results; for example, the United States officials successfully discovered a scheme wherein oil was transferred to shadow vessels in order to circumvent the sanction on **Sovcomflot**, the leading Russian tanker agency (Velma and Tan 2024).

EU sanctions on Russia are not limited to energy imports. EU exports towards Russia (especially in aviation and military industry) have also been prohibited (European Council 2024a). The European Council (2024a) has also introduced a **No-Russia Clause** which not only prohibits the

[4] The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US
[5] A price cap refers to the maximum purchase price enforced by a policy.

trade of Russian goods but also trading with third parties if the transportation involves through Russian logistics firms or passes through Russian territory. The European Council (2024a) also states that the sanctions are designed to maximize the negative impact on the Russian economy while limiting the negative consequences for EU businesses and citizens. The trade restrictions exclude products primarily intended for consumption and products related to health, pharmaceuticals, food and agriculture, in order not to harm the Russian civilians (European Council 2024a).

Taking note of those developments, the Foreign Affairs Council needs to discuss the ways through which the adverse effects of the war-induced energy crisis can be mitigated through energy partnerships while complementing the EU sanctions imposed on Russia.

IV. Global Gateway Initiative (GGI)

a. Brief Overview of the GGI

The **Global Gateway Initiative** (GGI) is a comprehensive yet broad framework which aims to strengthen the place of the EU in the world and international politics by setting out a new strategy to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world (European Commission 2023b).

The GGI framework also contains an ambitious investment scheme. According to the European Commission (2023b), EU member states, the **European Investment Bank** (EIB) and the **European Bank for Reconstruction and Development** (EBRD) aim to mobilize up to 300 billion Euros of investments for sustainable and high-quality projects between 2021 and 2027; these investments will consider the needs of partner countries and ensure lasting benefits for local communities. This commitment reflects the soul of GGI, which essentially aims to prompt improvements in targeted areas via partnerships conducted on an egalitarian basis. Such an investment scheme has been devised in order to allow the EU's partners to develop their societies and economies while also creating opportunities for the EU based businesses to make investments and remain competitive; the investment scheme is also intended to safeguard high environmental and labour standards (European Commission 2023b).

The initial milestone of the Global Gateway was the **Africa-Europe Investment Package** that comprised approximately 150 billion Euros of investment dedicated to fostering cooperation with African partners (European Commission 2023b). The European Commission (2023b) has since started implementing policies and establishing partnerships within the framework of GGI in **Asia and the Pacific**, and in **Latin America and the Caribbean**; President of the European Commission **Ursula von der Leyen** has announced that the EU and its members states will invest over 45 billion Euros in Latin America and the Caribbean. The European Commission (2023b) reported that 90 key projects were launched worldwide across the digital, energy and transport sectors through the Global Gateway Initiative in 2023 to strengthen health, education, and research systems globally.

According to the European Commission (2023b), the GGI projects and functions are in accordance with the following 6 principles:

- *Democratic Values and High Standards*. The soul of the GGI is based on equal partnerships and mutual gain. Due to this reason, upholding democratic values and high ethical standards is a must to fully comprehend the needs of the public and the partner states.

- *Good Governance and Transparency*. Since all partnerships within the GGI are mutually beneficial, the administration of the projects with transparency and good is a must for creating an honest and beneficial partnership environment.
- *Equal Partnerships*. GGI aims to foster growth while reducing growth inequality in the world. Therefore, the partnerships are built on an egalitarian basis that would promote reciprocal trust between the parties involved and ensure reciprocal gains are made through partnerships.
- *Green and Clean*. The spirit of the partnerships should comply with the global green trends (explained earlier) and an emphasis should be put on environmental matters during the planning and implementation of GGI projects.
- *Security Focused.* All projects within the GGI require remarkable financial investment and the hard work of many diplomats; the security of both is crucial. This is why, while conducting these projects, securing the money and people is a must in order to safely and successfully realise the potential of the GGI.
- *Catalyzing Private Sector Investment.* Such a large international partnership framework cannot exist without significant funding, which the states alone cannot provide. Therefore, promoting private sector involvement and investment is a key to accomplishing the goals of GGI, especially with respect to the financial and technical resources possessed by the private sector.

b. Main Areas of Partnerships within the GGI

i. Climate and Energy

Being the most important of its kind for the purposes of the committee's agenda item, this area of partnership involves creating better connections with partners in order to promote the regional and global scale handling of energy safety, energy logistics, and related environmental questions. Since this area will be examined further in the following sections, it would be appropriate to only name a couple of examples under this section.

One great example pertaining to energy trade is the **ELMED Interconnector Electricity Transmission Project**. As the European Commission (n.d.b) explains it, this project aims for the construction of an **interconnection**[6] between **Italy** and **Tunisia** with an undersea high-voltage electricity cable. The European Commission (n.d.b) believes that this project will increase the security and the sustainability of electricity supply of both states, allow for better renewable energy integration, and facilitate the elimination of gas-fired heat generation; all those improvements would contribute to the achievement EU climate mitigation objectives and climate change targets.

Another significant example within this area of partnership, pertaining to environmental goals, is the **Amazonia+ Project**. According to the European Commission (n.d.c), Amazonia+ is a Global Gateway flagship program that is intended to improve the capacity of the countries in the Amazon Basin to preserve and increase forestation; forestation efforts would then mitigate CO_2 emissions and increase the Amazon Basin's resiliency to the effects of climate change. With a total funding of 35 million Euros, Amazonia+ project furthermore includes measures for monitoring the Amazonian Basin in order to quickly identify and tackle problems that may occur along the way (European Commission n.d.c).

ii. Digital Sector

[6] Interconnection refers to the integration of electrical infrastructure of states.

Though not of primary significance for the purposes of the committee's agenda item, partnerships in the digital sector are still important for energy safety. As mentioned before, technological developments pertaining to energy production and consumption methods can improve energy security and the efficient use of energy resources.

According to the European Commission (2023c), digital transformation is an important component of sustainable development and carries a great potential to improve social and economic benefits across many sectors. However, the European Commission (2023c) believes that the current rates of digitalization are unequally distributed across the globe; more than 3 billion people worldwide still do not have any digital connections. The European Commission (2023c) also notes that digital transformation, in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals, can foster better education, reduce inequalities, boost economic growth, research and innovation, and support the creation of governance systems guided by the rule of law and democratic values.

In order to better understand the aims and tenets governing cooperation in this area, it would be appropriate to proceed with an example. The **BELLA (Building the European Link to Latin America) Project** is one of the most suitable examples. The European Commission (n.d.e) presents BELLA as a program that brings unprecedented opportunities for scientific, cultural and business exchange and has the potential to facilitate the sharing of high-performance computing and Earth observation data (which is quite critical for conducting environmental impact analysis) between Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. The European Commission (n.d.e) states that the primary goal of the BELLA Project is to reduce the digital divide[7] within Latin America and enhance cooperation on research and innovation projects between the EU and Latin America. The

[7] That is, the unequal distribution of digitalisation.

BELLA program had a total budget of EUR 54.7 million, with the EU providing EUR 26.5 million of it (European Commission n.d.e).

(Cable landing operation, European Commission, n.d.e.)

BELLA has a few components that facilitates the implementation of future EU energy policies. First, increased diplomatic activity in a collaborative sense fosters bilateral and multilateral trust between participating parties, which in turn builds trust and know-how for future projects (European Commission n.d.e). Second, the BELLA program has notable contributions to the promotion of knowledge and data sharing, a development which helps significantly with new technological discoveries and the observation of crucial phenomena that may have implications for environmental and energy policies (European Commission n.d.e).

iii. Transport

Transportation and logistics play a key role in shaping the economic landscape with which the concepts of energy policies and energy safety interact. Therefore, partnerships regarding trade routes, communication infrastructure and other key logistic partnerships have vital implications for energy safety and energy policies.

Perhaps one of the most notable elements covered under this area of partnership is the **2030 Ambition**. The European Commission (2023d) states that they intend to integrate the African and European transport networks in line with the regional and continental framework by 2030 and structure those networks in a manner tailored to realize economic potential of an African trade.



(European Commission n.d.g)

The figure above is planning map about the **EU-Africa Strategic Corridor**. The European Commission (n.d.g) has identified eleven strategic corridors aligned with the **Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA PAP 2)**, the enhancement of which would boost and make greener the connections between Africa and the EU. The European Commission (n.d.g) believes that these corridors will facilitate trade and mobility within Africa as well as between Africa and Europe. As will be further explained in the following chapter of the document, Africa is a crucial energy partner of the EU with a great potential for development. Therefore, the enhancement of transportation within Africa and between Africa and the EU proves important for solidifying African states as EU's reliable energy partners.

Another notable example with respect to cooperation in the transportation area is the **Caribbean Maritime Intra-Regional Transport**. The European Commission (n.d.h) explains how the **Caribbean Community (CARICOM)** and the **Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)**, in the leadership and funding of the **European Investment Bank (EIB)** have authorized the **Caribbean Development Bank** to examine the challenges to intra-regional regional transport and points out that the momentum of development in the Caribbean is strong and of high potential due to these developments. Even though this project is still in the works, the European Commission (n.d.h) states that the options include establishing a multi-modal ferry connecting Guyana and Suriname to Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the OECS, and the French overseas territories. The construction of these networks would significantly help boost cargo transit capacity for manufacturers and traders, as a crucial move for increasing energy trade.

iv. Education and Research

Qualified education can bring about the discovery of new technology and methods that can be beneficial for future growth. Therefore, partnerships on education and research can assist the realization of the international energy policy of the EU in the long run.

An exemplary partnership on education and research within the GGI has been the **Investing in Young Businesses in Africa (IYBA) Project**. According to the European Commission (n.d.i), this initiative has three objectives which are as follows:

- Supporting very early-stage businesses and entrepreneurs needing the earliest rounds of financing.
- Supporting early-stage businesses and entrepreneurs needing early rounds of financing.
- Supporting the entrepreneurship ecosystem to foster further activity in the African economy.

This initiative can create major new markets for the businesses based in the EU, and the research conducted by these new startups in Africa can yield very beneficial results for all the partners.

v. Healthcare

Healthcare partnerships within GGI are perhaps the ones that carry the least importance with respect to energy safety and energy politics. However, the projects within this partnership are still relevant to the philosophy and mission of the GGI. For example, the European Commission (2023e) states that the GGI will prioritize the security of pharmaceutical supply chains and the development of local manufacturing; the GGI is also expected to facilitate investments that would directly or indirectly contribute to the local production of medicine and medical technologies, thereby promoting welfare in the partner states' territories. It should be at least noted that energy partnerships may account for such types of investments that indirectly make contributions to the development of medicines and medical technologies.

V. Energy and Climate Partnerships by Regions Covered Under the Global Gateway Initiative

a. Sub-Saharan Africa

i. Green Energy

The European Commission (n.d.k) describes the **Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative** as a project that aims to encourage European and African public and private sector actors to increase electricity production with environment friendly production methods, facilitate access to energy, promote energy efficiency, support the establishment of an adequate environment for private investment, and foster market integration.

Some remarkable accomplishments within this initiative include the completion of the feasibility studies on the **GREGY Project** (an electricity interconnection scheme linking **Egypt** to **Greece**), inauguration of solar plants in the **Ivory Coast**, and agreement to support rural electrification in **Madagascar**, the proposal for building a hydrogen power plant in **Morocco**, and the initiation of the construction of a National Control Centre for Energy Infrastructure in **Mozambique** (European Commission, n.d.k).

The partnership for building a hydrogen power plant in Morocco deserves special attention. As the European Commission (n.d.k) openly states that the Morocco has a promising future in the field of hydro-energy production. The construction project is headed by Germany has raised a total funding of 110 million Euros. It is also remarkable due to the successful integration of public and private sector partnerships (European Commission, n.d.k).

Another exemplary project is the joint investment scheme that involves the EU and **Cabo Verde**. In a press release, the European Commission (2023f) announced that the Prime Minister of Cabo Verde and Ursula von der Leyen negotiated a 246 million Euro package under the GGI framework to fund green energy, digital connectivity, and transportation projects in Cabo Verde. In the same press release, Ms. von der Leyen stated that the EU shares the vision of Cabo Verde with respect to green energy and digital connectivity and reminded that the Global Gateway aims to foster prosperity for all partners.

ii. Critical Raw Materials (CRM)

Before moving on with the examination of partnerships within this initiative, it is crucial to comprehend the meaning and importance of **critical raw materials (CRMs)**. According to the CRM Alliance (n.d.) of the EU, CRMs are raw materials which are economically and strategically important for the European economy but the supply of which could not be easily secured. CRMs are used in the development and production of environmental technology, consumer electronics, health, steelmaking, defence, space exploration, and aviation sectors (CRM Alliance n.d.). CRMs are not considered "critical" due to scarcity, but due the lack of viable substitutes' availability, the risk of losing their supply, and their importance for the European economy (CRM Alliance n.d.). The European Commission (n.d.l) gives heavy rare earth elements (notable for being 100% supplied by **China**) and boron (notable for being %99 supplied by **Türkiye**) as examples of CRMs.

One remarkable partnership regarding CRMs is the investment partnership between **Rwanda** and the **European Investment Bank (EIB)**. The European Investment Bank (2023) states that this partnership will strengthen technical and financial cooperation to identify critical raw materials and accelerate private sector investment, support economic development, and ensure environmentally responsible development of critical raw material processing. The knowledge that could be obtained from this project has the potential to entail new CRM discoveries and business opportunities to process those materials. Bearing in mind that some CRMs are important for battery production, renewable energy technology research and energy production (European Commission 2020), the CRM partnerships within GGI are of the utmost importance.

b. Middle East, Asia and the Pacific

i. Green Energy

Being another geographical focus of the GGI, **Middle East, Asia and the Pacific** region is the subject of many partnership initiatives.

An exceptional initiative in this regard is the EU-**ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations)** partnership. Even though this partnership mainly focuses on interconnectivity, it has several implications on the transformation towards renewable energy and the submarine cable interconnectivity, which is greatly related to the conditions of the electric grids of both parties (Directorate-General for International Partnerships 2024).

ii. Critical Raw Materials (CRM)

While discussing CRM partnerships within the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, it would be most appropriate to start with analysing EU-**Kazakhstan** relations. Kazakhstan is one of the states with which the EU has a remarkably high number of partnerships. In 2022, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Kazakhstan and the EU; the memorandum outlined the prospects of future cooperation regarding the research, quality recognition, transportation, and trade of CRMs (European Commission, n.d.m).

The European Commission (n.d.m) states that this memorandum can significantly benefit the EU in vital sectors such as raw materials, batteries, and renewable hydrogen sectors. The European Commission (n.d.m) also stresses the importance of renewable hydrogen due to the significant role it will play in the energy and environment policies of the EU.

c. Latin America and the Caribbean

i. Green Energy

The flagship project regarding the promotion of green energy practices in the **Latin America and the Caribbean** region is the **Euroclima Project**. As the European Commission (2023d) reports, the Euroclima Project will contribute to the implementation of the **Global Gateway Investment Agenda** in the region. The European Commission (2023d) report also remarks that the 35 million Euro project lays the groundwork for future environmental remediation and fosters the transfer toward renewable energy.

The former European Commission Executive Vice President for the European Green Deal **Frans Timmermans** has said that tackling the climate crisis starts and ends with emissions reductions; yet the EU also needs to make finance flow towards low-emission investments and environmental sustainability in order to support the climate transition across the world (European Commission 2023d). The remarks of Mr. Timmermans show the commitment of the EU and the GGI initiative to environmental goals and the transition of all partners toward sustainable energy.

ii. Critical Raw Materials

The critical raw materials schemes within Latin America and the Caribbean region have one project that stands out since the project in question attempts to utilize **green hydrogen** (a CRM) to accelerate the region's transition to sustainable energy practices. The European Commission (2023d) states that moving toward the net-zero goal and digital economy is a shared objective of the EU and the states located in the Latin America and the Caribbean region; securing the sustainable supply of CRMs has been also noted as another shared challenge. The European Commission (2023d) further states that the shared interest on CRMs is the reason why the EU proposes to establish a **Critical Raw Materials Club** that would bring together consuming countries and resource-rich countries.

The European Commission (2023d) explains the aim of the Critical Raw Materials Club as creating win-win partnerships through putting together the basis for increased & sustainable investment and consequently enabling a secure supply of critical raw materials required for the green and digital transition.

The European Commission report explaining the CRM initiative in the region is important for two reasons. First, it forges a direct connection between the need to secure CRMs and entrenching green energy practices across the world. Second, it proposes the closely coordinated cooperation of CRM-rich states in an attempt to secure the supply of CRMs.

VI. Critical Trade Routes and Logistics for Energy and Significant Actors of the Regions

This section will include general remarks about the significant routes of international energy trade and the logistical conditions of those routes. Still, the members of the Foreign Affairs Council are strongly advised to individually study these routes on maps as well to get a more comprehensive view.

a. Atlantic Ocean

The importance of the Atlantic Ocean is that the Atlantic Ocean is a must pass route for trade with the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean region of the GGI. Even though the path of voyage does not have any neighbouring states, the trade passing through the area has much less factors that can disrupt the flow of trade.

b. Straits and Canals

i. Hormuz Strait

Located between the **United Arab Emirates** and **Iran,** the **Hormuz Strait** is a strategically important waterway. It is a strait through which a significantly large volume of global petroleum trade needs to pass through since it is the only connection of oil-rich Gulf countries to the ocean.

ii. Suez Canal

The Suez Canal is a human-made maritime passage within the borders of **Egypt,** and it connects the **Mediterranean Sea** to the **Indian Ocean**. Considering the high density of GGI initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, the Suez Canal emerges as a critical node through which maritime connections to those regions could be forged. Consequently, it can be commented that the EU's cooperation with **Egypt** is necessary to benefit fully from the prospects of improvement the Suez Canal could bring.

iii. Gibraltar Strait

The **Gibraltar Strait** is a waterway that carries importance for ensuring the safety of energy trade with the Latin America and the Caribbean region. It should be noted that since **Spain**, an EU member state, borders the Gibraltar Strait, the EU could be much more assured of the security and availability of this waterway.

iv. Turkish Straits (The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles)

The importance of the Turkish Straits mostly arises from the prospects of trade with **Russia** and other petroleum rich states such as **Belarus**. Even though it still caries significance, the Turkish Straits' importance for the EU has decreased since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, considering the fact that Türkiye is a long-time partner of the EU and the fact that Türkiye supplies %99 of EU's boron (European Commission n.d.l), the importance of the Turkish Straits should not be overlooked.

c. Nord Stream 1-2

(European Commission n.d.n)

The **Nord Stream 1-2 Pipelines** are natural gas pipelines that connect Russia to the EU over the Baltic Sea. Considering the current state of EU-Russia relations, these pipelines have lost their importance significantly. Moreover, both pipelines are currently out of operation due to an explosion that damaged them in September 2022 (AlJazeera 2024). However, in case of a future remediation of EU-Russia relationships, the Nord Stream Pipelines should be kept in consideration while constructing a future energy policy framework.

d. Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)



(Foreign Policy News n.d)

The Trans-Adriatic pipeline connects Eastern Greece to Eastern Italy and is used for petroleum-natural gas trade. As mentioned before, the Russo-Ukrainian War created major problems in energy security for the EU. Therefore, having access to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline will provide energy flow from Türkiye, a country that is in proximity to important centres of energy production, and other states connected to the pipeline. This will be beneficial for EU's future energy safety.

VII. Conclusion

The **Foreign Affairs Council**'s duties include making detailed decisions about the methods for implementing the EU's foreign policy and giving policy recommendations about foreign policy to the European Commission when necessary. With the analysis of energy politics dynamics in and around Europe, the case study of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and details pertaining to the specific areas of cooperation in mind, the ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council are expected take decisions about the future of the EU's international energy policies and energy partnerships. They should come up with sustainable, efficient, environment-oriented, fiscally viable, politically low-risk decisions and recommendations that should also regard the general well-being of European citizens.

An appropriate substantive document produced by the Foreign Affairs Council should outline short-term and long-term perceptions about the EU's international energy policy and energy partnerships. Those documents should regard the EU's environmental agenda set out by the EU Green Deal while still recognising the notable need for the use of petroleum products across many sectors in contemporary times. The document also has to be in line with the EU's foreign policy and its approach to international partnerships, which has its implications for the GGI and the foreign policy of EU member states.

As such, ministers are required to be mindful not only of the EU's foreign policy but also of the global energy market trends, the current situation of diplomatic relations with partners, and the conditions associated with the proposed partnership schemes between the EU and partners; the latter includes the degree of political stability in the region, financial and environmental viability of the proposals, and the logistics of the schemes. Through its authority to make decisions about the EU's international energy strategies, the Foreign Affairs Council bears the unique opportunity to defend the EU's global interests while contributing to the well-being of partners.

VIII. Questions to be Answered for Agenda Item A

1. What should constitute the foundations of the international energy policy of the EU, and the EU's energy trade and partnership schemes with extra-EU states?

2. How can the current and future energy security of the EU be ensured through energy cooperation with partners?

3. What are the economic, political, environmental and social welfare challenges of the EU with respect to energy safety and international energy politics?

4. What should be the place of the Paris Agreement framework and the SDGs in the EU's international energy strategies?

5. How can the disruptive effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War on the EU's energy safety and energy policies be mitigated?

6. How can the EU tackle the problem of Russian energy exports eventually finding their way into the EU?

7. What should be the Global Gateway Initiative (GGI)'s place in the EU's international energy strategy and energy partnerships?

8. How can the energy and environment initiatives set out by the GGI be upheld?

9. How can the undisrupted supply of CRMs to the European Union be secured?

10. Does the current logistic capabilities meet the EU's energy safety needs? If not, how can it be improved?

IX. Further Readings

- *Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability*. This document has been published by the European Commission and includes a list of Critical Raw Materials. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474.

4. AGENDA ITEM B: EU ASSISTANCE TO POST-WAR REBUILDING EFFORTS IN UKRAINE

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The path towards independence was a rocky road for Ukraine as the concept itself was numerous times questioned throughout history and is still being questioned. To adequately observe the challenges laid out for modern Ukraine, it is necessary to start from the end of the Soviet era with Gorbachev's reforms.

The dissolution of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) throughout in 1991 brought about many newly independent states, most of whom headed for the path of democracy albeit with varying rates of success. Ukraine is one such state that gained its independence after much struggle against, perhaps surprisingly, both its former imperial overlord and the West. To understand the reason, one needs to observe the 1980s and reflect on the quickly souring relations between the Ukrainian SSR and Moscow.

By the end of Secretary-General Brezhnev's rule in 1982, Ukraine had earned a strong voice in the ruling of the Soviet Union through its cliques and thanks to the ethnic roots of Brezhnev. His successors, though, had no connections to the region and saw the extensive influence of the Ukrainian cliques as a threat to their power. Finally, in the Gorbachev era, many of these officers would be replaced by ethnic Russians, leaving the Ukrainian SSR alienated against the Union; the alienation meant that the relations had now taken a sour turn at what would prove to be a critical time for the USSR. Gorbachev was determined to get rid this infestation of Ukrainian officials in important positions and he replaced most of these officers with ethnic Russians after assuming power. The frustration against Moscow was reinforced with the effects of the **perestroika** and

glasnost reforms. In the eyes of the public and officials of the Ukrainian SSR (who were mostly hardliner communists), these reforms undermined the foundations of the USSR. Meanwhile, the liberal Ukrainian intelligentsia believed that the reforms were not radical enough. This allowed for a common enemy to rise for both sides as they began uniting, although temporarily, against Moscow (Plokhy 2015 313-325).

The last straw that would permanently embed the idea of "sovereignty" into the Ukrainians' minds were the events in Chornobyl in 1986 since it helped Ukrainians realised how little of the actions taking place in their land was under their control. This tension continued to grow until March 1990, when Lithuania and later the rest of the Baltic states declared their independence from the USSR and were supported by the West; Ukraine followed suit. Still, it was only a declaration of "sovereignty" that was approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in the Summer of 1990; "independence" was left as a question for later. Many had become used to the Stalinist ideal of building global communism under one state and the Soviet Union was seen as the only country capable of realising that ideal. This limbo would continue for a year until the question was answered in a single day. A coup attempt by hardline communists trying to bring Gorbachev down and reinstate Stalinist ideals was all it took to destroy the idea of the continuation of the (reformed). Independence was now seen inevitable, and the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet unilaterally declared independence on 24 August 1991 (Plokhy 2015 321-331).

During the first years of its independence, there were many complications for Ukraine since the nation faced many crises on several different fronts. The first of those was the need to construct an army solely loyal to Ukraine while the armies standing in Ukraine were still that of the Soviet Union; however, the remaining Soviet forces had nowhere to go, and the Soviet navy had to be divided between Russia and Ukraine. The port of Sevastopol remained an issue until 1997 since

Russia refused to relinquish its ownership. The authority arrangements between the parliament and president had to be sorted out and the first president, Leonid Kravchuk, had to accept holding early elections in 1994. Economic decline accelerated and reached a stage that was significantly worse-off compared to the Gorbachev era; the total collapse of the economy seemed imminent. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the **Commonwealth of Independent States**, an international organisation that consisted ex-Soviet countries and was de facto led by the Russian Federation, resembled a reincarnation of the Russian Empire since the organisation's aim was to "preserve the political, legal and economic landscape built over centuries" (Plokhy 2015 334-341).

The economic collapse of the 1990s would become a serious factor in increasing the already rampant corruption within the country. It enabled the rise of the oligarchs, who used the situation to seize land from landowners and industry-owners. The oligarchs not only enriched themselves but had also landed themselves into administrative positions through proxies, bribes, and family connections. Though the nation's economy became far more stable towards the new millennium (partly thanks to the oligarchs), the oligarchs and President Kuchma maintained a great number of corruption schemes that plagued Ukraine to an extent that it is still possible to observe their effects today (Plokhy 2015 328-336).

The only problem that would never be solved among these was the position of Ukraine against the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as Yeltsin's (and later his successor Putin's) political ambitions were dissimilar to those of the Ukrainians. Yeltsin, in line with ambitions to be the leader of the entity that would replace the gap left by the collapse of the USSR, insisted that it would be the best for Ukraine to be a member of the CIS. However, the Russians refrained from engaging in military cooperation with Ukraine within the CIS framework and limited their engagement with the Ukrainians to matters pertaining to economic cooperation. Ukraine thus changed its approach and sought integration with the West and an eventual accession into the EU. However, there remained many critical issues to be addressed by the Ukrainian authorities, including those problems mentioned above (Plokhy 2015 337-342).

2004 was an important year for Ukraine as it marked the end of President Leonid Kuchma's tenure as he decided not to run for a third term. The scene was now left to two new contenders for the position, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Viktor Yushchenko was a Western-aligned representative that aimed to eradicate the rampant corruption within the country and begin a transformation that would end in the accession to the EU. Yanukovych, Putin's favoured candidate, did not share the same goals as he had connections with the oligarchs and supported the idea of maintaining better relations with Russia and remaining an associate member of the CIS; still, Yanukovych was careful to prioritise Ukraine's independence. The election was a close one as independent polls showed Yushchenko as the winner; however, Yanukovych was declared as the official winner by the state. Many were discontented by the fact that corruption had become prevalent enough even to alter election results; so, hundreds of thousands of civilians took to the streets. In a successful standoff against the government, today known as the **Orange Revolution**, they were able to get their wishes for re-election accepted, the results of which pointed to Yushchenko as the victor. The people were hopeful that this result would usher in an era of meaningful progress and alignment with the West (Plokhy 2015 339-346).

"Disappointing" would be the word that summarises Viktor Yushchenko's time in office. While the nation's economy had steadily grown and surpassed the GDP of 1990, little effort was made to deal with the crippling levels of corruption. The conflicting political ideology of the president and the prime minister, who was elected by the parliament, made it impossible for either side to implement reforms efficiently. Therefore, Yanukovych's victory in 2010 elections did not come as a surprise. Yanukovych's time in office was characterised by the reversal of the liberal reforms enacted under the Yushchenko administration and the smuggling of money into personal accounts. Yanukovych finally become the target of public outrage in 2013 once he refused to sign the associate membership agreement with the EU which had been in negotiation since 2008. What started with the protest of a couple of students became a gathering of more than half a million people, which triggered an even more panicked response by the state; the protests (known as **Euromaidan**) eventually turned violent and led to the death of close to one hundred people. Yanukovych was forced to flee the country on 21 February 2014 in what was later named the **Revolution of Dignity** (Plokhy 2015 339-351).

a. The Crimean Peninsula

The Crimean Peninsula, holding both geological and political importance, was first granted as a gift to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 by Nikita Kruschev. Since it housed many ethnic Russians, especially compared to other provinces of Ukraine, the region's recapture became one of Putin's aims as he alluded to his predecessor's ideals of Russia becoming the leader of the entity to replace the USSR (Plokhy 2015 346).

Within the peninsula, the most important hub was the port of Sevastopol. Russia had solemnly "convinced" Ukraine to lease the port to itself by simply refusing to leave it after the dissolution of the USSR; a 25-year lease agreement was made in 1997, and the agreement was extended by President Yanukovych in 2010 with the Kharkiv Pact. Being the only port in the Black Sea capable of housing the might of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the only choice for Russia was to find a way to retain the port indefinitely. In early 2014, Yanukovych had just been ousted from his position and there was a high likelihood of the Ukrainian parliament nullifying the extension of the lease of the port of Sevastopol; the perfect opportunity had simply presented itself for Putin to realise his ambitions of asserting the dominance of Russia (Plokhy 2015 348-349).

Even though it is still a matter of debate if Russia deliberately provoked the **Revolution of Dignity**, there is no doubt that Russia unilaterally benefited from the revolution. In the aftermath of the revolution, the new Ukrainian government was recovering from the authoritarian regime of Yanukovych as the army and police were mostly loyal to him rather than to the nation. So, an invasion of Crimea by the Russian Federation four days after revolution was met with minimal opposition (Plokhy 2015 349-352).

Crimea was important for two reasons. The first reason was related to the capacity of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Under the lease agreement of Sevastopol, the navy could not be upgraded in the port and had become outdated and outclassed. This was not a favourable situation since Russia continued to use its navy for asserting dominance in the Black Sea Region. The navy was used in 2008 to destabilise Georgia and to prevent the speculated accession of Georgia to NATO. The reason was the fact that Crimea's geopolitical location was quite suitable to exercise full control over the Sea of Azov (an inner sea bordered by both Russia and Ukraine) and to put military pressure over Ukraine (Lewis 2019).

Putin justified the takeover by stating that the majority of the peninsula's inhabitants were ethnic Russians who needed protection from the instability in Ukraine. A swift referendum followed the occupation and resulted overwhelmingly in favour of defecting to Russia. European leaders limited their responses to denouncing the act and not recognising the referendum results. In the end, Crimea became Russian once again (Plokhy 2015 352-353).

b. The War in Donbas

Ever since Ukraine gained its independence, the relationship between its East and its West has been strenuous at best. The East was a heavily industrialised region but experienced major regression with the economic crisis that left its mark on the 1990s and early 2000s. There arose a number of small separatist movements but nothing major followed until the Orange Revolution of 2004. By this point, the region's people hoped that the Party of Regions (Yanukovych's party) would guide them through the rough times. When the re-elections were held and Yushchenko emerged victorious, the people of the East felt cheated as a majority of Yanukovych's votes came from the East. This emotion was reflected in the actions of the politicians of the Party of Regions, who convened in the Severodonetsk Conference; they made several demands to the central government (such as the federalisation of the nation and the designation of Russian as an official language in Eastern and Southern provinces) and requested aid from Russia to help enforce these demands or to invade the region if the demands were not met. The crisis only ended when Yanukovych himself demanded the end of separatism within his party and accepted the results of the election (Marples 2022, 8-15).

The divide between the West and the East became even more apparent during the **Revolution of Dignity**. It was now the second time the West had undermined the wishes of the East. An air of delusion quickly covered the region as countless false rumours spread through the streets, the internet, local pro-Russian groups, and local and Russian news stations. Claims of the incoming shortages, constant abductions, drugged acquaintances, right-wing oppression, beatings of the Russian populace by the military, the government blocking positive change in the region were all parts those false rumours (Marples 2022, 15-26).



(Fisher 2014)

The figure above can help us understand how such hysteria penetrated people's minds and entailed a deep division between the East and the West. In some regions of the West, the Euromaidan protests led to the violent takeover of administrative buildings; such incidents were mostly organised by right-wing groups who found the mass protests as an opportunity to escalate conflict against the government and even seize power. The footage of these occurrences was well recorded and reached the people of the East and Crimea; it would eventually lead the population of these regions showing an acceptance when Russia undertook the same activities. When Yanukovych finally fled the country, there was a genuine fear in the East that the new leaders of Ukraine were fascists who wanted to oppress the ethnic Russians in the region. Even though these concerns turned out to be baseless, and armed insurgency nevertheless emerged in the region (Marples 2022, 24-28).

Conflict erupted on 12 May 2014, when pro-Russian separatists declared independence from Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk, claiming that a referendum conducted a day prior yielded overwhelming results in favour of secession. Events progressed rapidly as Russia decided to directly (yet unofficially) intervene by sending troops to assist and train the insurgents; the rebels were thus initially able to make considerable gains. It wasn't until the beginning of 2015 that a somewhat lasting ceasefire (the **Second Minsk Agreement**) was established. Unsurprisingly, the agreement helped the rebels consolidate their rule and failed a short time thereafter since the rebels used it to disguise their surprise offensive. The conflict later turned into a frozen conflict wherein neither side was able to make territorial gains (Galeotti and Hook 2019, 14-16).

Winter 2015: pro-Russian rebels walk past a destroyed building in Vuhlehirsk, Ukraine.

(Portnov 2016)

This document’s main point of concern about the early stages of war is not the individual events that took place, but those events’ implications. The War in Donbas signalled that the Ukrainian Army was not capable enough to assert dominance over the insurgents. Moreover, that phenomenon more importantly indicated that the Ukrainian Army would not be able to stand against a much larger Russian army in case of direct military confrontation between the two. This observation is important because had the things continued this way, the 2022 invasion would have ended quickly in favour of Russia.

The tide began turning in 2016 as Ukrainian troops started receiving international aid in soldier training and were better equipped, resulting in the year being concluded without any territorial losses. The start of 2017 saw a short, nonetheless heavy, escalation in fighting as the city of Avdiivka became the primary target, only for the conflict to be halted once again by mid-February. The year would once again see numerous attempts at a ceasefire none of which would achieve lasting results with rising claims from both sides blaming each other for breaching the agreement (Miller 2017).

2018 was the first time the Ukrainian side would initiate an offensive as the parliament passed a bill to regain control of separatist-held territories in Donbas. During the intermission, Ukraine undertook actions that would help the nation further align with the West. The Ukrainian Parliament ratified an EU Association Agreement and started deliberating on the prospects of NATO accession. Russia also had ample time for preparation as they built the **Kerch Bridge**, a 19-kilometres-long bridge connecting Crimea to mainland Russia, allowing them to both consolidate control over the region and better apply pressure on Ukraine (Walker 2023). Furthermore, Russia continued tightening its control over the Sea of Azov by blockading the Ukrainian ports and preventing military and civilian ships from docking (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2018).

Seeing the Ukrainian aspirations to accede to NATO, the West tried to strike an agreement between Ukraine, the **Donetsk People's Republic (DPR)** and **Luhansk People's Republic (LPR)** following the **Steinmeier Formula** in late 2019. The formula aimed at pleasing the insurgents by granting them political autonomy and the authority to hold independent elections. The year 2020 saw sporadic fighting (cut by short-lasting ceasefires) continue. By the end of the year, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy had approved a new National Security Strategy which emphasised Ukraine's aspiration for NATO membership and being granted the **Enhanced Opportunity Partner** status by NATO (Walker 2023). Perhaps it was this sharp pivot towards the West that enraged Putin as a mass buildup of troops began in the Spring of 2021 on the Ukrainian border, causing a concern among the Europeans that a new war may soon emerge at their doorstep. The cost of diffusing this escalation would prove too heavy to accept for Zelenskyy since Putin's conditions for withdrawal were clear: he demanded a guarantee that Ukraine would indefinitely refrain from joining NATO and that NATO would cease operations in Eastern Europe. Diplomatic resolution efforts quickly broke down once NATO refused the demands, preparing the grounds for a full-scale war in Ukraine (Al Jazeera 2022).

II. CHRONOLOGY OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE

On 24 February 2022, Russian forces stormed across the border, launching assaults from Donbas to Kharkiv, Crimea to Zaporizhzhia, and Belarus to Kyiv. Contrary to the calculations made by the Russians that the war would end in a Russian victory in a few weeks, Ukraine proved to be quite resilient, and the fighting continued to drag on (CBS News 2022). Russia's initial advantage slowly turned into a halting advance of the front and Ukraine initiated a counterattack in summer. A mechanised counterattack was launched on Kharkiv and Kherson (which were relatively unmanned by the Russians and lacked supply), and it proved successful. Russian troops in the southern front withdrew behind the Dnipro River, vacating the city of Kherson, and had to almost abandon the entirety of the Kharkiv Oblast (Gettleman 2022). These two major successes exponentially increased the expectations of the international community (and the EU) from Ukraine.

2022 concluded without many developments in terms of territorial exchanges. Due to unfavourable weather conditions in the winter, Ukraine did not attempt any large-scale offensive and the Russian troops simply used their numerical advantage to begin a slow advance on the Eastern Front; the Russians captured a few towns (for example, Soledar) and began an assault on the city of Bakhmut that would last until the end of May and result in tens of thousands of casualties for both sides (Engelbrecht 2023).

As Summer 2023 arrived, hopes were high for a continuation of the earlier major counter-offensives. However, this time the Ukrainian soldiers were able to advance at most 20 kilometres into enemy lines and were not able to meet their greater objectives, particularly the full reversal of the Russians' winter. For the observant, this was an expected result as several defensive lines extending the entire front in the south were built by the Russians during winter and the lack of manpower was compensated by the conscription of half a million citizens into the army. Each passing day weakened the Ukrainian army, which needed another conscription decree to compensate for its lack of competent soldiers. However, years of economic and political internal strife had caused the youth to emigrate from the country, causing the army to be mostly made up of men in their late 30s to early 40s; the number of those soldiers continued to decrease as well due to the constant fighting (Zafra and McClure 2023).

Another problem was the need for more equipment and ammunition in the army. Ukraine's capability in this matter was far outmatched by Russia, prompting Ukraine to seek foreign assistance for a chance to withstand further offensives. Unfortunately, while many promises of artillery shells, tanks, and SAM (surface-to-air) rockets were promised, deliveries have either been late or incomplete. For example, the EU was not able to fulfil its promise to deliver one million 155 mm self-propelled artillery ammunitions by the end of 2023 and delivered only around half a million; the largest cause for that was the French demands for said ammunition to be solely produced within EU territory (Evans et al., 2024).

2024 looks grimmer than ever with Ukraine now running out of manpower and SAM rockets, allowing Russia to gain air superiority (even if only for limited amounts of time and only in certain fronts). The Russian offensive continues to gain momentum as the progression undone by the 2023 Ukrainian summer offensive has been compensated for. At this point, it may be appropriate to consider the very existence of Ukraine a question of the future whose answer will be given by the Russian Federation. While this prediction is a highly pessimistic one, it stands likely that Ukraine has lost the opportunity to reclaim its occupied territory. (Bailey et al., 2024).

a. The Cost of the War

The war has had economic impacts over the entire globe across several sectors (such as food, gasoline and *energy*, which will be considered in our other agenda item). For Ukraine, the situation has been far more severe since the Ukrainian economy shrank by 29.1% during the first year of the war; a shrinkage of such proportions would send any growing economy straight to collapse. However, thanks to international aid, such a collapse was avoided. Nonetheless, the **EU Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit** estimates that the pre-war GDP can only be reached around 2030 even if the war was to halt by the end of 2024. This economic shrinkage can be explained with many factors, such as the damages given to infrastructure, the loss of territories (and the economic activity that was pursued by the industries in those territories), and lastly the burdening of the budget by the aid given to both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and internationally displaced persons (Rakic 2024).



(Rakic 2024)

First, looking at the damage given to the infrastructure (in categories such as housing, general infrastructure, enterprise assets, energy, agriculture, education etc.) by the war, it can be seen that it is impossible for the Ukrainian government to overcome this damage on its own. By the start of 2024, the cost of infrastructural damages amounted to approximately $155 billion according to the estimations of the Kyiv School of Economics. The most affected category was housing as an estimated 250,000 buildings were destroyed or heavily damaged across Ukraine; this also means that many no longer have a home to return to (Kyiv School of Economics 2024).

Second, currently 18% of Ukraine (not including Crimea) is under Russian occupation; the occupied areas include the the industrial region of Donetsk and major cities like Luhansk, Melitopol and Mariupol. A total of 5 million Ukrainians live under occupation, and they are a target of assimilation, especially considering that Russian passports are being handed out to the residents of Eastern Ukraine. So in the case of a ceasefire and continued occupation, this population will remain trapped as Russian citizens and will be most likely forced to part ways with their home nation for good (Karolina Hird 2024).

Lastly, the war has caused many (especially those living close to the front lines) to flee their homes in search of a stable life elsewhere. The Norwegian Refugee Council estimates that around 40% of the Ukrainian population, approximately 14.3 million people, require humanitarian aid while around 6.3 million have fled the nation in search of a refuge. Most of those displaced by the war have been able to receive some kind of aid or have been able to find employment elsewhere; however, some still have no source of income and live on their savings (Lekkerkerker, Glabbeek and Rayburn 2024, 4-46).



(Lekkerkerker, Glabbeek and Rayburn 2024)

III. THE EU AND UKRAINE

Since the start of the war, the EU has taken a strict stance against the aggression and has stood with Ukraine. The EU has given direct monetary aid to Ukraine, imposed very strict sanctions against Russia, and worked to rally further international aid for Ukraine. It could be observed that the EU is motivated by a notion of solidarity through which the EU sees Ukraine as a prospective member whose hardships need to be addressed (European Union n.d.). In line with that notion, the EU and its member states have provided over €143 billion worth of economic, humanitarian and military support. Furthermore, several programs to support Ukraine in many areas were initiated, such as civilian security advisory missions, Eurojust, and the EU Solidarity. Three of those programs directly concern our agenda: **Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform**, **EU Solidarity Platform** and most importantly **Ukraine Facility** (Council of the European Union n.d.).

a. Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform

The Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform was founded on 26 January 2023; the platform comprises Ukraine, the EU, the G7 nations (namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), four temporary members (namely Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and Sweden) and six observer states (namely Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Spain). Membership status requires states to contribute at least 0.1% of their GDP or $1 billion, while observer status requires states to contribute 0.05% of their GDP or $300 million. Here, it should be reminded that GDP amounts to the totality of the economic activities taking place within a nation; it does not amount to a state's annual budget, which is smaller compared to the nation's GDP (European Commission 2024).

The platform aims to aid Ukraine's repair, recovery and reconstruction process by bringing states, international donors and international financial institutions together. With that goal in mind, organisations such as the **International Monetary Fund**, the **World Bank** and the **European Investment Bank** are a part of the Donor Coordination Platform. This way, it would be possible to ensure coordinated support for Ukraine to cover both short-term financial needs and long-term reconstruction costs (European Commission 2023).

For the year 2024, the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform has decided that its main goal would be to protect the macroeconomic stability of Ukraine. This would require covering a portion of the budget deficit which Serhiy Marchenko (the Minister of Finance of Ukraine) estimates to be around $39 billion. Ukraine has also been using the platform as an arena to display transparency on the progress on economic reforms. This has helped build trust between Ukraine, the EU, and other financial institutions, enabling the lending of further loans and grants to the Ukrainian government (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 2023).

b. EU Solidarity with Ukraine

Currently over 4.2 million Ukrainian refugees reside in and receive aid from the EU (most of whom having found shelter in Germany, Poland and Czechia). In addition to providing assistance to refugees, the EU has also taken it upon itself to provide humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons and has invested more than €20 billion to help 14.6 million Ukrainians. However, it is thought that there are still those in need that the Union has not been able to reach. In addition to this, investments in the betterment of civil protections are actively being made in the form of patient transfers from hospitals and generator supplies to relieve the effects of constant Russian targeting of the Ukrainian power grid (Council of the European Union 2024).

c. Ukraine Facility

The **Ukraine Facility** is an initiative that was first conceived in a proposal made by the European Commission; the proposal was adopted by the European Council on 1 February 2024 and the

Facility was subsequently established through an **EU regulation**[8] on 29 February 2024. The initiative concerns the 2024-2027 period and aims to ensure that 1) the most pressing repair and rebuilding costs are covered, and 2) stability is protected in Central and Western Ukraine, where armed conflict has not occurred. Facilitating Ukraine's economic recovery demands a coordinated action to uphold the ongoing economic activity and to repair and maintain essential infrastructure. Such efforts will eventually prepare the necessary conditions for economic recovery, leading to increased revenues for the state budget and reducing the dependency on international aid over time. Moreover, supporting Ukraine's reconstruction at this juncture entails preserving or generating employment opportunities for the Ukrainians (including those that were internally displaced) and incentivising the Ukrainian refugees to return. No one state or organisation is capable of single-handedly compensating for the damages caused by the war; this is where the Ukraine Facility acts as an encouragement tool for other international actors and a spending limit for the EU (European Commission 2023, 1-5).

Through the Ukraine Facility, the EU aims to provide up to €50 billion, €33 billion of which is made up of loans and the rest is made up of non-repayable grants; it should be noted that this budget is not definitive and still open to reform. The Ukraine Facility covers the rebuilding costs while other expenditures, such as military equipment procurements, are to be addressed through other means unrelated to the Ukraine Facility (European Commission 2023, 28-29).

Under Article 3(1) of the **Regulation on Establishing the Ukraine Facility**, the general objectives of the Facility are to support Ukraine with (European Commission 2023, 25-26):

[8] EU regulations are legally binding documents that function as the EU's laws.

1. tackling the social, economic, and environmental aftermath of the war, thus aiding in the nation's recovery, reconstruction, and modernization efforts;
2. promoting resilience in social, economic, and environmental aspects, thereby facilitating the gradual integration of Ukraine into the Union and global economy and markets;
3. gradually conforming to Union regulations, standards, policies, and practices (known as the *EU acquis*) in preparation for potential future Union membership, thereby contributing to mutual stability, security, peace, prosperity, and sustainability.

Specific objectives of the Facility delve further into the needs of Ukraine and the expectations of the EU. As stated in Article 3(2), the specific objectives of the Facility are to (European Commission 2023, 26-27):

1. help maintain the macro-financial stability of the country and ease Ukraine's external and internal financing constraints;
2. rebuild and modernise infrastructure damaged by the war, such as energy infrastructure, water systems, internal and cross-border transport networks including rail, roads and bridges and border crossing points, and foster modern, improved and resilient infrastructures; restore food production capacities; help address social challenges stemming from the war, including for specific groups such as war veterans, internally Displaced Persons, single parents, disabled people, minorities and other vulnerable persons; contribute to the demining effort;
3. foster the transition to a sustainable and inclusive economy and a stable investment environment; support the integration of Ukraine into the Single Market; repair,

rebuild and improve social infrastructure, such as housing, healthcare facilities, schools and higher education institutions, and research infrastructure; strengthen economic and social development, with particular attention to women and youth, including through quality education, training, reskilling and upskilling, and employment policies, including for researchers; support culture and cultural heritage; strengthen strategic economic sectors and support investment and private sector development, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and innovation, as well as on agriculture and rural development, aquaculture and fisheries; restructure Ukraine's financial markets, including banking sector and capital markets; increase domestic revenue mobilisation; strengthen Ukraine's ability to trade;

4. further strengthen the rule of law, democracy, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including through promoting an independent judiciary, reinforced security, the fight against fraud, corruption, organised crime and money laundering, tax evasion and tax fraud; ensure compliance with international law; strengthen freedom of media and academic freedom and an enabling environment for civil society; foster social dialogue; promote non-discrimination and tolerance, to ensure and strengthen respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities and the promotion of gender equality; reinforce the effectiveness of public administration and support transparency, structural reforms and good governance at all levels, including in the areas of public financial management and public procurement and state aid; support initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine;

5. develop and strengthen a sustainable green transition in all economic sectors, including the transition towards the decarbonisation of its economy; promote the digital transformation as an enabler for sustainable development and inclusive growth;
6. support decentralisation and local development.

The regulation is centred around three pillars which specify the scope and means of the Ukraine Facility. Pillar I seeks to provide gradual financial support to Ukraine to encourage them for undertaking economic reforms and to ensure the macroeconomic stability of the country. Pillar II is an investment framework designed to work towards making the nation a more appealing target for outside investment, helping lessen the future economic burden on Ukraine and the EU, and providing jobs to the people. Pillar III focuses on technical support for the implementation of reforms and the expansion of administrative capability to ease Ukraine's future accession to the EU (European Commission 2023, 25).

i. Pillar I: Ukraine Plan

As explained under Article 17 of the Regulation on Establishing the Ukraine Facility, Ukraine is expected to prepare a detailed proposal document within two months of the passing of the regulation[9]; this document needs to address the general and specific goals of the Ukraine Facility and needs to contain articles detailing (European Commission 2023, 34-36):

1. a proposed schedule of reforms and investments, outlining qualitative and quantitative measures expected to be implemented by December 31, 2027;

[9] That is, by 29 April 2024.

2. the framework for monitoring, reporting, and evaluating the Plan by the Ukrainian authorities, including proposed qualitative and quantitative measures, along with associated indicators;
3. how the Plan aligns with the recovery, reconstruction, and modernization requirements arising from the conflict in Ukraine's regions and municipalities, thereby promoting their economic, social, environmental, and territorial advancement while advancing decentralization reform across the country and alignment with Union standards; additionally, an explanation of the methodology and procedures employed for project selection and implementation, along with mechanisms for engaging sub-national authorities, especially municipalities, in decision-making regarding the utilization of support for local-level reconstruction efforts;
4. (regarding the development and, if applicable, execution of the Ukraine Plan) a synopsis of the consultation process conducted in compliance with the national legal framework, involving pertinent stakeholders such as local and regional authorities, social partners, and civil society organizations, highlighting how the contributions of these stakeholders are integrated into the Ukraine Plan;
5. a clarification of the anticipated contribution of the Plan's measures to climate and environmental goals.
6. a description of Ukraine's system for efficiently preventing, detecting, and rectifying irregularities, fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interest in the utilization of funds allocated through the Facility and, an overview of the measures in place to prevent double funding from the Facility and other Union programs or donors.

7. possible further relevant information.

As can be seen above, using the conditions laid out in article 16, the EU aims to allow Ukraine to develop solutions to its problems by lifting the monetary constraints and using the funds of the Facility much like a reward system. The Union wants Ukraine to address past administrative issues like fraud and corruption, pursue environmentalist goals, allow for the transparency and trackability of investments and reform progress, and modernise the nation through this reconstruction; it is clear that the EU does not desire Ukraine to simply rebuild what existed before the war.

Once submitted, the assessment of the Ukraine Plan shall be made by the European Commission to ensure that the plan follows the general goals explained in Article 3 and conduct and scope determinations made in Article 16. In accordance with Article 20, both Ukraine and the European Commission may make amendments both before and after the passing of the proposal in situations where the reality of the war makes it impossible to implement certain clauses within the Ukraine Plan (European Commission 2023, 36-38).

The rest of pillar I details financing requirements under Articles 21, 22, 23 and 25, allowing for the Union to withhold or further limit the investment into Ukraine depending on the conditions decided on the Ukraine Plan for the payment of the loans and grants. Lastly, article 26 talks about transparency requirements which stipulates that any person or entity receiving more than €500,000 must be documented in a biannually updated public database (European Commission 2023, 38-41).

ii. Pillar II: Ukraine Investment Framework

Article 27(1) defines the scope and the purpose of the **Ukraine Investment Framework** with the following words: "Under the Ukraine Investment Framework the Commission shall provide the Union support to Ukraine in the form of budgetary guarantee, financial instruments or blending operations." The Ukraine Investment Framework is expected to be activated after the implementation of the Ukraine Plan; its members comprise the representatives of the European Commission, EU member states, and Ukraine (European Commission 2023, 41).

With an initial budget of almost €9 billion, the budgetary guarantee given through this framework (named the **Ukraine Guarantee**) will be irrevocable and unconditional; it will cover risks for operations such as loans, capital market instruments, and insurances in order to protect Ukraine's macro-financial stability. Pillar II is also the part of the Facility which allows for third parties, countries, or EU member states to make further contributions to the budget of the Facility beyond the initial €50 billion (European Commission 2023, 42-43).

iii. Pillar III: Union accession assistance and support measures

The assistance provided to Ukraine under this chapter is intended to support the gradual alignment of Ukraine with the with *EU acquis*. The budget of the Ukraine Facility which has not been allocated to the first two pillars (approximately €3 billion) has been committed to this pillar. Under this pillar, investments will mostly be made to increase trust in civil order and to increase the efficiency of related institutions. This pillar will thus divert fundings to promote justice, reparations, the collection of evidence, the functioning of international justice (with respect to Ukraine), and to strengthen local authorities, civil society organisations and social partners (European Commission 2023, 46-47).

IV. POSITIONS OF MEMBER STATES

Since the start of the Russian aggression, nearly all EU member states have shown unconditional solidarity to Ukraine, even though Hungary's Prime Minister **Viktor Orban** purposefully delayed the passing of the Regulation by several months (Kakissis 2024). Those member states have housed millions of refugees, provided humanitarian aid, and have given financial and military support. Contributions, of course, have been to varying degrees.

a. Austria

Austria is a nation that declared its neutrality in 1955 and currently remains non-aligned as the country is not a part of NATO and refuses to give direct military support to Ukraine (The Presidential Office of Ukraine 2023); 76% of the Austrian population support the government's neutrality policy (Scharitzer and Sonnek 2022). However, this has not stopped the nation from providing humanitarian aid and supporting the EU sanctions against Russia; Austrie has signed in to the Ukraine Facility and has provided a total of €802 million in financial and humanitarian aid since the start of the war (Ukraine Support Tracker n.d.). Also, owing to its neutrality, Austria has kept trade active with Russia and is among the few EU members that are completely dependent on Russian natural gas for gas imports (Hoare 2024).

b. Belgium

Since the start of the war, Belgium has been supporting Ukraine on all fronts and has committed total of €2.2 billion, €1.7 billion of which has been committed under the Ukraine Facility framework. Belgium is also a part of the **F16 Coalition**, which engages in the training of pilots that will serve on the front lines (FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation 2024). Recently Belgium has expressed its support for a European Commission proposal to divert profits from frozen Russian assets, most of which are in Belgium's Euroclear, to purchase military equipment for Ukraine. This proposal allows for an additional annual amount of €4-4.5 billion to be invested in Ukraine (Kate and Payne 2024).

c. Bulgaria

Bulgaria has chosen to negotiate military-technical cooperation, involving the joint production of weapons and military equipment, rather than directly committing its assets to financial and humanitarian aid. Bulgaria also seeks to take an active role in the reconstruction of Ukraine in the future; under that scheme, it aims to actualise a project connecting the power grids of the two nations and a Vertical Gas Corridor project to supply liquefied natural gas. Currently, the total commitment of assets from Bulgaria has reached €245 million and is expected to sharply increase starting from mid-2024 (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 2024).

d. Croatia

Croatia has focused on providing humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, and its total commitments reach €276 million (https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/). Croatia's main assistance has been its assumption of the leadership of demining operations (in collaboration with the **United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]**); those operations concentrate in Kharkiv Oblast, which was responsible for 40% of Ukraine's pre-war gas production (United Nations Development Programme 2024).

e. Cyprus

Since Cyprus was home to many Russian companies before the start of the war, the nation has played a key role in the implementation and effectiveness of sanction packages; it has forced the said companies to relocate, thereby delaying their operations and reducing their profits. (Reuters

2024). Cyprus has also provided a total of €4 million in humanitarian aids to Ukraine (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024).

f. Czechia

Czechia has played a key role since the start of the war as it was the first EU and NATO member to provide tanks and armoured equipment to Ukraine (Lewis 2022). Throughout the war, Czechia has invested a total of €1.34 billion, most of which have been in the form of military commitments (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). In 2024, Czechia spearheaded the efforts to complete and compensate for the delay of the promised 1 million artillery ammunitions (which were to be normally delivered by the end of 2023). In this regard, finding a total of 800,000 shells, the nation turned to NATO member states in search of donors to cover the purchasing costs and received guarantees from the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, and Belgium. Looking towards the future, Czechia aims to increase its contributions and to convince other EU nations (especially France) to follow suit in order to prevent Ukraine from suffering further defeats in the war (Chastand and Pietralunga 2024).

g. Denmark

Standing as one of Europe's biggest contributors to Ukraine, Denmark has committed a total of €8.76 billion, most of which are in the form of military commitments (https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/). Denmark has also signed a security cooperation treaty with Ukraine, aiming to conjoin arms production industries, perform common military drills, and to arm Ukraine with a capable air force made up of F16s. In this document, Denmark has also stated their objectives to first convince Nordic countries and later the rest of EU member states to begin rearmament processes against the upcoming threat of a new round of

Russian offensives. For 2024, a minimum of €1.8 billion has been pledged by Denmark to further military assistance to Ukraine (Dysa 2024).

h. Estonia

Standing as one of the most vulnerable nations against Russian aggression, Estonia has been the most committed nation in terms of investment to GDP ratio; its commitments total at €1.21 billion (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). It is clear that Estonia sees Ukraine's defeat as a serious threat to the Union as a whole, and this is the reason why it has been lobbying to increase the commitments of the EU and NATO to Ukraine. Estonia has been searching for further equipment to supply Ukraine and plans to purchase an additional mount of one million artillery shells to supply to the front with the help of outside donors (Axe 2024). Kusti Salm (The Permanent Secretary of the Estonian Defence Ministry) has also remarked that "allocating €120 billion a year to military aid to Ukraine is a ballpark figure for what should be enough for Ukraine to win the war," demonstrating Estonia's commitment to supporting Ukraine (Pugnet 2024).

i. Finland

Having entered NATO in 2023, Finland has been looking to increase its military contribution to Ukraine. Having already provided €1.92 billion, Finland has recently signed a long-term security agreement with Ukraine to increase cooperation between militaries (Euronews 2024). Finland has also been very committed to humanitarian investments. Still, it has mostly been following the EU's decisions rather than giving direct financial aid to Ukraine, in a fashion similar to those of some other EU members (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024).

j. France

In line with the recent developments, it seems that France might play a pivotal role to play in the future of the war. From the start of the war until the end of February 2024, France has committed a total of €1.8 billion; in the same period, President Macron preferred to attempt to convince Putin and Zelensky to sit at the negotiating table for a ceasefire (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). This approach changed when Macron refused to rule out the possibility of the presence of French soldiers on Ukrainian soil; even though the plan was to deploy soldiers away from the front lines and mostly for training purposes, it still was a sharp shift in France's attitude. The reason behind this shift is unclear; nonetheless with further supplies from the US indefinitely delayed and with the recent Russian advances, Macron may have seen this as a possibility to make an advance to become the leading actor of the EU's Ukraine policy (Schofield 2024).

k. Germany

Germany is the single biggest supporter of Ukraine in Europe, having invested a total of €22 billion. Most of that amount has been reserved for military commitments while €3 billion was reserved for humanitarian commitments and €1.4 billion for financial commitments (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). However, Germany showed reluctance to further its support when the situation turned dire in 2024; the disagreements in approach strained the relationship between France and Germany. While it in no way intends to abandon Ukraine, and even plans for an investment of about €6 billion for April 2024, Germany currently refuses to supply the advanced technology which may help turn the tide of the war (Naughtie and Paternoster 2024). Nonetheless, Germany frequently underlines that it stands in solidarity with Ukraine (Reuters 2024).

l. Greece

Being one of the EU members that provide only military support, Greece has pledged €185 million since February 2022 (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). Greece has recently aided Ukraine in cultural restoration activities and has generally been supportive of the Ukrainian cause in the war (The Presidential Office of Ukraine 2024).

m. Hungary

The position of Hungary in this war is particularly unique and could be only matched by Slovakia's position. Since the start of the war, Hungary has only provided humanitarian aid totalling €54 million (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). Hungary's current position favours the immediate end of the war with a ceasefire, preventing further destruction; the Hungarian state believes that it will be suitable to provide financial aid for the reconstruction of Ukraine only after the end of the war. In this manner, Hungary withheld its support from the Ukraine Facility initiative and managed to postpone its approval until 1 February 2024 (when it abstained) since the approval of such initiatives require the unanimity of EU member states. Even though it did not directly veto the initiative in February 2024, Hungary continues to carry its particular outlook even after Russia's recent advances; some observers speculate that Hungary uses its dissident position to pressure the European Commission into unfreezing the EU funds that were allocated to Hungary but were withheld over Hungary's failure to meet the rule of law criteria required to obtain the funds. (Kakissis 2024).

n. Ireland

Ireland pursued a rather neutral stance throughout the war, only providing a total of €120 million in financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). Outside of its own contributions, Ireland has been following EU regulations regarding Ukraine's reconstruction and has provided humanitarian aid to both refugees and IDPs (Irish Digital Government 2022).

o. Italy

Having contributed a total of €1.3 billion until 2024, Italy had remained more reluctant to directly contribute to Ukraine's efforts compared to other EU members (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). Recently, however, cooperation between Italy and Ukraine saw an increase through the signing of a security agreement through which Italy will provide aid in protecting Ukraine's public and border security for the upcoming ten years (Reuters 2024). While Italy's current position is actively supportive of Ukraine, its future stance remains unclear as the Italian people grow sceptical of the positive influences of EU efforts (Pascale 2024).

p. Latvia

Similar to Estonia, Latvia is among the nations that feel quite threatened by the prospects of a Russian aggression. Considering this, the country has made significant contributions to Ukraine compared to its economic size; it has committed a total of €650 million, mostly in the form of military donations (Ministru Kabinets 2024). Through joint troop training, direct military contributions and donations to the European Peace Facility, Latvia has made its stance clear and wishes for the total victory of Ukraine. In an interview, Edgars Rinkevics (the President of Latvia) stated that "Ukraine is not only fighting for us but fighting instead of us"; this remark clearly shows the extent of Latvia's solidarity with respect to Ukraine (Tavberidze 2024).

q. Lithuania

Connected to the rest of the EU only by a narrow strip known as the Suwałki corridor, Lithuania shares much of the worries of Estonia and Latvia on a possible Russian invasion and the return of a Soviet-like rule to their nation (Seputyte and Kevin 2024). Lithuania has already committed 1.5% of their GDP (roughly equal to €394 million) to the Ukrainian cause and is ready for further commitments in collaboration with the EU (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024).

r. Luxembourg

Like most other EU nations, Luxembourg is supportive of Ukraine and has committed €130 million (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). Until now, the nation has provided mostly military aid, but it has recently signed a technical and financial cooperation agreement with Ukraine, thereby strengthening bonds between the two nations (The Luxembourg Government 2024).

s. Malta

Until the present day, Malta has only provided humanitarian aid to the Ukrainians that have reached its shores. Nevertheless, it has expressed its political commitment to support Ukraine via its representatives in the EU (Sovereign Order of Malta 2023).

t. The Netherlands

Having committed a total €6.2 billion to the Ukrainian cause, the Netherlands has not shied away in its support since the start of the war (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). The Netherlands has also signed a 10 year-long agreement on security cooperation with Ukraine, deepening collaboration. Through that agreement, the Netherlands also pledged to donate twenty-four F16 fighters to Ukraine and also pledged to help fund the Czech in their endeavour to supply 800,000 artillery shells (The Presidential Office of Ukraine 2024).

u. Poland

Being another nation that stands in proximity to the Russian Federation, Poland is frightened by the prospects of a Ukrainian defeat. This is why Poland has invested €4.2 billion into Ukraine, mostly in the form of military commitments (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). However, political friction brewed between the two nations over agricultural products towards the end of 2023. The process of mending this friction is still ongoing but the outlook seems positive (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 2024). Poland also houses approximately one million Ukrainian refugees and thus has committed itself to ensuring the refugees' wellbeing (Golebiowska, Pachocka and Kubiciel-Lodzińska).

v. Portugal

Due to its distance from the war, Portugal has committed only a small amount, totalling around €76 million, mostly in the form of military commitments (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). Portugal has also pledged to fund the Czech scheme to obtain 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine and lends its support to the EU schemes that regard the reconstruction of Ukraine (Reuters 2024).

w. Romania

Being one of the EU members that have only provided humanitarian assistance, Romania looks forward to deepening its economic and political connections with Ukraine; the country has already been carrying the duty of transporting most of the Ukrainian grain exported out of Ukraine (Chastand 2024). Even though it has not yet directly contributed to the funding efforts for reconstruction, Romania supports the Regulation on Establishing the Ukraine Facility (European Parliament 2024).

x. Slovakia

The Slovak response was one of direct military support for Ukraine; on this path, Slovakia has donated €670 million worth of military equipment and €16 million worth of financial and humanitarian aid (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). However, with recent elections and a change in government, this outlook is all but gone as the current President of Slovakia calls the EU's efforts in Ukraine "warmongering". This change in stance worried many in Europe as now Slovakia wishes for the war to end as quickly as possible and refuses to further lend support to Ukraine (Silenská 2024).

y. Slovenia

Slovenia has invested a total of €78 million in humanitarian and military commitments since the start of the war (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024). The nation's stance was expressed by Tanja Fajon (Minister of Foreign and European Affairs), who stated that Slovenia will "stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes" (President of the Republic of Slovenia 2024).

z. Spain

While directly engaging with Ukraine in the form of agreements, Spain is also a part of many EU schemes aimed at helping reconstruct Ukraine, such as the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform (La Moncloa 2024). Since the start of the war, Spain has committed €933 million and is currently among the main importers of Ukrainian grain (Ukraine Support Tracker 2024).

aa. Sweden

Up until today, Sweden has contributed a total of €3.2 billion to Ukraine (Government Offices of Sweden n.d.). Sweden has a special relationship with Ukraine as the two have been in a partnership since 2014 through Sweden's **Reform Cooperation with Ukraine** program; the program aims to increase Ukraine's economic integration into the EU, help Ukraine battle corruption and assist the Ukrainians in their efforts to reform administration (Sweden Abroad n.d.). In 2024, Sweden started to support the Ukraine Facility and became a temporary member of the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform.

V. QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED FOR AGENDA ITEM B

1) How can the Union better reach IDPs to provide them with aid and shelter?
2) How should the EU shape its approach the education of displaced children?
3) Should an alteration to the budget of the Ukraine Facility be made?
4) Should member states be encouraged to deploy peacekeeping forces to Ukraine?
5) Should the EU divert more money towards procuring military equipment for Ukraine?
6) Should further procured equipment be focused on modernising the Ukrainian army or should it be focused on supplying compatible equipment.
7) What can the Union do to further help stabilise the Ukrainian energy grid?
8) What can be done to further lay the groundwork for the post-war economic integration of Ukraine with the EU.

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