

# Parliamentary Crisis Committee



## Handbook

# Parliamentary Crisis Committee Handbook

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## A. Basic Introduction To Crisis Committees

Crisis Committees are a special type of Committee within Conferences designed to enhance participants' experiences by simulating historical, current, or future organisations and allowing them to take action in real time. In comparison to General Assembly committees, delegates are expected to write multiple documents throughout the Conference to address various issues presented to them, rather than a single one at the end. Depending on the contents of the documents written by the delegates, the supposed outcomes are evaluated by the Crisis Team and the Committee Secretariat (which will be delved upon later in this document), and the committee is given various updates in real time, either in written form, such as newspapers or verbally by Academic Team members. After receiving said updates, delegates are expected to further resolve problems presented to them, be it new or old, which creates a cycle of Documents -> Updates -> Documents -> Updates and so on until the very end of the committee, with a usually penultimate ending. To explain it further,

Crisis

committees are designed to test out the capabilities of participants in the area of rapid problem-solving while simultaneously representing individuals with specific views and backgrounds to consider. Furthermore, the solutions and the activities of a delegate need to correlate with the individual they represent to a high degree, e.g. a member of a party known for their pacifist ideology should not defend an overseas military intervention.

Activities (Documents) of the delegates and the chairboard are assessed by two primary teams in order to decide upon the effects and whether or not such a plan is possible. The first one is the committee secretariat, made up of the under-secretaries-general and the academic assistants of the committee, who are responsible for pretty much the creation of the committee, which encapsulates everything from choosing the agenda item to writing the study guide and any additional documents. The second one is the crisis team which is made up of the head of crisis and crisis team members who are responsible for aiding the committee secretariat during the conference by way of helping to read documents, evaluating them, preparing updates for them and so on.

Additionally, delegates of the French Parliament portion are called deputies, with their main aim being to come up with an overall solution for the ongoing Algerian War while simultaneously dealing with numerous other socio-economic issues surrounding the nation by writing documents called Legislation (which will be delved into in a later section) as well as advancing the political agenda of their specific countries. Within the French Parliament, there exists the Cabinet of Ministers, made up of different deputies. The process of formation of a cabinet will not be explored further within this document, as the necessary explanations are already given in the Rules of Procedure. Ministers have the right to both write legislation and a special type of directive called ministerial directives, which allow them to rapidly take actions on their specific ministerial fields, such as Interior, Finance and Economy, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Forces. In addition, the Prime Minister exercises jurisdiction over all

these sectors and can conduct their activities across all of them with the mentioned ministerial directives. On the other hand, members of the National Security Council are called officials, and their main objective is to maintain the security of the nation as well as advance its military efforts by utilising intelligence and the French army to its full capacity in directives. Officials have different duties ranging from a wide variety of areas of interest, and on top of the existing military personnel, 5 civilian roles are appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers from deputies in the Parliament with the roles being Director of Investigations and Operations, Director of Directorate General for External Security (DGSE), Director of the Police Force, Director of Communications and Operations and Director of Financial Affairs of Ministry of Defence. Some officials may even have specific agendas they wish to pursue written into their specific roles, such as being in favour of or against the existing government.

## **B. Various Directives and Examples**

In general, directives can be seen as “orders” of an individual who has jurisdiction over a sector such as the navy chief of staff having command over the naval forces or the minister of agriculture and industry having the able to work upon those sectors as they please such as by funding new factories or expanding agricultural production in areas they see fit. All directives must have a From: and To: portion filled out in the top left, with the From: part representing who the directive is coming from and the To: part representing the Institution/Person the document is addressed to. It should be noted that directives that have “Related Department” written in the To: portion will not be considered valid. Moreover, directives should have the suitable amount of detail necessary for what they aim to accomplish, for example, a directive which aims to take down an entire terrorist organisation via a military campaign should

obviously be quite lengthy and consider multiple scenarios to succeed. These details range from There are 4 types of directives present in the Parliament and 3 present in the Security Council, with their details explained once again in the Rules of Procedure right after Article 64 and 68, respectively.

**Scenario 1:** There are talks of a Front de libération nationale (FLN) (Algérie)-backed uprising starting off within the district of Tlemcen, with rebels already conducting disruptive events such as throwing Molotov cocktails at municipal buildings and arranging mass anti-French protests. The involvement of Front de libération nationale (FLN) (Algérie) is not yet confirmed, though the movement is quickly garnering attention with its follower count having reached at least a few thousand.

**Directive Example 1:**

**From:** Army Chief of Staff, (Then the name of the person currently in that position)

**To:** Ministry of Defence

**1. The 1st Army Division located in Algiers shall move to Tlemcen within at least the next day by utilising the railroads. Their supplies shall be provided by the existing government depots within Algiers, with supplies to last at least 2 weeks, travelling with them.**

**2. After arriving in Tlemcen, their number one priority will be to establish a defence perimeter in the following locations: the city's railway station, municipal buildings, city centre and the central police station against threats of rebel sabotage or uprisings waiting to erupt.**

**3. Having secured the area, the next objective of the soldiers shall be to eliminate rebel resistance within the city by cooperating with the Director of the Directorate General for External Security (DGSE) and their Director to infiltrate existing groups and pinpoint their hideouts and weapon supply depositories.**

**If infiltrating their groups was not successful, then a nighttime curfew should be introduced in Tlemcen between the hours 20:00 and 05:00 while making exceptions for those with documented medical conditions and new medical emergencies. Then, while collaborating with the police, routine checks of houses, stores, public spaces and even municipal buildings at random with the soldiers detaining any “suspicious” acting individuals to gather further information on them. The actions of the soldiers in question will be directly monitored by their higher-ups in the chain of command to avoid human rights violations.**

**4. The borders of Tlemcen shall be heavily monitored by at least 30% of the 1st Army Division and all entry and exit activities to the city will be heavily documented. Individuals both entering and exiting the city will be subject to thorough searches, and the Moroccan border will be a specific area of interest to the soldiers, with it being heavily guarded and the communications being maintained constantly. In the event of FLN militias entering the city, the National Security Council shall be informed as soon as possible.**

**Scenario 2: A massive earthquake has hit the city of Pau, and a large percentage of the houses belonging to workers and the North African migrant population have been decimated. With 10s of thousands being left homeless, the nation faces a deep crisis to provide housing to the displaced folk.**

**Directive Example 2:**

**From: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, (Then the name of the person currently in that position)**

**To: Ministry of Industry**

**1. 800,000,000 French Franc shall be taken as debt from the Central Bank, and by utilising 1,000,000,000 French Franc from the Ministries, put together a fund of around 1,800,000,000 French Franc. The fund shall be allocated to the establishment of a National Cement Factory in Bordeaux, with construction to begin immediately to supply materials for the production of new housing within the nation's rebuilding efforts. The location of the Cement Factory should be directly connected to the railways running through the district. While choosing the location of the factory, the distance to limestone and other raw materials required for cement shall be taken into consideration as well. To build the factory, at least 20 experienced mechanical engineers and around 80 electricians shall be selected uniformly from non-essential factories across the nation, such as those involved in machinery modernisation and products utilised mainly for exports. With the help of the mentioned personnel, the planning stage of the factory and its details shall be determined in Pau, then employing this very plan and allocating a total of around 1000 workers from the same factories to work on building the factory. The total timeframe for the project is 6 months to build a fully capable and sustaining factory, with the ministry following the progress of the project closely.**

**2. Whilst the factory is being built, all ongoing non-essential government construction projects shall be suspended indefinitely. Furthermore, the excess materials belonging to said projects, such as cement, bricks, steel components and so on, are being directly**

utilised in temporary housing complexes in Pau. The number of complexes shall be determined by the number of displaced individuals, with each complex housing at least 200 people. The budget of the project is 450,000,000 French Francs taken from the budget of the Ministry. The temporary complexes aim to provide housing space for the displaced French whilst the cement factory is in its construction state. The complex shall consist of one room consisting of two beds for families with 3-5 individuals, whereas families with more than 5 members will have two rooms with 2 beds instead. Within the housing complex, there should be one toilet and bathroom for every 3 rooms, and one kitchen for every 10 rooms. The agricultural exports of the nation (outside of coffee) may be suspended temporarily to move the produce to the complexes and other essential needs to ensure the sustenance of the public.

If the project appears too costly for the Republic to undertake on its own, then the current Minister of Foreign Affairs' plans shall be in order to garner support from neighbouring countries and worldwide partners.

## **C. Legislations and Examples**

Legislation ("Yasa" in Turkish) are documents which are the approved version of the Bills (Yasa Tasarıları in Turkish) by the Parliament of the Fourth French Republic. In comparison to directives, Bills are voted upon within the Parliament, with a simple majority being required for one to pass. The details of the voting procedure are once again explained further in the Rules of Procedure between 42-48 for legislation and 73 for their amendment process. Deputies are expected to further the agenda of their respective parties, e.g. a more

left-leaning party could have policies adjacent to an overall “socialist” agenda, whereas a liberal party could have policies allowing for the free market to expand.

Scenario: In the current political and economic landscape of France, it is a must for France to issue a lengthy land reform in order to either entirely change the structure of land and agricultural production or to allow the current status quo, with foreign investors holding the power to expand even further. There are countless possibilities present to fundamentally change the nation in a way the deputies of the Parliament see fit, or at least the majority.

Bill:

### **BILL ON LAND REFORM: STAGE 1**

**From: (The name of the deputy proposing the bill)**

**To: Parliament Chairboard**

**Appendix: The following contents of the bill will replace the current land policy of France**

#### **Part 1: Co-ops**

**A.1.1. Farming/Agricultural workers with no land property will be asked to gather together and form co-operatives, with each one composed of 40 farmers.**

**A.1.2. Each co-op shall be administered by a central committee of 5 or 10 members based on the co-op’s discretion.**

**A.1.3. Members of the committees will be elected from the farmers in the co-op directly every 2 years. Elected officials can be changed/deposed on special occasions or if more than 60% of the members decide to call special elections.**

## **Part 2:Distribution/Redistribution**

**A.2.1. After the establishment of the co-ops, seizure of the large land-owner property will begin.**


**A.2.2. Percentages of property ownerships in the total amount of land properties will be taken into account during the redistribution.**

**A.2.3. Landowners and their relatives' properties will be counted together to prevent the exploitation of the policy through relatives.**

**A.2.4. Those with more than 300 m<sup>2</sup> of farm property will have their lands seized by the ministry. Those who resist or refuse will be imprisoned for 40 years of prison and their rights to own land will be revoked.**

**A.2.5 Collected lands will be distributed equally among the 50-farmer co-operatives. A.2.6. The remaining farm owners that were left untouched (ones smaller than 150 m<sup>2</sup>) shall have their properties inspected by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. If their farms are found to be appropriate/suitable for co-operative farming, their properties should be seized and given to co-ops composed of 30 farmers instead of 40. The procedures of these co-ops are the same otherwise. Former owners will be appointed to these co-operatives.**

**And on the last page of the bill, deputies are expected to write the names of the sponsors and their signatories, similarly to the following:**



The given example of a bill was created by a deputy with a more left-leaning ideology; another deputy belonging to a more centre-leaning or right-leaning party would have completely different views on the topic, and it should be noted that without gaining the simple majority of the committee in the voting, bills have no chance of passing and becoming legislation.

## D. Various Linguistics Utilised in Crisis

### Committees

A

- Army – A very large military formation  
*Size: ~100,000–1,000,000 soldiers*  
*Made up of: Multiple corps*
- Armistice – An agreement to stop fighting
- Artillery – Heavy weapons such as cannons and howitzers
- Artillery unit – A unit operating heavy weapons  
*Size: ~100–500 soldiers*
- Assault – A direct military attack

B

- Battalion – A key tactical unit  
*Size: ~300–1,000 soldiers*  
*Made up of: 3–5 companies*
- Blockade – Cutting off supplies or access to an area
- Bombardment – Sustained attack with artillery or bombs
- Brigade – A large combat unit  
*Size: ~3,000–5,000 soldiers*  
*Made up of: 3–6 battalions*

C

- Ceasefire – A temporary or permanent stop to fighting
- Combat – Armed fighting
- Company – A standard combat unit  
*Size: ~100–250 soldiers*  
*Made up of: 3–4 platoons*
- Conscription – Mandatory military service
- Corps – A very large operational unit  
*Size: ~20,000–50,000 soldiers*  
*Made up of: 2–5 divisions*

D

- Defence – Protection against attack

- Deployment – Movement of forces to a location
- Doctrine – a guide for a battle, usually explained in heavy detail
- Division – A major military formation
  - Size: ~10,000–20,000 soldiers*
  - Made up of: 2–4 brigades*

## E

- Encirclement – Surrounding enemy forces
- Engagement – A battle or clash

## F

- Frontline – Area closest to combat

## G

- Garrison – Troops stationed in a location
  - Size: Varies widely*
- Guerrilla warfare – Irregular warfare using small, mobile units

## I

- Infantry – Soldiers who fight on foot
- Infantry unit – A unit of foot soldiers
- Invasion – Entry into territory by force
- Irregular forces – Fighters not part of a formal army

## L

- Logistics – Supply and organisation of forces

## M

- Mechanised unit – Infantry supported by armoured vehicles
- Militia – Armed civilian force, often locally organised
  - Size: Small groups to several thousand*
- Mobilisation – Preparation of troops and resources for war

## O

- Occupation – Control of territory by foreign forces
- Offensive – A planned attack

## P

- Platoon – A small combat unit  
*Size: ~20–50 soldiers*  
*Made up of: 2–4 squads*
- Partisan – Member of an armed resistance group

## R

- Reinforcements – Additional troops or supplies
- Regiment – A traditional military unit  
*Size: ~2,000–3,000 soldiers*  
*Made up of: 2–3 battalions*

## S

- Siege – Surrounding a place to force surrender
- Squad – The smallest military unit  
*Size: ~8–15 soldiers*
- Support unit – Logistics, medical, or engineering unit (not armed for action)

## T

- Tank unit (Armoured unit) – Unit equipped with tanks
- Trench – Defensive ditch used by soldiers

## W

- Withdrawal – Organised retreat

## Size comparison

Squad → Platoon → Company → Battalion → Brigade → Division → Corps → Army

A directive is a concise and action-oriented document used in MUN crisis simulations to propose immediate actions that a committee, individual actor, or state intends to carry out. Unlike resolutions, directives are short, specific, and focused on practical execution rather than long-term policy.

Directives typically outline:

- **Who**
- **How**
- **Where**
- **when**
- **Why** (optional)

What can you use it for?

1. Deployment of military or security forces

2. Intelligence gathering or covert operations
3. Diplomatic communications
4. Emergency economic or humanitarian measures
5. Trade between nations
6. Creation of new government organs

## **E. Parties within the Parliament and Their Stances**

### **1. French Communist Party (PCF)**

In June 1958, the French Communist Party entered its clearest period during de Gaulle's rise to power as prime minister. Its overall agenda combined defense of parliamentary sovereignty with a class-based view of the social and economic structure of the Fourth Republic. The PCF supported the idea that the position of France was not entirely due to its constitution, it was the sheer product of capitalism, colonial war, inflation and the deliberate push of the working class from actual power. It presented itself as the defender of workers, small employees, and poor peasants against financial elites, conservative governments, and the anti-communists. The party was also tied to the Soviets and continued to uphold its highly centralised and ideological structure.

In terms of the Algerian War, the PCF saw that repression had failed and that the continuation of the conflict was deepening France's political and moral crisis. It opposed the war not from a nationalist point of view, but from an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist one. The party supported an end to the repression and accepted that Algeria had to move toward its own self-determination, even if communist remarks were often more cautious than direct endorsement of the FLN. Moreover, it insisted that the army and colonial powers in Algeria could not be allowed to dictate the future of the nation.

In terms of the party's economic views, the PCF favored nationalizations on all sectors, more in depth state planning, wage protection, price controls, and expansion of welfare measures. Its agenda dictated that war spending and budget deficits were being handled in a way that protected capital while burdening workers through inflation and declining purchasing power. It supported industrial modernization, but envisioned it to be carried out under stronger worker control and with far greater attention to their protections, trade-union power, and the balance between wages and prices.

On social issues, the party saw polarization, censorship, and surveillance as signs of a state transitioning toward authoritarianism and fascism. It held values of war-weariness, class divides, and social injustice more than questioning national unity. The PCF generally treated migration less as a cultural problem than as a social and economic issue, thinking that migrant workers, especially North Africans, were often exploited by employers and should not be used to instead of French labor, though they valued the rights of North African migrants to a great extent. It was also deeply vocal of extending police jurisdictions and of media systems that encouraged class divides as well as furthering worker resentment.

## **2. French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO)**

The SFIO entered June 1958 in a difficult state. Its overall agenda remained reformist socialist rather than flat-out revolutionary: it supported parliamentary democracy, measures on sustaining welfare of the people, state intervention in the economy, and gradual social reform rather than any radical forms. At the same time, the party had become deeply tied to governmental responsibility, and the defense of republican order. This gave it a more cautious tone than the PCF and made it so it was more willing to accept more groundbreaking constitutional solutions if the state's integrity was at stake by military pressure from Algiers.

The leadership around Guy Mollet believed that de Gaulle could be accepted as a legal solution, though many on the left feared this would weaken parliamentary democracy so opinions differed from member to member.

On the Algerian War, the SFIO was divided but not as anti-colonial in the way the Communist Party was. The party had supported reform, civilian authority, and negotiation in principle, yet there were members who had also backed repression, and continued military action. By 2 June 1958, the dominant socialist position was shaky, there were sentiments of Algeria not being abandoned, but also keeping the crisis under lawful civilian control and not let it be dictated by the army or settler activists. The party therefore stood between colonial hardliners and immediate pro-independence positions.

Economically, the SFIO favoured a mixed economy with state influence rather than full control, social protections, public investment, and planned modernisation. It accepted planning, industrial development, and some financial discipline, but rejected full nationalisation on all fronts. On financing the war, deficits, and inflation, the SFIO thought that prolonging the war was draining resources from domestic affairs and deepening instability. It backed better protections for wages, labour rights, and welfare institutions of the government as part of upholding the nation's social status.

On social issues, the SFIO underlined democracy, social reforms, and preventing civil fracture. It saw political polarization, war fatigue, and the diminishing effect of colonial conflict on civil life as extremely vital issues. The SFIO viewed migration widely through the lens of social integration and labor conditions, supporting state management in this context to establish social protections while also keeping about tensions caused by war and the need for full on integration of migrants. While not as against to state surveillance as the PCF, it remained attached to legality and did not prefer France to be governed permanently through emergency methods and censorship.

### 3. Radical Party (PR)

The Radical Party began June 1958 as one of the most fragmented political parties in French politics. Its overall agenda still rested on principles of legality, parliamentary life, secularism, and reformism, but by this stage it had shifted to contain sharply different viewpoints. One current, associated with figures such as Pierre Mendès France and René Billères, favored democratic changes, modernization, and resistance to authoritarian drift of France. Another, associated with deputies such as André Morice, was harder on notions of the empire, much more nationalist, and more willing to support a strong state in colonial affairs. As a result, the party represented not a single unified agenda, but a broad republican centre struggling to respond to the unrest of the Fourth Republic.

On the Algerian War, this internal split was especially seen. The left-leaning wing of the party believed the conflict could not be solved by armed affairs alone and thought that the war was destroying both France's finances and the sovereignty of its institutions. The more right-wing deputies wanted strict military control and rejected any sign of abandoning Algeria. In a broad sense, the party as a whole could be seen as under the impression that Algeria should be kept under civilian political authority in Paris and was against the idea that military should determine national decision. But there was not a single voice on whether the end point should be major reforms, continued French authority, or perhaps political separation entirely.

Economically, the Radicals were generally supportive of modernising, development, and administrative changes. They favoured planning, industrial modernisation, and state action, but usually within a mixed economy model rather than through full nationalization. Many Radicals viewed that war expenditures, deficits, and inflation were harming modernisation and weakening the people's trust in the state. They were critical on financial seriousness,

investment in infrastructure and education, and a fairer balance between labour demands and economic stability.

On social issues, the party preferred gradual changes aimed at slowing down hardships. It saw the growing polarisation as a major issue as well as the effects of war-weariness on public life, and also erosion of trust in parliamentary and governmental institutions. The Radical Party had no single fully unified line in the topic of migration, but broadly saw it as something that had to be administratively managed in an extremely strict manner to preserve public order and republican cohesion, especially in the context of Algerian unrest. It was also critical of both communist agitation and the evolution of a security-first French state, preferring a republic governed by law, debate, and reform rather than by permanent emergencies.

#### **4. Popular Republican Movement (MRP)**

The MRP is a Christian-democratic party committed to republican values, European integration, social reforms, and anti-communism as of June 1958. Its overall agenda was much more uniform than that of the Radicals, and more socially conscious than that of the nationalist right. The party believed in a powerful state rooted in principles of law, a responsible free market economy, and a social order created by Christian-democratic ideas and morals. It was also one of the main parties backing de Gaulle's return, if it took place through constitutional means rather than through a militaristic pressure. The MRP in a position to balance rescuing the state while keeping legality and accountability.

On the Algerian War, the MRP was often firmer than it may seem. Many of its leaders viewed the FLN as bringers of disorder, anti-Western nationalism, and threats against their national integrity, and they were not in favour of the rapid abandonment of Algeria. At the same time, the party did not want policy to be dictated by Algiers alone or by the military. Its

preferred point of view was that France had to restore its authority, keep control of the crisis in civilian control, and seek a result from a position of strength rather than weakness.

In terms of its economic views, the MRP preferred modernisation, planning of the state's affairs rather than short-term solutions, labour regulations to sustain production, and reconciliation between social classes rather than their convergence. It did not support communist-style transformation, but it also was not in a pure conservatism-esque form. On questions such as war financing, inflation, and budget deficits, it tended to support disciplined state management, productive investment in vital sectors, and a conscious and dynamic response to rising costs. It also saw industrial modernisation as a necessity for national strength and for France's position in Europe.

On social issues, the MRP emphasised social order, moral undertones, and institutional stability. It worried that polarisation, war-weariness, foreign migration and ideological extremism were hollowing out the Christian values of France. But it also viewed migration through a Christian-democratic lens, accepting the need for humane treatment and lengthy integration while remaining cautious about instability, problems related to the North African community, and the effects of the conflict. It accepted a stronger state position in controlling the nation than the Radicals did, especially in desperate times of crisis, but still held legality as a key point and civilian authority over military politics and decisions.

## **5. Union for the Defence of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA)**

The UDCA is the most openly anti-establishment of the five major political currents in June 1958. Its overall agenda consisted of tax revolt, distrust of the parliamentary class, defence of small and large business owners, and hostility to modernisation in all levels. Its coherence as a party was questionable as it could also be viewed as a protest movement, and its influence

came from artisans, traders, shopkeepers, and lower middle-class voters who felt pressured by rising inflation, taxes and regulation. The party pioneered its political thought under the name of Poujadism, which mixed anti-tax populism, nationalism, anti-communism, and anti-parliamentary resentment, making it more forceful than systematic.

In terms of the Algerian War, the UDCA stood firmly in the notion of French Algeria. It saw retreat as humiliation on a national level and thought of compromise as a sign of weakness of the Fourth Republic. Many of its deputies were intensely hostile to even sentiments of surrender, and its language was similar to that of the broader nationalist right. In the June crisis, the movement stood in the eyes of the public as a transfer toward a stronger authority, which promised firmness and order, which was appealing.

Their economic policies consisted of not long-term planning or social redistribution, but immediate relief for small producers. The UDCA did not think like the socialist left or the Christian-democratic centre. It was very vocal about taxes, administrative regulations, and the way inflation and debt seemed to punish those who worked independently rather than those associated with the state or the economic interests of the state. It was wary of industrial modernisation when modernisation resulted in the concentration of capital, the expansion of bureaucracy and its jurisdiction or the decline of the small shopkeeper and artisan world.

On social problems, the UDCA fed off of polarisation rather than aspiring to erase it. It presented the country as in a huge divide between ordinary French people and corrupt elites, between national producers and parasitic politicians. It was deeply against the media, administrative, and policing frameworks when they appeared to defend the established order against protest, yet it was not keen on civil liberties. The UDCA viewed migration, especially from North Africa, hostility, often presenting it as a source of urgent disorder, competition, and loss of national identity rather than something to be integrated into the country. Its

agenda was toward authority, nationalism, and confrontation rather than going through parliamentary hardship.



## **F. Character Sheet**

### **1. Charles de Gaulle**

Prime Minister of France on 2 June 1958, having been appointed by the President on 1 June 1958 as the head of government of the Fourth Republic.

Born in 1890 in Lille, de Gaulle was an army officer whose early military reputation was built through service in the First World War and through interwar writing on strategy, mechanization, and national strength. In June 1940 he rejected the armistice, led the Free French during the Second World War, and then pioneered the Provisional Government after Liberation before resigning in 1946 because he viewed France's circumstances as weak and party-dominated.

During the Fourth Republic he remained its most famous critic, founded the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, and presented himself as a figure standing above parliamentary fragmentation. He returned to power in the May 1958 crisis as the Algerian War and the collapse of governmental authority pushed much of the French political class to accept him as a likely candidate for a leader capable of restoring order. His allies at this stage included Michel Debré and the broader Gaullist camp, while many figures on the left, especially François Mitterrand and the Communists, feared that his return threatened parliamentary democracy.

By 2 June 1958, de Gaulle stood for a stronger executive, restoration of state authority and influence, and an end to nationwide instability through parliamentary reform. On the economic and sociological situation of France, he favored national restoration through governmental discipline, modernization, and aspired to regain confidence in the state rather than continuing party politics. In the Algerian War, his position at this starting date was that Algeria had to remain under French sovereignty while order was reimposed and the crisis was brought back under the control of the central government.

Gaullist nationalist; conservative republican with a strong-executive, above-party orientation, rooted in the tradition of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français.

## 2. Émile Pelletier

Minister of the Interior of France on 2 June 1958, having entered that office in Charles de Gaulle's government on 1 June 1958.

Born in 1898 in Saint-Brieuc, Pelletier entered the French administration at a young age and built his career through the district governor-related corps, serving in posts such as Mulhouse, Arras, Montreuil, Cambrai, and Valenciennes before the Second World War. He was not a major politician but a senior state administrator whose authority came from his experience and the prefectural system.

During the Occupation, he served as district governor in the Somme and later in the Aisne region, a record that exposed him to criticism because he had worked within the Vichy-era administrative structure. At the same time, he later drifted away with that order, was removed by Laval in 1943, joined the OCM Resistance, and remained underground until Liberation. After 1945, he resumed his rise through the state, becoming district governor of Seine-et-Marne, then Haute-Garonne, and finally district governor of the Seine in 1955, which made him one of the Republic's most senior administrative figures.

By 2 June 1958, Pelletier stood for the regaining of state authority, administrative efficiency, and firm control over public order during the collapse of the Fourth Republic. He supported a stronger executive and aligned naturally with de Gaulle and other supporters of institutional reform, while critics viewed him as too centralized and too closely tied to the old administrative mechanisms of the past. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored order, state direction, and disciplined management of urban and social tensions rather than ideological experimentation. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to maintain control, suppress insurgent violence, and defend the authority of itself.

Government-aligned independent (sans étiquette), Gaullist-leaning strong-state administrator rather than a regular parliamentary party figure.

### **3. Maurice Couve de Murville**

Minister of Foreign Affairs of France on 2 June 1958, having entered that office in Charles de Gaulle's government on 1 June 1958.

Born in 1907 in Reims, Couve de Murville studied law and political science in Paris and entered the corps of finance inspectors in 1930, beginning his career as a senior technocrat rather than a mass-party politician. In 1940 he became director of external finance in the Ministry of Finance and initially served within the Vichy state, a fact that remained the most obvious disgrace in his career.

In 1943 he moved to Algiers, joined the Free French authorities, and became commissioner of finance under de Gaulle, tying his career to the national restoration rather than parliamentary rise. After the war he went through the steps of diplomatic hierarchy as director general of political affairs and then as ambassador to Egypt, NATO, the United States, and finally West Germany from 1956 to 1958, which made him one of France's most experienced diplomats by the time of de Gaulle's return.

By 2 June 1958, Couve de Murville stood for state authority, administrative competence, and a foreign policy centered on French independence and prestige, working in close alignment with de Gaulle and alongside other strong-executive figures such as Michel Debré. On the economic and sociological situation, he preferred stability more than anything else, modernization, and getting the confidence of the people in the state over the instability and party fragmentation associated with the late Fourth Republic. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to keep the crisis under control, resist external pressure, restore order, and maintain French sovereignty while the government reasserted authority.

Government-aligned independent, Gaullist in orientation, and seen as a conservative nationalist technocrat loyal to de Gaulle rather than as a regular party parliamentarian.

## 4. Antoine Pinay

Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs of France on 2 June 1958, having entered that office in Charles de Gaulle's government on 1 June 1958.

Born in 1891 in Saint-Symphorien-sur-Coise in the Rhône, Pinay graduated from business related majors, worked in industry after the First World War, and built his early political career as mayor of Saint-Chamond before becoming deputy and then senator for the Loire. One of the lasting controversies in his record was his 10 July 1940 vote granting full powers to Marshal Pétain.

After 1945 he returned as a leading figure of the independent conservative right, helped build the National Centre of Independents and Peasants, served repeatedly in cabinet, and became prime minister in 1952–53, earning a reputation for financial stability. His closest political allies came from the conservative figures, while Pierre Mendès France and the parliamentary left represented an opposing position on both economic and colonial questions. He later served as foreign minister and, during the May 1958 crisis, supported de Gaulle's return to power.

By 2 June 1958, Pinay stood for budgetary cuts, anti-inflation policy, and regaining governmental authority amid parliamentary instability and socially polarised circumstances. He preferred conservative economic management, limiting inflation at the cost of lowering economic growth, and favored order over upholding social standards. On the Algerian War, his position was that Algeria should remain under French sovereignty and that the state had to preserve control rather than move toward decolonisation.

Conservative, economically liberal, anti-communist center-right to right.

## 5. Pierre Guillaumat

Minister of the Armed Forces of France on 2 June 1958, having entered that office in Charles de Gaulle's government on 1 June 1958.

Born in 1909 in La Flèche, Sarthe, Guillaumat was the son of General Adolphe Guillaumat and he was trained at the École Polytechnique and the École des Mines before entering the technical aspects of state administration. In the 1930s and early 1940s, he served in the mining prefects in Indochina and then Tunisia, establishing himself as a renowned engineer and planner rather than most other parliamentary politicians.

During the Second World War, he joined the Resistance in 1943 and served through Free French intelligence networks, which tied his career closely to the Gaullist state even today. After Liberation, de Gaulle appointed him director of fuels, and he later rose through refineries and plants in petroleum, electricity, and atomic energy, becoming one of the most important technocratic figures in France's defense and energy sectors. By 1958, he was associated with centralized power, planning of modernisation, and the growing influence of technical experts within the French state.

By 2 June 1958, Guillaumat stood for strong military discipline, and centralized state authority in matters of defense and national decision-making. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored industrial modernization and planning, and regaining of authority rather than parliamentary unrest or ideological clashes. He viewed national recovery as the same as state control over energy, defense production, and long-term development. On the Algerian War, his position was that France had to maintain military control, defeat the FLN, preserve French sovereignty, and protect the strategic value of Algeria and the Sahara. His natural allies were de Gaulle and other strong-state reformers, while critics associated him with the hardening of the conflict and the growing political weight of military and technocratic elites.

Government-aligned independent, Gaullist in orientation, and best understood as a nationalist defense technocrat rather than a conventional parliamentary party figure.

## 6. Maurice Thorez

**Speaker of the French Communist Party** and communist deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958.

Born in 1900 in Noyelles-Godault in the Pas-de-Calais coal basin, Thorez came from a mining family and went down the pits as a boy before entering socialist politics in 1919 and the Communist Party after the Tours split in 1920. He rose quickly through the party machine in the 1920s, became secretary for Pas-de-Calais, endured prison for agitation, and in 1930 secretary-general of the PCF. During the Popular Front years he helped transform the communists into a mass force of the French left and became one of the best-known parliamentary figures of the Republic.

His career also carried major controversy. After being mobilized in 1939, he left the army after the Communist Party was banned, was condemned in absentia and stripped of his nationality, and spent the war years tied to Moscow, a record that remained a lasting point of attack from anti-communists and nationalists. After Liberation he was pardoned by de Gaulle's government, returned to France in late 1944, recovered his citizenship, and served as minister of state and then deputy premier before the communists were pushed out of government in 1947 as the Cold War hardened. By 1958 he remained the dominant figure of the PCF, closely allied with Jacques Duclos and Jeannette Vermeersch, and one of the clearest rivals of de Gaulle, Guy Mollet, and the anti-communist center.

By 2 June 1958, Thorez stood for defense of the parliamentary republic against de Gaulle's return, class-based politics against conservative national restoration, and a strongly organized party aligned with the Soviet camp. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored wage protection, price controls, nationalizations, expansion of social welfare, and a stronger political role for workers and trade unions against inflation, austerity, and capitalist concentration. On the Algerian War, his position was that the war had to end through negotiations, colonial repression had to stop, and Algeria had to receive the right of self-determination, even though the PCF's line remained more cautious than outright identification with the FLN. Politically, he belonged to the French Communist Party and represented a Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet, Stalinist far-left orientation.

## 7. Jacques Duclos

One of the principal leaders of the French Communist Party, deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958.

Born in 1896 in Louey in the Hautes-Pyrénées, Duclos came from a modest background, trained as a pastry worker, fought in the First World War, and was wounded before entering communist politics after 1920. He rose quickly inside the PCF, entered its central leadership, became a deputy in 1926, and built a reputation as one of the party's toughest organizers and most effective parliamentary speakers. During the interwar years he also worked in clandestine party activity, spent time in Moscow, and became deeply identified with the disciplined, pro-Soviet wing of French communism.

His career remained deeply controversial because of the PCF's loyalty to Moscow, and during the Occupation he helped lead the secret communist apparatus inside France. After Liberation, he stood at the head of the party until Maurice Thorez returned, then remained one of the PCF's central figures as president of the communist group in the Parliament and, during Thorez's illness, its effective acting leader. By 1958 he was widely regarded as Thorez's principal lieutenant, closely tied to the party machine and to the hardest anti-Gaullist line on the French left.

By 2 June 1958, Duclos stood firmly against de Gaulle's return under emergency conditions and argued that the Parliament was being asked to surrender legislative, executive, and constituent power to one man. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored nationalizations, stronger worker protections, social welfare, wage defense, and resistance to inflation and conservative austerity. In the Algerian War, his position was that the conflict had to end politically, that continued war would deepen the economic crisis, and that the Algerian people's drive toward independence could not simply be crushed away.

French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 8. Waldeck Rochet

Communist deputy for Saône-et-Loire and one of the senior agrarian specialists of the French Communist Party on 2 June 1958.

Born in 1905 in Sainte-Croix in Saône-et-Loire, Rochet came from a rural background, worked as a market gardener, and entered communist politics in the early 1920s before receiving political training in Moscow. He rose through the party as a regional organizer in Lyon, became closely associated with agricultural issues, and entered the national communist leadership during the Popular Front era. In 1936 he was elected deputy, and in 1937 he founded *La Terre*, the party's major paper aimed at rural France, which helped make him the main communist voice to peasants and small farmers.

His career also carried major controversy. Like many communist deputies, he refused to break with the party line after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, was arrested after the PCF was banned in 1939, and spent years in prison and detention before being freed in North Africa in 1943. He then joined the communist resistance effort in Algiers and later represented the PCF in the provisional political structures of Free France. After Liberation he entered the Politburo (Main core of the Communist Party), returned to parliament for Saône-et-Loire. By 1958 he stood just below Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos in the party hierarchy, with a reputation as the figure who gave the PCF a serious foothold in rural France.

By 2 June 1958, Rochet stood for disciplined communist opposition to de Gaulle's return and for the defense of parliamentary sovereignty against the gathering of power in the executive. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored nationalizations, protection of wages and small producers, stronger social welfare, and a closer alliance between workers and peasants against inflation, austerity, and conservative centralization. In the Algerian War, his position was that oppression had failed, that a ceasefire and political settlement were necessary, and that Algeria had to move toward self-determination rather than remain under permanent military rule.

French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 9. Jeannette Vermeersch

Communist deputy for the Seine and one of the party's leading figures on women's and social issues on 2 June 1958.

Born in 1910 in Lille in the Nord to a working-class family, Vermeersch entered labor very young, first as a domestic worker and then in the textile industry, before moving into trade-union and communist activism in the late 1920s. She rose through the Young Communists, helped organize communist women's activism in the 1930s, and became one of the most well-known female strength of the PCF before the war. Elected deputy for the Seine after Liberation, she remained in parliament continuously through the Fourth Republic and established herself as a major party voice on family, health, labor, and social policy.

Her career was closely tied to Maurice Thorez, whom she married in 1947, and by the 1950s she stood near the center of the Stalinist leadership of the party alongside Thorez and Jacques Duclos. During the war years she followed the communist leadership into exile connected to Moscow, a record that remained a clear target for anti-communist critics after 1945. After Thorez's illness in 1950, she joined the Political Bureau and helped keep his power in the party while pushing out rivals like André Marty and Charles Tillon. Her reputation by 1958 was that of a strict, disciplined, orthodox communist leader who fought hard to keep the party together and make sure everyone followed the same beliefs.

By 2 June 1958, Vermeersch stood distinctly against de Gaulle's return under emergency conditions and supported the communist defense of parliamentary sovereignty against concentration of power in the executive. On the economic and sociological situation, she favored stronger protections for workers, expansion of social welfare, equality in pay, and a larger role for organized labor, while also defending a socially conservative communist line on birth control that she publicly upheld in 1956. In the Algerian War, her position followed the PCF line that colonial repression had to end, the conflict required a political solution rather than permanent military escalation, and Algeria had to move toward self-determination.

French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 10. François Billoux

Communist deputy for Bouches-du-Rhône and one of the senior leaders of the French Communist Party on 2 June 1958, as well as one of the party's most experienced former ministers.

Born in 1903 in Saint-Romain-la-Motte in the Loire, Billoux came from a family of wine producers, studied commerce in Roanne, and entered socialist and trade-union activism before moving into communism after the postwar split of the left. He joined the Communist youth movement early, became a member of the party's Central Committee in 1926, served as secretary-general of the Communist youth federation from 1928 to 1931, and built his political base above all in Marseille. Elected deputy in 1936, he became one of the PCF's established parliamentary figures before the collapse of the Third Republic.

His career carried controversy as well. Pursued for antimilitarist activity, he lived by hiding for part of the early 1930s, and after the Communist Party was banned he was arrested, condemned, and imprisoned; in 1940 he wrote from prison to Pétain in a move that later left him open to criticism. Released in Algiers in 1943, he reentered politics through the Provisional Consultative Assembly and then held major offices after Liberation, serving as minister of public health, national economy, reconstruction and urbanism, and finally national defense in 1947 before the communists were expelled from government. By 1958 he remained one of the party's central figures, with Politburo (innercore) experience, responsibility for ideological work, and influence through communist publications such as *La Marseillaise* and *France Nouvelle*.

By 2 June 1958, Billoux stood distinctly against de Gaulle's return on emergency terms, voting with his group against the placement on 1 June and against full powers and constitutional revision on 2 June. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored a strongly interventionist program centered on anti-inflation measures that protected workers, nationalizations, social welfare, and large-scale housing construction rather than conservative management. On the Algerian War, his position was that the war had to end, that continued repression was deepening France's crisis, and that the conflict required a political solution rather than indefinite military escalation.

French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 11. Étienne Fajon

Communist deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958, member of the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the French Communist Party, and one of the party's leading ideological and press figures. In 1958 he also moved from longtime deputy editor to director of *L'Humanité*, which placed him at the center of communist messaging and party doctrine.

Born in 1906 in Jonquières in Hérault, Fajon studied as a schoolteacher and entered the PCF in the 1920s, rising quickly through the party as both an organizer and theorist. In the early 1930s he lost his post in public education because of his politics, then built himself as a regional militant and journalist before entering the Central Committee in 1932. Elected deputy in 1936, he became one of the party's established parliamentary figures and developed a reputation less as a mass tribune than as a disciplined ideological cadre who shaped communist education and doctrine.

His career was also marked by deep controversy. After the Communist Party was banned in 1939, he followed the party line during the Nazi-Soviet Pact period, defended Soviet actions in Finland in 1940, lost his parliamentary mandate, and was condemned to prison, which made him an easy target for anti-communist opponents for the rest of his career. After the war he returned to parliament, reentered the top structures of the party, represented the PCF in the Cominform orbit, and by 1958 stood close to the hard orthodox leadership around Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos.

By 2 June 1958, Fajon stood distinctly against de Gaulle's return on emergency terms and against the weakening of parliamentary sovereignty in favor of a stronger executive. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored nationalizations, stronger worker protections, price and wage defense, social welfare expansion, and a political culture shaped by disciplined Marxist education rather than anti-communist conservatism. In the Algerian War, his position followed the orthodox communist line that colonial repression had to end, that the war was deepening France's political and social crisis, and that the conflict had to move toward a political settlement based on Algerian self-determination. French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 12. Raymond Guyot

Communist deputy for the Seine and one of the senior international and organizational figures of the French Communist Party on 2 June 1958.

Born in 1903 in Auxerre, Guyot came from a modest background, trained in clerical and accounting work, and entered socialist youth politics before joining the communist movement after the Tours split. He rose early through the Jeunesses communistes, became a central party cadre in the late 1920s, and built a reputation as a disciplined organizer closely tied to the Moscow-oriented side of the PCF. In the early 1930s he lived partly underground, faced prosecution for antimilitarist activity, and then moved into both national party leadership and the structures of the Communist Youth International.

During the 1930s and early 1940s, Guyot's career became deeply linked to the international communist apparatus, including long periods of work tied to Moscow and the Communist Youth International. He entered parliament in 1937, lost his seat after the banning of the PCF in 1939, and after Liberation returned to the top ranks of the party as a member of the Politburo (innercore of PCF) and a deputy once again. By 1958 he was widely seen as one of the party's main specialists in foreign affairs, Soviet relations, and inter-party communist diplomacy, standing close to Maurice Thorez, Jacques Duclos, and the core Stalinist leadership.

By 2 June 1958, Guyot stood firmly against de Gaulle's return under emergency conditions and against any constitutional settlement that weakened parliamentary sovereignty in favor of a stronger executive. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored the standard communist program of wage protection, stronger social welfare, nationalizations, and resistance to inflation and conservative austerity, while also viewing politics through the wider Cold War struggle between the communist and Western blocs. In the Algerian War, his position followed the PCF line that repression and indefinite military escalation would deepen the crisis, and that the conflict had to move toward a political solution based on Algerian self-determination rather than permanent colonial rule.

French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

### 13. Roger Garaudy

Communist deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958 and one of the leading intellectual and philosophical figures of the French Communist Party.

Born in 1913 in Marseille, Garaudy studied philosophy, joined the PCF in 1933, passed the agrégation in 1936, and quickly became known less as a mass organizer than as a doctrinal thinker and public intellectual. By the late 1940s and 1950s he had established himself as one of the party's principal theoreticians, writing and teaching in ways that connected communist politics to universities, philosophy, and broader intellectual life. Unlike many senior communist leaders whose authority rested mainly on trade-union or organizational work, his influence came above all from ideological production and intellectual prestige.

Mobilized in 1939, he fought in the war, received the Croix de Guerre (a type of military medal), and was later detained in North Africa during the Vichy period before resuming political activity in Algiers. After Liberation he entered the upper ranks of the party, served for years in parliament, and became one of the best-known communist intellectuals of the Fourth Republic. By 1958, he was very close to the orthodox leaders Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. He also gave the party a more refined philosophical and cultural voice than many of its other senior members.

By 2 June 1958, Garaudy stood firmly against de Gaulle's return under emergency conditions and against any constitutional settlement that strengthened executive authority at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored nationalizations, stronger worker protections, social welfare expansion, and a Marxist transformation of society aimed at reducing capitalist inequality and conservative social hierarchy. He saw the crisis of the Fourth Republic not as a reason to strengthen one man's authority, but as proof of the failures of capitalism, colonialism, and anti-communist political exclusion. In the Algerian War, his position followed the communist line that colonial oppression and indefinite military escalation had to end and that the conflict had to move toward a political solution based on Algerian self-determination. French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 14. Fernand Grenier

Communist deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958 and one of the senior parliamentary figures of the French Communist Party, with a background that also included service as Air Commissioner in the Free French provisional authorities during 1944.

Born in 1901 in Tourcoing, Grenier came from a working-class background, trained as a baker, later worked in municipal and commercial employment, and joined the French Communist Party from its early years. He rose through communist activism in the 1920s and 1930s, became secretary-general of the Association des Amis de l'Union soviétique, built a base in Saint-Denis, and entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1937 after defeating Jacques Doriot's camp. By the late Third Republic he was already identified as a loyal, disciplined communist parliamentarian closely tied to the party's pro-Soviet line.

His career was marked by major conflict and controversy. After the PCF was banned, he lost his parliamentary mandate in 1939, was arrested, interned, escaped in 1941, and then played an important role in rebuilding communist resistance networks and opening direct contact between the PCF and de Gaulle's Free French movement in London. During the Liberation period he represented the communists in Algiers, became Air Commissioner in 1944, and also left a lasting mark through the amendment that helped secure women's suffrage in France. After the war he returned to parliament, remained a central communist deputy for the Seine, and continued to be associated with a strongly pro-Soviet political identity.

By 2 June 1958, Grenier stood firmly against de Gaulle's return on emergency terms and, with his group, refused confidence in the government as well as full powers and constitutional revision. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored defense of popular living standards, nationalization of major capitalist monopolies, mass construction of affordable housing, democratic sovereignty, and closer unity between workers and the broader democratic left. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to make peace in Algeria rather than continue military escalation, and that the country's crisis required democratic and social renewal rather than concentration of executive power. French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 15. Arthur Ramette

Communist deputy for the Nord on 2 June 1958 and one of the principal regional labor figures of the French Communist Party, especially in the mining and industrial basin of northern France.

Born in 1897 in Caudry in the Nord, Ramette came from a modest working-class family, entered factory work very young, worked as a mechanic, and first became active in socialism before joining the Communist Party at the Tours split in 1920. He rose through the communist organization in the Nord during the 1920s, became a major regional organizer, entered the party's Central Committee in 1931, and soon after moved into the national leadership as well. Elected deputy in 1932 and reelected in 1936, he built his reputation above all as a defender of miners, industrial workers, and the hard communist base of the North.

His career was also marked by sharp controversy. After the Communist Party was banned in 1939, he remained loyal to the party line during the Nazi-Soviet Pact period, became president of the replacement workers' and peasants' group in parliament, and later went underground before reaching the Soviet Union, where he rejoined Maurice Thorez. After returning to France in 1944, he resumed leadership in the Nord federation (of PCF), helped direct the communist daily *Liberté* in Lille, served again in parliament and in the Senate, and by 1958 remained one of the strongest regional communist figures in the country even though he had lost his place in the Politburo (innercore) in 1950.

By 2 June 1958, Ramette stood firmly against de Gaulle's return on emergency terms and against the transfer of greater power to the executive at the expense of parliament. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored wage protection, social welfare, housing construction, defense of miners and industrial labor, and attacks on what he called the excessive profits of capitalist firms. In the Algerian War, his position was that the war was worsening France's economic and financial crisis, draining resources from housing and development, and had to be brought to a political end rather than prolonged through repression and escalation. French Communist Party (PCF); Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet far left.

## 16. Guy Mollet

Speaker of the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO), deputy for the Pas-de-Calais.

Born in 1905 in Flers in the Orne, Mollet studied as a teacher, settled in Arras as an English instructor, and entered socialist and trade-union politics in the 1920s. During the Second World War he was mobilized, wounded, taken prisoner, then joined the Resistance through the OCM after his release, later taking part in the liberation of Normandy. After 1945 he became mayor of Arras and quickly rose inside the SFIO, becoming its secretary-general in 1946 and one of the dominant party leaders of the Fourth Republic.

During the Fourth Republic, Mollet combined strict party leadership with a reformist socialist image, but his career became deeply controversial through his premiership of 1956–57. He helped advance European integration, including the Rome Treaties and Euratom, yet his government was also marked by the Suez crisis and by the intensification of the Algerian War through special powers and a hardening of French policy. By the May crisis of 1958, he chose to negotiate with de Gaulle rather than resist him to the end, helped bring a large part of the SFIO behind the investiture, and entered the new government himself, a move that weakened his standing among many socialists and sharpened conflicts with figures such as Daniel Mayer and Alain Savary.

By June 2 1958, Mollet was in favor of keeping republican legality by accepting a stronger executive and controlled constitutional reform instead of letting military and settler pressure cause the state to completely lose its power. He preferred reformist socialism, welfare measures, state intervention, European cooperation, and anti-communist parliamentary order to revolutionary politics when it came to the economy and society. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to restore authority, continue fighting the FLN, and push the conflict toward a controlled political settlement under French direction rather than immediate Algerian independence. French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO); democratic socialist, reformist, anti-communist, pro-European, and broadly Atlanticist.

## 17. Christian Pineau

Socialist deputy for the Sarthe on 2 June 1958 and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, having held that ministry from 1 February 1956 to 14 May 1958.

Born in 1904 in Chaumont in Haute-Marne, Pineau studied law and political science in Paris, placed first in the Banque de France entrance competition, and then worked in banking before moving into trade-union activism through the CGT. He entered national politics from the socialist and syndicalist world rather than from local notability, and before the war he had already built a reputation as a serious economic and labor-minded figure.

During the Second World War, Pineau opposed both the armistice and the Vichy regime, helped found the Libération-Nord resistance movement, made contact with Free France in London, and was later arrested by the Gestapo and deported to Buchenwald. After Liberation, he entered de Gaulle's provisional government, then became one of the main socialist parliamentarians of the Fourth Republic, serving in major economic ministries before rising to the Quai d'Orsay under Guy Mollet. His career was marked both by prestige and controversy, since as foreign minister he became closely associated with the Suez crisis while also signing the Treaties of Rome and defending European integration. By 1958 he stood near the moderate, governing wing of the SFIO, close to Mollet on many major questions even if he was less dogmatic in style.

By 2 June 1958, Pineau stood for parliamentary legality, republican order, European integration, and resistance to any transfer of power brought about by military pressure from Algiers. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored reformist socialism, modernization, welfare protections, and closer European cooperation rather than communist economics or conservative colonial nationalism. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to keep control of policy in civilian republican hands, reject the pressure of the Algiers activists, and move the conflict toward a political settlement rather than allow the army and settlers to dictate the future of the Republic. French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO); moderate reformist socialist, pro-European, anti-communist, and Atlanticist.

## 18. Robert Lacoste

Socialist deputy for the Dordogne on 2 June 1958 and the recently departed former Minister of Algeria, making him one of the central SFIO figures most closely known for French policy in Algeria during the crisis of the Fourth Republic.

Born in 1898 in Azerat in the Dordogne, Lacoste studied law in Paris, became a civil servant and CGT trade unionist, and entered politics through the socialist and labor movement rather than through elite parliamentary asylum. During and after the Second World War he built a strong reputation as a resistant and administrator, serving in the Resistance and then rising into the provisional government of Liberation under de Gaulle. In the late 1940s and 1950s he became one of the most important governing socialists of the Fourth Republic, held positions in industry, commerce, and briefly finance before taking on the Algerian question.

After the “day of tomatoes” crisis in February 1956, he replaced General Catroux and served first as resident minister in Algeria and then as Minister of Algeria until May 1958, where he became associated with forceful repression, exceptional powers for the army, and the hardening of the war. At the same time, he also supported administrative and socio-economic reforms in Algeria, including efforts to expand Muslim representation and reorganize the territory, which reflected his belief that repression and reform had to go together.

By 2 June 1958, Lacoste stood for preservation of French sovereignty in Algeria, a strong state, and a “French solution” imposed from Paris rather than abandonment, military separatism, or revolutionary decolonization. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored reformist socialism, state intervention, modernization, and public authority, but he believed that national recovery required order and hardness rather than parliamentary drift. In the Algerian War, his position was that the FLN had to be defeated militarily, that France had to retain control of the territory, and that reform for Muslim Algerians should occur within continued French rule rather than through immediate independence. French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO);

reformist socialist, anti-communist, statist, and strongly committed in 1958 to keeping Algeria French.

## **19. Paul Ramadier**

Socialist deputy for Aveyron on 2 June 1958 and one of the SFIO's old-guard statesmen, a former Prime Minister of France and former Minister of Finance.

Born in 1888 in La Rochelle, Ramadier studied law, became an advocate in Paris, and built his political base as mayor of Decazeville and then as a deputy from Aveyron. He was part of the long-established republican socialist tradition and became known for being serious, having experience in parliament, and being especially strong on labor, budget, and economic issues.

During the Second World War, he was one of the parliamentarians who voted against granting full powers to Pétain on 10 July 1940, then later joined the Resistance under the name "Violette." After Liberation he served in de Gaulle's provisional government, and in 1947 he became the first premier of the Fourth Republic, where his government faced food shortages, labor unrest, colonial conflict, and the deepening split between communists and the rest of the governing coalition. He later returned to high office as Minister of Finance under Guy Mollet in 1956–57, reinforcing his image as an experienced economic manager.

By 2 June 1958, Ramadier stood for parliamentary legality, republican continuity, and restoration of governmental authority without abandoning the traditions of the Parliamentary-based republic. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored reformist socialism combined with budget discipline, monetary stability, and careful state management rather than either communist economics or careless drift. In the Algerian War, his position was that the crisis had to remain under civilian republican control and could not be allowed to destroy the institutions of France. French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO); old-guard reformist socialist, anti-communist, and firmly parliamentary in orientation.

## 20. Jules Moch

Socialist deputy for Hérault on 2 June 1958 and one of the SFIO's leading anti-communist and security-focused figures, having just served as Minister of the Interior in Pierre Pflimlin's government during the May 1958 crisis.

Born in 1893 in Paris, Moch trained as an engineer at the École Polytechnique and entered socialist politics as a highly intellectual, technocratic figure rather than as a traditional local notable. He first won election as a deputy for Drôme and later for Hérault, where he became one of the most important national socialist figures tied to the department. Before the war he was already associated with Léon Blum's camp and built a reputation for expertise in transport, public works, and economic administration.

During the Second World War, Moch opposed Vichy, was imprisoned, joined the Resistance, and later took part in the liberation effort with the Free French. After Liberation he returned to the front rank of politics, serving repeatedly as minister, especially in transport, the interior, and national defense. His career became particularly controversial because as Interior Minister in 1947–50 he became famous for crushing major communist-led strikes, which made him one of the most hated socialist figures on the far left and one of the clearest symbols of anti-communist republican firmness. By 1958 he also had a significant international reputation through his work on defense questions and as France's delegate on disarmament.

By 2 June 1958, Moch stood for republican legality, strong public order, and firm civilian control of the state against both communist agitation and military pressure from Algeria. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored reformist socialism, modernization, state management, and social order rather than communist economics or authoritarian nationalism. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to preserve authority and defeat insurrection, but that policy had to remain in the hands of the lawful republican government rather than the army or the settler movement in Algiers.

French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO); anti-communist, reformist socialist, republican, and Atlanticist in orientation.

## 21. André Le Troquer

Socialist deputy for the Seine, and one of the senior parliamentary figures of the Fourth Republic.

Born in Paris in 1884, Le Troquer trained as a lawyer and entered socialist politics before the First World War. He was badly wounded in that war and lost the use of his right arm, a mark that remained central to his public image as a veteran of the Republic. Elected as a socialist deputy in the 1930s at first.

During the collapse of 1940, he opposed the armistice, sought to continue the struggle from North Africa, later defended Léon Blum at Riom, and then helped rebuild the SFIO in clandestinity while serving in the Resistance and the National Council of the Resistance. He developed a relationship of confidence with de Gaulle during the Liberation period, served in the provisional authorities, entered Paris with the Free French in August 1944, and later held the posts of Interior Minister and briefly Defense Minister. By the 1950s he had risen to the presidency of the Parliament and become one of the clearest parliamentary guardians of the Fourth Republic's legal order.

He played a key but difficult role in the May 1958 crisis. He didn't like any kind of bonapartist drift, but he met with de Gaulle and Gaston Monnerville at Saint-Cloud at René Coty's request and worked to make sure that de Gaulle's return happened through constitutional means instead of a military coup. That made him crucial in legalizing the transfer of power, even though he understood that the constitutional revision of June 1958 would likely mean the end of the Parliament-centered regime he had spent years defending.

By 2 June 1958, Le Troquer stood for parliamentary legality, republican continuity, and preservation of civilian authority at a moment of institutional collapse. On the economic and sociological situation, he fit the SFIO's reformist socialist tradition, favoring state action, social protection, and democratic order over communist economics or authoritarian nationalism. In the Algerian War, his position was that the crisis had to remain under the control of the lawful metropolitan government and could not be settled by military pressure or settler insurrection.

French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO); reformist socialist, parliamentary republican, and strongly attached to constitutional legality.

## 22. Pierre Mendès France

**Radical Party speaker** for the Eure on 2 June 1958, former Prime Minister of France, and the leading figure of the left wing of the Radical Party.

Born in 1907 in Paris, Mendès France studied law and political science, entered the Radical Party in the 1920s, and became one of the youngest lawyers in France before beginning his parliamentary career. Elected deputy for the Eure in 1932, he quickly built a reputation for brilliance on financial and economic questions and entered government under Léon Blum in 1938 as an undersecretary of state. From early on, he stood out inside the Radical camp as a modernizing, reformist, and unusually left-leaning republican rather than a traditional party notable.

During the Second World War, he served in the air force, was imprisoned by the Vichy regime, escaped, and eventually reached London, where he joined the Free French. After Liberation he served under de Gaulle in the provisional authorities, then rose to national prominence as Prime Minister in 1954–55, above all by ending French involvement in the Indochina War and trying to renovate both the Fourth Republic and the Radical Party. His career also became defined by Algeria: he resigned from Guy Mollet's government in 1956 over its handling of the war, and by 1958 he stood in open conflict with the more conservative and colonial wing of his own party. By the May 1958 crisis, he had become one of the clearest anti-Gaullist voices of the non-communist left.

By 2 June 1958, Mendès France stood firmly against de Gaulle's return under emergency pressure and against constitutional change that weakened parliamentary sovereignty in favor of a stronger executive. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored modernization, planning, public honesty, social reform, and a more rational republican state rather than conservative drift or personal rule. In the Algerian War, his position was that the crisis could not be solved by military force alone, that civilian republican authority had to prevail over settler and army pressure, and that the conflict had to move toward a political settlement.

Radical Party (PR); left-wing radical republican, reformist, anti-Gaullist, and strongly parliamentary in orientation.

## 23. Félix Gaillard

Radical deputy for Charente on 2 June 1958 and the recently fallen former Prime Minister of France, having served as the prime minister of the cabinet from 6 November 1957 until April 1958.

Born in 1919 in Paris, Gaillard studied law and entered the Inspection des finances, coming into politics as a brilliant young technocrat rather than as a traditional local notable. During the Second World War he joined the Resistance and worked on its financial committee, then after Liberation entered parliamentary life as a deputy for Charente in 1946. By the 1950s he had already built a reputation as one of the most gifted younger figures of the Radical Party, especially on questions of finance, economic management, and modernization.

His rise was exceptionally rapid. He served in several major ministerial posts during the Fourth Republic, notably in economic and financial portfolios, and in 1957 became Prime Minister as the youngest head of government France had seen since Napoleon. His premiership was energetic but fragile, and it became closely associated both with technocratic modernization and with the instability of the late Fourth Republic. It also ended in controversy after the Sakiet Sidi Youssef crisis on the Tunisian border and the disputes that followed over Algeria, Tunisia, and foreign mediation, which helped bring down his government in April 1958.

By 2 June 1958, Gaillard stood for economic modernization, administrative efficiency, and a stronger, more rational state, but not for outright Bonapartist personal rule. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored technocratic reform, fiscal seriousness, industrial development, and national modernization, which also helps explain why he was linked to the early strengthening of France's nuclear program. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to preserve authority, continue the fight against the FLN, and seek a controlled political outcome under French power rather than immediate independence, even though the crisis had already wrecked his own ministry. Radical Party (PR); center-left radical republican, modernizing technocrat, and broadly anti-communist.

## 24. Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury

Radical deputy for Haute-Garonne on 2 June 1958 and a recent former Prime Minister of France, as well as former Minister of National Defense and former Minister of the Interior in the Fourth Republic.

Born in 1914 in Luisant in Eure-et-Loir, Bourgès-Maunoury was trained at the École Polytechnique, also studied law and political science, and entered public life as a highly educated technocratic radical rather than as a traditional local notable. Before the war he belonged to the younger, more reformist wing of the Radical Party, and from the beginning he stood out for his administrative ability and interest in questions of state modernization and national defense.

During the Second World War, he served as an artillery officer, joined the Resistance, worked with the X-Libre network, and was later recognized as a Companion of the Liberation. After Liberation he became commissioner of the Republic in Bordeaux, then entered parliamentary politics and rose quickly through the Fourth Republic, eventually serving as Minister of National Defense, Prime Minister in 1957, and Minister of the Interior in late 1957 to early 1958. His premiership was associated with the ratification of the Treaty of Rome and with the attempt to hold together a collapsing parliamentary center, but it was also marked by the Algerian crisis and by his support for a hard line in North Africa. By June 1958, although he had been a strong-state Radical and no pacifist on Algeria, he had turned against de Gaulle's return and later campaigned against the new constitutional order.

By 2 June 1958, Bourgès-Maunoury stood for republican legality, technocratic modernization, and a stronger but still parliamentary state rather than a transfer of power built around one dominant executive figure. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored administrative efficiency, fiscal seriousness, national modernization, and orderly reform directed by the state rather than communist economics or political drift. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to preserve control, maintain sovereignty, and pursue a forceful policy against the FLN rather than move immediately toward independence.

Radical Party (PR); modernizing, anti-communist, strong-state radical republican of the party's reformist wing.

## 25. René Billères

Radical deputy for the Hautes-Pyrénées on 2 June 1958 and former Minister of National Education, having held that ministry from 1956 to 1958 in the Mollet, Bourgès-Maunoury, and Gaillard governments.

Born in 1910 in Ger in the Hautes-Pyrénées, Billères studied at the École normale supérieure, became an agrégé (“uzman öğretmen” in Turkish) in letters, and entered politics as an intellectual and reform-minded radical rather than as a purely local notable. He was elected deputy in 1946 and built a reputation as one of the younger modernizing figures of the Radical Party, especially on educational and social issues. As education minister, he became closely associated with the “Plan Billères,” which aimed to extend compulsory schooling and broaden access to secondary education.

His political style was more humanist and reformist than colonial or security-driven, and he was widely seen as part of the current around Pierre Mendès France that wanted to push radicalism toward modernization and a more serious social program. At the same time, he was not part of the anti-Gaullist refusal camp in June 1958: he voted confidence in de Gaulle on 1 June and voted for full powers and constitutional revision on 2 June. That placed him among the Radical figures who accepted de Gaulle as the legal solution to the immediate institutional breakdown, even if he did not represent the authoritarian or hard-right wing of French politics.

By 2 June 1958, Billères stood for republican legality, educational expansion, and state-led modernization rather than parliamentary paralysis or ideological extremism. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored public investment, social mobility, and reform of the education system as part of a broader effort to modernize France and reduce class barriers. In the Algerian War, his position was that the crisis had to be brought back under legal civilian authority in Paris and handled through reform and political control rather than through settler or military pressure from Algiers.

Radical Party (PR); center-left radical republican, reformist, modernizing, and close to the Mendèsist current.

## 26. Édouard Daladier

Radical deputy for Vaucluse on 2 June 1958, former Prime Minister of France, and one of the old-guard elder statesmen of the Radical Party.

Born in 1884 in Carpentras, Daladier began his career as a teacher before rising through local and national politics, first as mayor and then as one of the principal leaders of the Radical Party. A veteran of the First World War, he became one of the major republican figures of the interwar years, led the left wing of the Radical Party, and served repeatedly as minister and prime minister in the 1930s. His pre-1958 reputation was inseparable from Munich and the collapse of 1940, which left him both an experienced statesman and a deeply contested symbol of the old parliamentary order.

After the defeat of 1940, he left Massilia, was arrested by the Vichy authorities, defended himself forcefully at the Riom Trial, and spent the war years in captivity before returning to parliamentary life in 1946. During the Fourth Republic he remained a prominent Radical deputy for Vaucluse and a strong critic of both communist influence and Gaullist attacks on the parliamentary regime. By 1958 he stood politically closer to anti-Gaullist republican figures such as Pierre Mendès France and François Mitterrand than to those in the center who were ready to reorganize the regime around de Gaulle.

By 2 June 1958, Daladier stood firmly for the classical parliamentary republic, civilian legality, and resistance to any transfer of power produced by pressure from the army and the ultras in Algeria. Three days after the 13 May coup in Algiers, he called for defense of the Republic against “personal power,” marched in the 28 May demonstration for the defense of the Republic, then voted against de Gaulle’s investiture, against full powers, and against constitutional revision. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored republican order, financial seriousness, and moderate reform through parliamentary institutions rather than authoritarian concentration of power or communist class politics.

Radical Party (PR); old-guard radical republican, parliamentary, anti-Gaullist in June 1958, and strongly attached to national sovereignty expressed through the Assembly.

## 27. André Morice

Radical deputy for Loire-Inférieure on 2 June 1958 and one of the strongest right-wing figures of the Radical Party, as well as a former Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces.

Born in 1900 in Nantes, Morice studied law in Paris, emerged from a family rooted in left-republican, secular Radical politics, and built his early career through youth republican activism before becoming a major Radical leader in his department. In parallel, he founded and ran a public works company, which gave him a more business-minded and administrative profile than many traditional parliamentary radicals. After the Liberation he sat in both Constituent Assemblies and then continuously in the Parliament, while also holding a long series of ministerial offices in technical education, sports, merchant navy, public works, commerce, and finally defense.

By the later Fourth Republic, Morice had become identified with the hard, nationalist, and colonial wing of Radical politics. His name became permanently tied to the “Morice Line,” the fortified and mined barrier established in 1957 on the Algerian borders while he was defense minister, which symbolized his support for a forceful military containment strategy against the FLN. Politically, he stood in constant tension with Pierre Mendès France and the Radical left, since he rejected their softer or more reformist colonial approach and instead defended a much firmer conception of French authority.

By 2 June 1958, Morice stood for a strong state, administrative authority, and preservation of French sovereignty in Algeria rather than retreat or negotiated abandonment. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored modernization, infrastructure, business-minded state management, and firm public order rather than ideological experimentation or left-wing radicalization. In the Algerian War, his position was that Algeria had to remain French, that the FLN had to be defeated, and that metropolitan politics could not be allowed to weaken national resolve.

Radical Party (PR); right-wing radical republican, anti-communist, colonial nationalist, and a strong defender of Algérie française.

## 28. Pierre-Henri Teitgen

**Popular Republican Movement speaker** for Ille-et-Vilaine on 2 June 1958 and one of the MRP's leading jurists, former party president, and former Minister of Justice and National Defense.

Born in 1908 in Rennes, Teitgen studied law at Nancy, became one of France's youngest agrégés (“uzman öğretmen” in Turkish) in public law, and made his name as a professor and legal intellectual before the war. He entered Christian democratic politics through the MRP after Liberation, served continuously as deputy for Ille-et-Vilaine from 1945 to 1958, and led the party from 1952 to 1956. More than a local notable, he was known nationally as one of the MRP's principal constitutional minds and one of its most serious dogmatic voices.

During the Second World War, Teitgen was taken prisoner in 1940, escaped, and joined the Resistance, later being named a Companion of the Liberation. After Liberation he entered de Gaulle's provisional government, served as Minister of Information and then Minister of Justice, and became closely associated with the purge of collaborators and the reconstruction of republican legality. He later held several major offices under the Fourth Republic, including Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Overseas France, while also developing a strong profile as a pro-European statesman. By 1958 he stood near the left wing of the MRP, combining Catholic democratic politics with legalism, social reform, and a strong commitment to European institutions.

By 2 June 1958, Teitgen stood for restoring authority through legal constitutional revision rather than through an outright military rupture, and as rapporteur he made clear that the MRP would support de Gaulle on the basis of the guarantees the General had given to Parliament. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored Christian-democratic reform, social protections, state-guided modernization, and European integration rather than communist class politics or pure laissez-faire conservatism. In the Algerian War, however, his position was distinctly hard: he supported Robert Lacoste's repressive line, compared Arab nationalism to Nazism, and treated compromise with the FLN as a French surrender comparable to Munich.

Popular Republican Movement (MRP); Christian democratic, pro-European, anti-communist, and center-right with a legalist parliamentary temperament.

## 29. Maurice Schumann

Popular Republican Movement deputy for the Nord on 2 June 1958 and one of the MRP's best-known national figures, especially in foreign affairs and public communication. He was already famous across France as the wartime "Voice of London."

Born in Paris in 1911, Schumann studied philosophy, moved into journalism in the 1930s, and first made his name through political reporting and Catholic intellectual circles rather than through local machine politics. He belonged to the Christian democratic current that would later form the MRP, and from early on he combined strong republican patriotism with Catholic social thought and interest in foreign affairs.

During the Second World War, he went to London, joined Free France, and became one of its most important public voices through hundreds of BBC broadcasts directed at occupied France. After Liberation he entered the Provisional Consultative Assembly, helped found the MRP, and rose rapidly inside the party, serving as its president from 1944 to 1949 and later as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1951 to 1954. By 1958 he had become one of the most recognizable MRP parliamentarians, combining Resistance prestige, parliamentary experience, and a reputation for seriousness on diplomatic and European questions.

By 2 June 1958, Schumann stood for republican legality, national authority, and a restoration of effective government through de Gaulle's return by constitutional means rather than by military rupture. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored Christian-democratic reform, social protections, state-guided modernization, and European cooperation rather than communist class politics or purely conservative laissez-faire politics. In the Algerian War, his position was that France had to avoid diplomatic isolation, maintain state authority, and prevent the Algerian crisis from being resolved through either revolutionary victory or a collapse of metropolitan power.

Popular Republican Movement (MRP); Christian democratic, pro-European, anti-communist, and center-right with a strong Resistance-based patriotic identity.

## 30. Paul Bacon

Popular Republican Movement deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958, already one of the MRP's best-known social-policy figures in the Fourth Republic.

Born in Paris in 1907, Bacon came from a working-class background, moved early into Christian trade-union activism, and built his political identity through Catholic social thought rather than through conservative notability. After Liberation he became a deputy for the Seine, joined the national leadership of the MRP, and developed a strong profile as a labor specialist and advocate of social reform. He was also closely associated with the party's effort to link the working world to Christian democracy and to present the MRP as a social as well as a religious and republican force.

During the Second World War, Bacon joined the Resistance through Georges Bidault's National Liberation Movement and was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943. After 1945 he became one of the principal architects of French labor and welfare policy, serving repeatedly as Minister of Labour and helping shape postwar social security institutions. He became especially identified with social dialogue, labor protections, and the creation of the SMIG, which made him one of the clearest social-policy faces of postwar Christian democracy. By 1958, he stood close to the governing leadership of the MRP and was one of the party figures most willing to work with de Gaulle in order to stabilize the state.

By 2 June 1958, Bacon stood for republican legality, social reform, and restoration of effective government through de Gaulle's return by constitutional means rather than through military rupture. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored Christian-democratic social policy, protection of workers, wage regulation, welfare institutions, and state-guided modernization rather than communist class politics or pure laissez-faire conservatism. On the Algerian War, his position was broadly that France had to preserve state authority and avoid national collapse, while keeping policy in the hands of the lawful government rather than allowing the crisis to be dictated by insurrectionary pressure from Algeria. Popular Republican Movement (MRP); Christian democratic, anti-communist, socially reformist, and pro-European.

## 31. Robert Buron

Popular Republican Movement deputy for Mayenne on 2 June 1958 and one of the younger socially reformist figures of the MRP, also a former minister under several Fourth Republic governments.

Born in 1910 in Paris, Buron studied law and entered politics through Catholic and Christian-democratic activism rather than through the older radical or conservative parliamentary networks. After the Liberation, he was elected for Mayenne, and he built his career as an MRP parliamentarian with a reputation for social reform, administrative competence, and economic policies. During the Fourth Republic, he served in major ministerial positions, including Economic Affairs, Information, Overseas France, and Finance.

Buron was active in the Resistance, was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944, and after the Liberation became one of the Christian-democratic generations trying to reconcile republican legality, social reform, and moral seriousness in public life. Within the MRP, he was known for his social awareness, notably through his defense of the party's "option travailliste," which placed him on the reformist side of Christian Democrats.

By 2 June 1958, Buron stood for restoring state authority through legal means rather than through a military rupture. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored Christian-democratic social reform, modernization, and public responsibility rather than either communist policies or strict conservatism. In the Algerian War, he believed that Algeria had to evolve politically and that the crisis had to remain under civilian political control rather than be dictated by settlers or military pressure.

Popular Republican Movement (MRP); Christian democratic, center-right overall, but belonging to its socially reformist wing.

## 32. Robert Schuman

Popular Republican Movement deputy for Moselle on 2 June 1958 and first president of the new European Parliamentary Assembly.

Born in 1886 in Luxembourg City, Schuman studied law at German universities and spent his early career as a lawyer and Catholic deputy from Lorraine after the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. During the interwar period, he became one of the leading Christian-democratic and Catholic republican figures of eastern France, known for his seriousness, legal expertise, and attachment to parliamentary government. Although he was not popular as much as de Gaulle or Mollet, by 1958, Schuman was one of the most respected figures of the parliamentary center.

His career was marked by both prestige and controversy. In July 1940 he voted full powers to Pétain and briefly served in the last government of the Third Republic, which damaged his reputation, but he was later arrested by the Gestapo, escaped custody, lived in hiding until Liberation, and was politically rehabilitated with de Gaulle's support in 1945. After the war he became one of the central leaders of the MRP, served as the minister of finance, twice as the prime minister, and above all as the foreign minister from 1948 to 1953, where he worked with Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer and gave his name to the 1950 Schuman Declaration. By 1958, he had become the symbol of Christian-democratic France.

By 2 June 1958, Schuman stood for republican legality, Christian-democratic social reform, European cooperation, and restoration of effective government without abandoning parliamentary legitimacy. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored a market economy with social awareness, welfare protections, modernization, and a common point between capital and labor rather than a communist stance or authoritarian nationalism. On the Algerian War, he claimed that the crisis had to remain under lawful civilian authority, that France could not allow military and settler pressure to dictate national policy, and that order had to be restored without destroying the Republic's legal foundations.

Popular Republican Movement (MRP); Christian democratic, pro-European, anti-communist, and center-right with a strongly legalist and parliamentary orientation.

### 33. Georges Bidault

Popular Republican Movement deputy for the Loire on 2 June 1958, former President of the Council, former Foreign Minister, and one of the founding elder figures of the MRP.

Born in 1899 in Moulins, Bidault studied history in Paris, taught at Valenciennes, Reims, and Louis-le-Grand, and first became nationally known through Catholic youth and political journalism. In the 1930s he moved from the Parti démocrate populaire into a broader Christian-democratic milieu, co-founded *L'Aube*, and built a reputation as an anti-fascist Catholic republican who opposed Maurras, Nazism, and the Munich settlement.

During the Second World War, Bidault joined Combat, represented the Christian Democrats in the National Council of the Resistance, and succeeded Jean Moulin as president of the CNR in 1943. After the Liberation he supported de Gaulle in Paris, entered the provisional government as foreign minister, helped found the MRP in 1944, and then became one of the central statesmen of the new regime, serving as foreign minister, head of the provisional government, and later President of the Council. However, after 1954, he shifted towards the nationalist right, opposing what he called the politics of “abandonment,” clashing with Pierre Mendès France, and aligned with the defenders of French Algeria.

By 2 June 1958, Bidault stood for strong state authority, militant anti-communism, and a hard nationalist refusal to concede Algeria. On the economic and sociological situation, he supported Christian-democratic social conservatism, national unity, and public authority in terms of the economy and society. However, by this point, he was more focused on issues of nation, empire, and order than social reformism of the MRP’s moderate wing. On the Algerian War, he proposed that France must reject any idea of abandonment, keep Algeria under French sovereignty, and resist both parliamentary weakness and colonial retreat.

Popular Republican Movement (MRP); right-wing Christian democrat, anti-communist, nationalist, and strongly committed in June 1958 to *Algérie française*.

## 34. Pierre Poujade

**Speaker for the Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans** on 2 June 1958 and founder and symbolic leader of the party as well and the populist movement generally known as Poujadism.

Born in 1920 in Saint-Céré in the Lot, Poujade came from a modest background, worked in commerce, and eventually became a bookseller and stationer in his homeland. He did not rise through the traditional parties of the Republic but through protest politics, creating a movement that appealed to small shopkeepers, artisans, and provincial taxpayers who felt threatened by modernization, bureaucracy, and the tax authorities. Rather than engaging in movements within the parliament, he utilized mass meetings and his ability to present himself as the voice of “little people” against elites to enforce his political stance.

In 1953 he launched a tax revolt in Saint-Céré, then turned the UDCA into a sudden nationwide movement marked by anti-tax populism, anti-intellectualism, anti-communism, and deep hostility to the parliamentary regime. In the 1956 elections, his movement assisted a large bloc of deputies into the National Assembly, but it remained ideologically unstable, containing conservatives, nationalists, anti-system populists, and figures far to the right. By 1958, Poujade had become one of the symbols of the crisis of the Fourth Republic, admired by supporters as a defender of small producers and condemned by critics as a demagogue who helped legitimize anti-parliamentary politics.

By 2 June 1958, Poujade was known for his hostility to the established political class, defense of small proprietors, lower taxes, and a stronger, more direct conception of authority than the Fourth Republic had provided. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored protection of small business, resistance to fiscal pressure, hesitation toward technocratic modernization, and opposition to the financial, administrative, and intellectual elites. On the Algerian War, he suggested that France had to remain firm, reject retreat, and preserve national authority, which located him on the side of *Algérie française* and the anti-compromise nationalist right.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA); far-right populist, anti-tax, anti-communist, anti-parliamentary, and nationalist.

## 35. Jean-Marie Le Pen

Deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958 and one of the youngest public figures of the Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans party.

Born in 1928 in La Trinité-sur-Mer in Brittany, Le Pen came from a modest Catholic family, studied law in Paris, and entered politics very young through student activism on the nationalist right. He started his reputation via deep parliamentary experience rather than combative speaking, personal ambition, and a capacity to prevail in the anti-establishment politics of the UDCA movement. Among the Poujadists, he represented a younger and more aggressive stance than many of the small-trader protest figures around him.

His early career was marked by militancy and controversy. He served in the army, including in Indochina and Algeria, formed the image of a hard nationalist veteran, and entered the National Assembly in 1956 as part of the Poujadist movement. He was known for his sharp anti-communism, harsh rhetoric, and strong association with imperial and military themes. By June 1958, he was one of the deputies most associated with a harsh nationalist response to the crises of both Algeria and the French regime.

By 2 June 1958, Le Pen promoted strong authority, fierce anti-communism, contempt for the parliamentary center, and a militant defense of French Algeria. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored protection of small producers, national discipline, social conservatism, and nationalist-authoritarian policies rather than reformist movements. On the Algerian War, he believed that France had to defeat the FLN, refuse retreat, and reject any settlement that undermined French sovereignty.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA); far-right nationalist, anti-communist, anti-parliamentary, and strongly committed to *Algérie française*.

## 36. Jean-Maurice Demarquet

Deputy for the Finistère on 2 June 1958 and one of the ideological young figures within the Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans party, aligned with its nationalist side.

Born in 1920, Demarquet belonged to a younger generation of right-wing deputies who entered parliament through the anti-system wave created by Poujadism rather than through a long career in one of the established parties. He entered politics as a militant of the nationalist right rather than a regional figure, and within the UDCA bloc, he stood out for boosting more intellectual and political shape to a movement driven by protest alone. Compared with Pierre Poujade's more instinctive populism, Demarquet represented a more explicitly nationalist and activist style.

His parliamentary rise was tied to the 1956 Poujadist breakthrough, when the movement sent a large group of deputies to the Assembly. He was closely associated with the younger hard-line figures around Jean-Marie Le Pen and with attempts to push the movement beyond tax revolt toward a broader nationalist and anti-parliamentary doctrine, making him part of the camp that was attracted to forceful solutions, executive authority, and rejection of the old party system. By June 1958, he was identified with ideological radicalization more than with the original small-shopkeeper grievances that had launched the movement.

By 2 June 1958, Demarquet supported nationalist renewal, anti-communism, and rejection of the party system that he viewed as corrupt and exhausted. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored defense of independent producers, hostility to administrative and fiscal centralization, and a socially conservative politics centered on discipline and national unity. On the Algerian War, he thought that France had to remain firm, refuse compromise, and keep Algeria under French sovereignty rather than move toward negotiation or withdrawal.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA); far-right nationalist, anti-parliamentary, anti-communist, and aligned with the movement's more ideological wing.

## 37. Léon Delbecque

Deputy for the Nord on 2 June 1958, elected on the Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans party, and one of the most significant behind-the-scenes figures of the May 1958 crisis.

Born in 1919 in the Nord, Delbecque studied law and moved through nationalist and activist political circles rather than through the classical parliamentary parties. Although elected with the Poujadists in 1956, he was not just a tax-revolt deputy and was far more connected to power networks, strategic maneuvering, and the politics of crisis than many others in the group. His importance came from organization, personal contacts, and political operations rather than from symbolic leadership or ideological writing.

By the late Fourth Republic, Delbecque had become deeply involved in the momentum pushing for an end to the parliamentary paralysis. In the spring of 1958, he was one of the key civilian figures in Algiers helping organize the Committee of Public Safety and the pressure campaign that critically contributed to de Gaulle's return. This contribution made him a consequential figure for his age and party label, while also making him highly controversial as someone operating at the intersection of parliamentary politics, nationalist networks, and extra-parliamentary pressure. By 2 June 1958, he was aligned with the camp that wanted the Algerian crisis resolved through a transfer of authority to a stronger national leadership.

By 2 June 1958, Delbecque favored the rejection of Fourth Republic weakness, strong executive authority, militant anti-communism, and a nationalist solution to the French crisis. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored order, authority, suspicion toward traditional party politics, and a politics of national restoration rather than social reform in the parliamentary socialist ideals. On the Algerian War, he claimed that France had to keep Algeria, back the forces of order, and refuse any retreat under insurgent pressure.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA); nationalist right, anti-communist, anti-parliamentary, and closely aligned with the hard-line *Algérie française* camp.

## 38. Henri Dorgères

Deputy for Ille-et-Vilaine on 2 June 1958 and one of the most famous agrarian-nationalist figures associated with the Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans party.

Born in 1897 in Wasquehal in the Nord, Dorgères came from a modest butcher's family, studied with difficulty after his father's death, and was marked early by militant nationalism during the First World War, when he was imprisoned by the Germans and later received the Croix de guerre. After briefly studying law, he turned to journalism in Brittany and started his reputation as the organizer of peasant protest, especially through *Progrès agricole de l'Ouest* and the agrarian mobilizations that produced the Front paysan, Défense paysanne, and the "Green Shirts." By the 1930s he was a famous anti-party provoker whose politics mixed defense of small farmers with authoritarian, anti-parliamentary, and anti-bureaucratic sentiment.

After fighting again in 1939–40, he escaped captivity and then entered the Vichy agrarian apparatus and became a leading figure in the Corporation paysanne, which permanently linked his name to collaborationist and corporatist politics even though he later obtained political relief from postwar penalties because of services recognized as having aided the Resistance. Returning to public life in the 1950s, he resumed peasant militancy, drew closer to Pujade, and won election in 1956 as a protest deputy rooted in agrarian and anti-fiscal discontent.

By 2 June 1958, Dorgères became known for his defense of small farmers, hostility to parliamentary weakness, and a nationalist conception of authority that relocated him closer to the anti-system right compared to the old republican center. On the economic and sociological situation, he favored protection of peasants, artisans, and small producers, fierce resistance to fiscal pressure, and suspicion toward technocratic modernization and European integration. On the Algerian War, his stance was that France had to remain firm, reject retreat, and preserve national authority, which placed him clearly on the side of *Algérie française*.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA); agrarian nationalist right; far-right populist, anti-parliamentary, anti-tax, and anti-communist.

### 39. Louis Caminade

Deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958 and one of the organizational figures of the Poujadist movement in Paris and its suburbs, especially on questions related to tax protest and the movement's small-business base.

Caminade emerged politically not through the established parties of the Fourth Republic but through the anti-tax revolt that made Pierre Poujade's movement a national force in the mid-1950s. Similar to many second-rank Poujadist deputies, he belonged to the political world of traders, artisans, and small proprietors who felt threatened by fiscal controls, administrative centralization, and the social effects of rapid modernization. He represented the kind of constituency from which Poujadism gained its first sparks.

His importance was backed mainly by organization and movement discipline, compared to his fame. Rather than standing as a great parliamentary speaker or an ideologue, he appears as the transformer of the Poujadist movements into a persistent political activity in and around the capital. He is known as one of the group's organizers, especially in the Paris suburbs, and as a figure who brought the UDCA's "tax strike" actions into parliament, placing him within the practical activist wing of the movement rather than among its symbolic leaders.

By 2 June 1958, Caminade stood for anti-tax populism, hostility to the established parliamentary parties, and defense of small independent producers against what Poujadists regarded as a fiscal and bureaucratic state in downfall. On the economic and sociological situation, he promoted relief for small business, resistance to central administration, and hesitation toward elite-led modernization that proved to benefit large interests over artisans and shopkeepers. On the Algerian War, his position fit the broader Poujadist right: firmness, rejection of retreat, and distrust of any settlement that looked like national decline or imperial surrender.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans (UDCA); far-right populist, anti-tax, anti-parliamentary, nationalist, and aligned with the *Algérie française* current.

## 40. Jean Dides

Deputy for the Seine on 2 June 1958, former police commissioner, and one of the most security-focused figures elected through the Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans party.

Born in Paris in 1915, Dides studied law, passed the police commissioner examination in 1937, and built his career inside the Paris police and the Renseignements généraux rather than through traditional party politics. In the early 1950s, he worked around Police Prefect Jean Baylot and became known for the anti-communist “Dides networks,” which sought to infiltrate communist circles and gave him further influence. The 1954 leaks scandal ended his police career but turned him into a famous political figure, and he entered the Assembly in 1956 from extreme-communist parts of the Seine on a radical anti-communist platform.

His earlier police work during and after the Occupation, his connections to hard anti-communist policing, and his doubted intelligence methods made him an object of suspicion even on the right, while communist deputies treated him as a symbol of police reaction. In the parliament, he became known for violent clashes with the PCF, for obsession with internal subversion, and for speeches positioning Algerian nationalism, communist organization, and metropolitan disorder into a single security crisis.

By 2 June 1958, Dides embraced strong policing, anti-communist repression, and a harsh nationalist answer to both the Algerian rebellion and domestic instability. On the economic and sociological situation, he was less a coherent economic thinker than a law-and-order politician who saw public authority, anti-subversive alertness, and national discipline as the primary conditions of recovery. On the Algerian War, his belief was that France had to crush FLN networks, back hard pacification, and refuse any weakening of sovereignty; by the end of May 1958, he viewed de Gaulle’s return favorably as a national rescue from parliamentary collapse.

Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans origin, later independent right; far-right security nationalist, anti-communist, anti-parliamentary, and strongly committed to *Algérie française*.

## 41. General Henri Lorillot

Army Chief of Staff on 2 June 1958 and one of the most senior professional soldiers in metropolitan France, positioned at the center of the struggle between legal military hierarchy and the rebellious political disputes regarding Algeria.

Born in 1901 in Bourges, Lorillot trained at Saint-Cyr and built a classic career through the professional officer corps, especially in colonial and operational commands. He rose as a disciplined army officer formed by the interwar military world, by the ethos of hierarchy, and by France's imperial responsibilities. By the 1950s he had become one of the Republic's top military figures, representing the regular high command rather than the activist factions around the Algerian crisis. His authority derived from seniority, command experience, and institutional legitimacy rather than ideological charisma.

His career placed him inside the central military problems of the late Fourth Republic. He had commanded in Algeria before reaching the highest levels of the army, which indicated that he was aware of the scale of the war and the frustrations of officers on the ground. At the same time, unlike the generals pushing direct political pressure from Algiers, he remained attached to regular hierarchy and lawful authority. He was a Republican general who was loyal to the Paris government and tried to restrain the rebellious activities in Algeria, creating a balance to the camp that wanted the army to become the decisive engine of regime change.

By 2 June 1958, Lorillot was known for his military discipline, continuity of command, and preservation of state authority through the legal government rather than through extra-parliamentary pressure. On the economic and sociological situation, his outlook was conservative and institutional, placing order, cohesion, and state stability above ideological reform programs. On the Algerian War, he embraced a harsh military-based stance, but politically, he did not support de Gaulle's rise to power and did not want the army used as an instrument for forcing a new regime onto Paris.

He belonged to no party, but his ideals were conservative, anti-communist in military culture, and opposed to de Gaulle's rise.

## 42. Admiral Philippe Auboyneau

Navy Chief of Staff on 2 June 1958 and one of the most prestigious senior admirals of the French armed forces, with a long career that linked the Free French tradition to the military command structure of the Fourth Republic.

Born in 1899 in Constantinople, Auboyneau entered the *École navale* in 1917 and built a long naval career through wartime service, overseas assignments, and higher command. Unlike many officers whose legacies formed mainly from colonial ground warfare, his career was backboneed by the navy, on strategic service across several theaters, and especially on his loyalty to Free France in 1940, giving him both military credibility and a strong attachment to the Gaullist tradition of national resistance and restored authority. By the 1950s he stood as one of the senior admirals whose legitimacy came from both combat service and political symbolism.

During the Second World War, he joined Free France, became one of the important naval officers of the Gaullist war effort, and held major commands in the Pacific and later in the unified French naval structure. After the war, he remained in top naval positions, and by the 1950s, he had become one of the senior admirals of the Republic. In contrast to more cautious or strictly legalist officers, he belonged to the military camp that viewed de Gaulle not as a threat to the state but as an individual capable of restoring national authority in a moment of crisis. His political position was marked by military discipline with political confidence in a Gaullist solution to the breakdown of the regime.

By 2 June 1958, Auboyneau supported firm national authority, military cohesion, and a solution to the crisis through de Gaulle rather than through continued parliamentary drift. On the economic and sociological situation, he based his beliefs on imperial and authoritarian sentiments, placing order, discipline, and national strength above partisan experimentation. On the Algerian War, he proposed that France had to hold firm, preserve strategic control, and enforce a political authority strong enough to master both the war and the crisis of the regime.

He belonged to no party, but his stance was conservative in institutional terms and pro-de Gaulle.

### **43. General Edmond Jouhaud**

Air Force Chief of Staff on 2 June 1958, one of the senior air commanders associated with the Algerian conflict, a military figure hostile to the return of de Gaulle.

Born in 1905 in Aïn Boucefara in French Algeria, Jouhaud came from a European settler background that strongly shaped his political ideals and his view of the empire. He trained at Saint-Cyr, entered the air arm in the interwar period, and built his career as a professional officer rather than as a public political actor. During the Second World War, he took part in resistance activity in the Bordeaux region and eventually joined Free France, which gave him a patriotic and military legitimacy that created a basis for his political career. By the 1950s, he became one of the best-known senior air officers of the Republic, with service in both Indochina and North Africa.

He had commanded air forces in Indochina and then in Algeria, where the war increased his attachment to the army's mission and to the preservation of French sovereignty. Unlike other senior officers in Paris, he regarded parliamentary drift as dangerous and metropolitan hesitation as a threat to the nation. However, his harsh militarism did not turn into a trust in de Gaulle on 2 June 1958, and he appeared as an anti-de Gaulle air commander rooted in the Algeria-centered officer corps.

By 2 June 1958, Jouhaud boasted strong military authority, preservation of French Algeria, and a severe anti-communist nationalism shaped by war and empire. On the economic and sociological situation, he placed order, discipline, and national cohesion above party argument and parliamentary bargaining. On the Algerian War, he claimed that France had to defeat the FLN, reject retreat, and preserve sovereignty by force if necessary.

He belonged to no party, but politically, he was within the nationalist military right and stood against de Gaulle in the June crisis.

## 44. General Paul Grossin

Chief of Military Intelligence on 2 June 1958 and one of the most influential intelligence chiefs in France at the moment the Fourth Republic gave way to de Gaulle.

Born in 1900, Grossin created his career through the army and rose through staff, command, and state-security roles rather than through parliamentary politics. By the 1950s he had reached the upper military hierarchy and, in September 1957, took charge of the Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage, France's main external intelligence service. He was regarded as politically skillful and highly capable in navigating the overlapping worlds of government, military command, and intelligence networks, making him a particularly important figure in the unstable final phase of the Fourth Republic.

The intelligence service under his leadership reorganized itself in the late Fourth Republic and adapted quickly to the transfer of power as de Gaulle returned to office. He was known as a man who secretly fed information to de Gaulle and reported on the incompetence of the existing government rather than standing neutrally with Paris, placing him in the camp of the security elite that saw de Gaulle as the answer to institutional breakdown, even before the new regime had fully formed.

By 2 June 1958, Grossin represented a strong intelligence state, restored executive authority, and imposed national discipline at a time of political paralysis. On the economic and sociological situation, he prioritized stability, anti-subversion, and state control over ideological reform. On the Algerian War, his claim was that France had to maintain authority, strengthen intelligence coordination, and defeat insurgent networks through organized state power.

He belonged to no party, but in political regard, he was a conservative intelligence soldier and loyal to de Gaulle.

## 45. Colonel Yves Godard

Deputy Director of the Directorate General for External Security on 2 June 1958 and one of the most feared intelligence and counterinsurgency officers tied to the Algerian struggle.

Born in 1911 in Saint-Maixent-l'École, Godard trained at Saint-Cyr and built his reputation through elite military service. During the Second World War, he became a prisoner in 1940, escaped after repeated attempts, and joined the Resistance, which gave him a strong legitimacy within the military generation. After the war, he served in the army staff, commanded the 11e Choc, and fought in Indochina, where he became known for his aggressive special operations and parachute warfare. By the mid-1950s he was one of the most specialized officers in counterinsurgency and intelligence.

As chief of staff to Massu's parachute division and one of the main operators in the Battle of Algiers, he oversaw links between army, police, and intelligence services and became identified with infiltration, urban repression, and the dismantling of FLN networks. In 1958, he stood among the military men whose authority came from proven effectiveness in the harshest phase of the war, turning him into a security-prioritizing military elite figure who was impatient with the weakness of parliamentary politics.

By 2 June 1958, Godard supported hard counterinsurgency, centralized security control, and the view that the Algerian conflict had to be mastered by force and intelligence penetration rather than compromise. On the economic and sociological situation, his view was prioritizing order, treating public discipline and destruction of subversive networks as more urgent than social or parliamentary reform. On the Algerian War, his position was that France had to break the FLN's urban and cross-border structures, preserve sovereignty, and maintain authority in Algeria.

He belonged to no party, but politically, his ideals were parallel with the anti-communist military right and the camp of officers most committed to *Algérie française*.

## 46. General Maurice Gazin

Chief of the National Gendarmerie on 2 June 1958 and a senior security officer who remained neutral during de Gaulle's rise.

Born in 1904 in Pau, Gazin belonged to the generation of officers formed between the wars and carried a long military career through engineering, command, and senior staff service. He was associated with the army's technical and organizational side as much as with field command, which gave him a more institutional than ideological public image. By the late 1950s, he had reached high ranks and was connected to other high-ranking individuals from positions from which major territorial and security commands were drawn. He was not a public political general but a senior officer of the state apparatus.

In a period when parts of the military were moving openly into politics, Gazin appears as a figure who did not commit himself decisively to the rebellious anti-parliamentary camp or to an openly Gaullist solution. His significance is based in institutional steadiness rather than dramatic intervention. He represented a cult of an officer whose first concern was the continuity of command and the avoidance of military fragmentation at a moment when the regime itself was close to collapse.

By 2 June 1958, Gazin stood for order, continuity, and the preservation of disciplined state security forces above factional politics. On the economic and sociological situation, his ideals were conservative and administrative, emphasizing stability, hierarchy, and state cohesion rather than ideological innovation. On the Algerian War, he defended maintaining firm authority and disciplined control while avoiding the kind of openly political military activism that could harm the chain of command.

He belonged to no party; he appears as a neutral institutional soldier rather than either a rebel anti-Gaullist or a declared Gaullist partisan.

## 47. General Paul Vanuxem

Chief of Border Security on 2 June 1958 and the commander known for the defense of the Tunisian frontier and the military logic of the Morice Line.

Born in 1904 in Bully-les-Mines in the Pas-de-Calais, Vanuxem first studied and taught before turning fully to a military career, entering Saint-Cyr in adulthood and rising through colonial infantry command. He fought in the Second World War, was wounded in 1940, then returned to battle after the Allied landings in North Africa and served in Italy, France, and Germany. After the war he served in Indochina, where his reputation for hard field command and operational intensity grew further. By the Algerian War, he had become one of the army's most skilled combat generals, known more for offensive action than for bureaucratic caution.

Salan assigned him responsibility for destroying FLN forces attempting to cross from Tunisia, and he became strongly associated with the battle of the borders and with the defense of the Morice Line, which symbolized the militarization of the frontier. He was also publicly sympathetic towards *Algérie française*, and unlike more neutral officers, he belonged to the military current that saw any weakening on Algeria as a national betrayal.

By 2 June 1958, Vanuxem stood for a harsh military solution, strict border defense, and rejection of any retreat on Algerian sovereignty. On the economic and sociological situation, his beliefs were based on discipline, sacrifice, and national will far above party bargaining or social experimentation. On the Algerian War, he suggested that France had to hold the frontier, destroy FLN infiltration, and defend *Algérie française* by force.

He belonged to no party, but politically, he was from the nationalist military right and the hardest security camp of the late Fourth Republic.

## 48. General André Zeller

Chief of Logistics and Operations on 2 June 1958 and one of the most senior army planners in France, a general whose authority relied on long staff experience, major wartime service, and a hard line on Algeria.

Born in 1898 in Besançon, Zeller entered the army during the First World War instead of following the *École Polytechnique* path for which he had originally prepared. Trained in artillery, he fought at Verdun and the Somme, then stayed in uniform after 1918 and served in the Levant before moving into higher staff work in the interwar years. By the 1930s, he had already combined technical competence with North African experience, including staff service in Algiers, which later shaped his view of imperial and military questions.

During the Second World War, he escaped the Dunkirk encirclement, later served in North Africa, joined the French forces fighting alongside the Allies after Operation Torch, and took part in Tunisia, Italy, Provence, the Vosges, and the Colmar campaign. After 1945 he rose slowly through the high command, became inspector of artillery, commanded the military region at Rennes, and in 1955 became chief of staff of the army. His resignation in 1956 over troop reductions in Algeria made him a figure of the army's dissatisfaction with parliamentary handling of the war and marked him as an influential figure of the militarist views.

By 2 June 1958, Zeller defended restoring military capacity, forming stronger executive authority, and preserving French sovereignty in Algeria. On the economic and sociological disputes, his proposals were conservative and institutional, placing order, discipline, anti-communism, and national cohesion above political bargains. Upon the Algerian War, his idea was that France had to maintain the effort, resist retreat, and back a regime capable of ending parliamentary weakness. He supported de Gaulle's return as a means of restoring national authority.

He had no party affiliation; he was a nationalist, senior professional army officer, conservative, and pro-de Gaulle on 2 June 1958.

## 49. General Paul Gardy

Commander of the French Foreign Legion on 2 June 1958 and one of the most famed senior Legion officers of the Fourth Republic, a general associated with the colonial army and the martial ethos of the Legion.

Born in 1901 in Paris, Gardy graduated from Saint-Cyr in 1923, completed his cavalry training at Saumur, and began his officer career in mounted units before becoming closely related to the Foreign Legion. His early service brought him into the colonial and overseas military, including the Syrian theater, and gave him the profile of a career officer experienced with expeditionary warfare rather than metropolitan party politics. By the 1950s he was already viewed less as a staff intellectual than as a hard professional soldier of command, discipline, and combat reputation.

In 1944, he served with the 2nd African Chasseurs in the campaign of France, was wounded twice, received citations, and then moved through senior instructional, armored, and staff posts before taking command roles linked to the Foreign Legion at Sidi-Bel-Abbès. He later served with the 1st Armored Division in Germany and rose to brigadier general in the late 1950s, becoming one of the most recognizable senior Legion figures at a time when the Algerian conflict was pushing the officer corps towards engaging in political disputes.

By 2 June 1958, Gardy represented strong military authority, colonial firmness, and a refusal to concede Algeria. On the economic and sociological atmosphere, his view was conservative, martial, and order-first, valuing discipline, sacrifice, hierarchy, and national cohesion far above parliamentary bargaining or social experimentation. On the Algerian War, his position was that France had to continue the struggle, preserve imperial authority, and reject any settlement that looked like weakness or abandonment. He supported de Gaulle's return and saw it as an effective political answer to restore authority while keeping Algeria French.

He had no party affiliation; he was a senior Legion officer, a nationalist military conservative, pro-war, and pro-de Gaulle on 2 June 1958.

## 50. Colonel Charles Lacheroy

Chief of Psychological Warfare Department on 2 June 1958 and an influential theorist of counterinsurgency in the French army, a colonel who had significant intellectual authority.

Born in 1906 in Chalon-sur-Saône, Lacheroy was raised in a military family after his father was killed in the First World War, studied at the Prytanée national militaire, and graduated from Saint-Cyr in 1927 near the top of his class. He chose the colonial infantry, served in Africa and the Levant, and spent his early career in the imperial army, later contributing to his awareness to the link between colonial conflict, political mobilization, and military control over populations.

Sent there in 1951, he drew from that experience the ideas that made him the main French theorist of psychological action and revolutionary war, then returned to Paris to direct studies at the Centre d'études asiatiques et africaines and to lecture widely, including at the Sorbonne in 1957. By the time the Algerian crisis exploded in 1958, he had become one of the officers mainly responsible for spreading the belief that modern war had to be fought not only with force but also through propaganda, ideological control, and manipulation of civilian loyalties. In the spring of 1958 he was active in Algiers in information and psychological-action structures closely related to the camp of French Algeria.

By 2 June 1958, Lacheroy represented a highly interventionist sense of military power, in which the army should determine political behavior and the methods to defeat the armed rebellion. On the economic and sociological stage, his ideals were deeply hesitant to parliamentary softness, left-wing mobilization, and civilian weakness, and he favored ideological discipline, anti-communist vigilance, and strong state direction. On the Algerian War, his claim was that France had to retain Algeria, destroy the FLN's political and urban networks, and treat the conflict as a total struggle over allegiance and control. At this stage, he was aligned with the Algiers movement that viewed de Gaulle's return as the authority most likely to preserve French Algeria.

He had no party affiliation; he was a colonial army officer, a theorist of psychological warfare, an anti-communist military hardliner, and a supporter of de Gaulle.