

Political and Security Committee



Addressing the 2028 Military and Civil Fallout of the
Afghan Collapse

Study Guide

Political Security Committee

Study Guide

European Union Simulation in Ankara (EUROsimA) 2025

Organized by

Foreign Policy and International Relations Society

Middle East Technical University

Üniversiteler Mah. Dumlupınar Bulvarı No: 1

İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi B Binası Zemin Kat

06800, Çankaya, Ankara, Türkiye

EUROsimA 2025

Ankara - Türkiye 2025

This document is prepared solely for educational purposes and cannot be used for any commercial purpose. No copyright infringement intended. Please consider the environment before printing.

Table of Contents

- 1) Welcome Letters
 - a) Welcome Letter of the Secretary General
 - b) Welcome Letter of the Under Secretary General
 - c) Welcome Letter of the Academic Assistant
- 2) Introduction to the European Union
 - a) History of the European Union
 - i) Pre-Union Era
 - ii) Union Era
 - b) Functions of the European Union
 - i) Legislative
 - ii) Executive
 - iii) Judiciary
 - iv) Elections and political groups of the EU
 - v) Decision-making Procedure (OLP)
 - vi) Accession to the European Union
- 3) Introduction to the Political and Security Committee (PSC)
 - a) Role and Responsibilities
 - b) Structure and Composition
 - c) Decision-Making Process
 - d) Interaction of the PSC with Other EU Institutions
 - e) Key Policies and Actions Taken by the PSC
- 4) Events happened between 2025 to 2032.
 - a) Economic developments in Europe and in the world
 - b) Political developments in European countries
 - c) Political developments in the world
 - d) New member states and candidate countries in the EU
 - e) Timeline of these events
- 5) Problems needed to be addressed in the Council
 - a) Inadequacy of Diplomatic Security Infrastructure in Conflict Zones
 - b) Limitations of the EU's Crisis Response Mechanisms
 - c) Engagement with Armed Non-State Actors
 - d) Extradition of local accomplices and Border Management Risks
- 6) Conclusion
- 7) Country Stances in 2032
- 8) Further Reading
- 9) Bibliography

1) Welcome Letters

a) Welcome Letter of the Secretary General

Dear Participants,

My name is Burak Eren Ceyhan, I am a second-year International Relations major studying in the Middle East Technical University and it is my utmost pleasure and honor to be serving as the Secretary General of EUROsimA'25.

Considering that I am 21 years old and EUROsimA'25 will be the 21st edition of our conference, the history and excellence of EUROsimA needs no further deliberation. As someone who has participated in Model UN, Model EU and Moot Court simulations with a general experience in such simulation conferences in its seventh year; this experience holds a special place in my heart. Myself, my partner the honorable Director General Selin Örsak and our academic and organization teams have worked night and day to present you with the best experience possible. In that regard, I expect you all from the most experienced to the first timer participant alike to give it your all and ensure that EUROsimA'25 reaches its full potential.

One sentiment that stuck with me from my previous EUROsimA experiences was a sentence all former and current Secretary Generals stated in their closing speeches; “EUROsimA is, and always will be, a family business.”. I get the meaning more than ever as I am preparing this letter. I would like to thank my family that has given me their all despite my demanding deadlines and feedback, it would not have been the same without you.

I am very excited to see you all soon; please prepare to the conference with your best efforts and make the most of your experience of fun and learning. Good luck.

Burak Eren Ceyhan Secretary-General

b) Welcome Letter of the Under Secretary General

Hello, peacemakers, diplomats, and future architects of European chaos,

I am Burak Yağız Güllü your friendly neighborhood headache or more officially **the Under Secretary General of the Political and Security Committee**. It is both a pleasure and a calculated strategic move to welcome you to what will likely be one of the most complex, dynamic, and geopolitically charged simulations of your MEU career.

Firstly let me extend my heartfelt thanks to our Secretary General, **Burak Eren Ceyhan**, and Academic Assistant, **Akın Kızıltepe** for their unwavering dedication, the countless hours they devoted to making this committee a success and their patience with the dozens of spam messages I sent while writing this guide. Their vision and commitment were instrumental in every step of our journey.

Let me be the first to say it: this committee is not for the faint-hearted. We're talking about **2032**, a Europe caught between its dreams of unity and the cold, hard reality of crisis. Afghanistan is spiraling (again), EU diplomatic missions are under siege, and there are rogue actors with guns and demands knocking on the door of European foreign policy. PSC isn't just responding to the fire, it is the room where the fire gets named, negotiated, and maybe contained.

You're not just delegates. You are now the voices of states with old scars and new ambitions. You'll clash, compromise, and collaborate, not necessarily in that order. From Paris to Warsaw, from Stockholm to Athens, your policies will be tested.

Some of you will want to save the EU. Others will want to weaponize it. And one or two of you are probably just here to watch the world burn. I support all those choices—so long as they're backed by logic, passion, and excellent policy memos.

Let me give you a few words of advice while you're still somewhat sane:

- **To the federalists among you:** Yes, strategic autonomy is sexy. But remember, speed means nothing if you're all sprinting in different directions.
- **To the realists and the sovereignists:** I know “national interest” is your favorite bedtime story, but you might want to open the window and see that the neighbors are on fire.
- **To the undecided middle grounders:** You are the swing votes, the dealmakers, the peacekeepers... or the reason this committee will descend into glorious diplomatic gridlock.

We've set the stage. The crisis is waiting. The clock is ticking.

So, arm yourselves—with policy, creativity, and a healthy disregard for sleep. I'll see you in the war room.

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan."

– Robert Schuman (and probably also someone in your bloc trying to buy time)

Sincerely,

Burak Yağız Güllü

Under Secretary General

Political and Security Committee – EUROsimA 2025

c) Welcome Letter of the Academic Assistant

Acclaimed representatives of the Political and Security Committee,

I am Akın Kızıltepe, a first-year Mechanical Engineering student at Middle East Technical University. This year's rendition of EUROsimA will simulate the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the European Union. It is not just any PSC either, you will be transported to the near future of 2032, wherein the European political sphere is quite literally set ablaze by certain developments elaborated upon thoroughly in this very document. I am met with impeccable joy as my trusty Under Secretary General Burak Yağız Güllü and I present an hopefully unparalleled experience for the likes of you.

Before we proceed with expanding upon the committee, I want to express my gratitude for some of the individuals who helped carry both the conference and our committee with all their might. Starting, I express my utmost gratitude for our Under Secretary General, Burak Yağız Güllü, showing immense commitment and enthusiasm to this committee, me and EUROsimA as a whole. It was particularly challenging for two of us as our engineering education is known for taking a substantial toll on your body, soul and time, though in the end we managed to put together the most grand study guide I have had the privilege of constructing. Next up, I want to offer my thanks to our Secretary General, Burak Eren Ceyhan (Common Buraks Theorem), who put up with our stubbornness and any additional hurdles that approached his way on top of managing the rest of the committees. Lastly, I will prefer to show my appreciation for our Director General, Selin Örsak and her organisation team. While the academic team focused their attention on their respective committees, our Director General and her team were laying the groundwork for ensuring the creation of an astonishing conference and that any possible bumps in this long and arduous voyage are taken care of.

Moving on to the committee, the current trajectory of European foreign policy is met with resistance from some external factors, but be not afraid, as you possess the key to the issues present, that being the capability of taking the decisions you deem the most optimal. The journey ahead will not be simple, and the choice between regional priorities, balance of diplomacy and the obligations of the European Union in the international scene. Whether you push for harsher measures or more realistic methods, it is not trivial to say that the option finalised by the PSC will have consequences far beyond the city of Brussels and perhaps Europe itself. Your head will ache, and you will be flabbergasted by perhaps the views of some of the other representatives, but I do not doubt that you will prevail in the end.

To safeguard the smoothness of the simulation awaiting you and to bestow upon you the necessary direction, we have prepared a thorough study guide, ranging from topics such as the innerworking of the European Institutions to international advancements in the future. I would highly encourage that it be your paramount priority to digest this guide carefully and take notes when needed. Finally, if you have further questions regarding the committee and the structure of the EU, feel free to contact me at my email address: akinkiziltepe46@gmail.com. Please do not hesitate to contact me here whenever need be as I would be more than happy to help resolve obstacles that you may face.

Sincerely,

Akın Kızıltepe

Academic Assistant

Political and Security Committee – EUROsimA 2025

2) Introduction to the European Union

a) History of the European Union

i) Pre-Union Era

The Union's earliest roots could be traced back to the aftermath of the Second World War. Almost all European nations had been facing a heavy toll on their economy left by the repercussions of such a large-scale war. Consequently, they each began seeking methods to ease the crises, and one common approach was broadening the cooperation with other European countries facing a similar fate.

The first considerable achievement in this endeavour, intersecting with European integration, could be seen as the Schuman Plan. In 1950, France's Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman proposed the idea of pooling the coal and steel reserves of France and Germany under a separate association which could take further members and Schuman had two main aims with this plan: to incorporate Germany back into the European structure and to boost overall production for the mentioned materials in both nations (CVCE.eu 2016a). Following the involvement of four additional nations being Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) filling the role of the association referred to in the Schuman Plan and therein existed the Common Assembly, later became the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, later became the Council of the European Union also known as the Council, the Court of Justice, later became the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the High Authority, later became the European Commission, which could all be seen as earlier counterparts of current EU bodies. As the prices of transporting coal, iron ore and steel and also the prices of the materials themselves varied notably from ECSC member state to member state, the organisation aimed

to mitigate the difference by way of creating a primitive single market in those areas, a notion which would acquire even more attention in the future (McKesson 1952, 18-21).

European Integration advancements would be halted for a few years, with some ECSC members not being quite comfortable with Integration in certain sectors. Integration was a hot topic to discuss, even when insignificant concrete action was taken. For instance, in the Messina Conference (1955), the High Authority of the ECSC convened and discussed further attempts at economic integration. One of the discussed concepts was the utilisation of horizontal economic integration, meaning integration across comparable industries and sectors in different countries rather than between different scopes (The Federalist 2005). With the success of the ECSC, it was inevitable that European integration would continue. The next substantial achievement in this process was the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM) within the Treaties of Rome (1957). The foundation of the EEC aimed to strengthen the integration and relations between member states by setting up a common market where the flow of products, capital, services and people would be completely free through a gradual process program. In addition, the Treaty of Rome laid the foundation for a shared external tariff on imports parallel to common agricultural, transportation and trade policies (EUR-Lex, 2017). On the other hand, EURATOM sought to standardise the safety protocols in nuclear plants, supervise the stockpile of radioactive ores and promote research in atomic energy (BMUV 2022).

The Treaty of Rome additionally introduced a concept called “Qualified Majority Voting”, meaning for a decision to be approved by the Council it needed the approval of 4 out of the 6 members and also installed a system where the weight of the vote of the members was different to one another based on their population, for example 4 for France, Italy, Germany; 2 for the Netherlands, Belgium and 1 for Luxembourg, and 12 out of 17 in favour votes were

required on this front and in some sectors, a resolution needed to cater to both qualifications to pass (European Union, Treaty Establishing the EEC 1957, art. 148). Not all members of the Council were pleased with this reform, though a member could practically reject all actions, undermining their interests when all arrangements required unanimity. Due to the area of use of unanimity being lessened, conflict was soon to arrive. With the schedule set by the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was set to make a move to extend qualified majority voting to other fields, while at the same time, the Council was elaborating on a budget for the Common Agricultural Policy and a proposal to enhance the powers of the Commission and Parliament. After this development, French President de Gaulle withdrew all French presence from the Council in 1965. What is now known as the “Empty Chair Crisis” brought the EEC to a freeze and displayed member states were unprepared for heightened involvement from a separate association. The crisis was solved thanks to the Luxembourg Compromise (1966), which brought about a full-on veto right in cases of programs that could meddle with a given country's national interests (Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory n.d.). The Compromise meant that the decision-making process had to be a lot more gradual to ensure no member would feel their welfare was not being infringed upon. Following the Compromise, The Treaty of Brussels, also known as the Merger Treaty, was signed where the European Communities; namely the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM, which had their own distinct Commissions, Councils and Parliaments were merged into a single administrative Commission, a single Council and a single Parliament governing the divergent bodies (Eur-Lex, 2018a). This new entity would be known as European Communities (EC). Although several critical plans were set in place with the Treaty of Rome, only a few had been properly reached, with most being nowhere near completion. This incited the Hague Summit (1969) to revise previous plans and set up a better framework. In the Hague Summit, a compromise was finally reached on the troublesome Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the budgetary powers of the European

Parliament had been increased, a plan for an Economic and Monetary Union was proposed, political cooperation was seriously considered for the first time by creating a committee to debate upon a unified foreign policy. Lastly, Denmark, the UK, Ireland and Norway were accepted as members (CVCE.eu 2016c).

With there already being remarks about a monetary union, the prime minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner, outlined a plan for achieving said union with the final goal of attaining a single currency between the members. Unfortunately, though, economic instability and disagreements between members delayed implementation. The achievements of the Hague Summit made way for heads of state and government of member states to regularly meet, which will be incorporated into the EU as the European Council in the future, where key difficulties of the Communities were discussed starting from 1974. In 1979, two major advances of progress took place; the highly awaited European Monetary System was established to help stabilize the struggling European currencies. Furthermore, members of the European Parliament were elected for the first time instead of being appointed by the governments of the European Communities (EC) members. Afterwards in the early 80s, even with Greece, Spain, and Portugal's accession to membership and the Monetary System, the EC proved to be inadequate in keeping the European economies steady in times of trouble with the existing economic crises meaning immediate action was required to keep the European dream afloat (Cini 2007, 26-27).

The Single European Act (SEA), adopted in 1986, was what the Communities needed to proceed. In its broadest sense, the SEA aspired to overcome stagnation in European integration by way of fastening advancements on all fronts.

- **Reforms on Institutions and the Decision-Making Process:** It reintroduced the Qualified Majority voting in the Council of Ministers and vastly expanded the areas where it was applied. This way, proposals regarding the single market could be taken without the approval of all members of the Council, paving the way for true multinational decision-making. Moreover, the formerly paralysed European Parliament was given a proper voice by allowing it to propose amendments to the Council and guaranteeing it was considered. Even if the Parliament still lacked full-on legislative capability, this was a substantial step in the democratisation of the EC. Finally, the SEA formalised the European Council, where heads of state/government had been meeting informally since the 70s, and recognised it as a provider of general agenda for the European Communities, still it was not blended into the existing structure as an official institution just yet (European Union, Single European Act, 1987, art. 2-8).
- **Political Advancements:** The SEA laid the foundations for the framework of political cooperation by establishing European Political Cooperation (EPC), a precursor to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where members could consult one another on internal cases and also on affairs concerning foreign policy. This marked a momentous occasion in European Integration as solid action was taken on the political front, which used to be a matter of a nation's sovereignty (European Union, Single European Act, 1987, art. 30-31).
- **Economic Integration:** To complete the single internal market, a deadline was set as 1992, and proper objectives were put in place to achieve them. Border control between members was to be eliminated to confirm the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. Regulations were to be standardized to not stall trade between nations due to technical limitations. Competition was to flourish by unifying corporate taxation and

business laws. The SEA encouraged all the mentioned plans, with the emphasis being put on cooperation in monetary practices as well (European Union, Single European Act, 1987, art. 13-20).

In conclusion, the SEA served as a turning point and stepping stone for European Integration by changing the grim-looking fate of the Communities, pioneering the foundations of the European Union and ensuring its focus could be pointed in all the appropriate territories.

ii) Union Era

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was famous for establishing the European Union as it is known today and laying the groundwork for the Union's evolution thereafter. It built upon the existing European Communities to achieve the following:

- Economic and social progress through an internal market and a monetary union, eventually resulting in a single currency,
- Affirmation of its identity via a common foreign and security policy, which has the potential of including a defence aspect,
- Reinforcement of the interests of citizens of Member States by the proposal of a shared citizenship belonging to the Union,
- and triumph of partnership in justice and home affairs (European Union, Treaty on European Union 1992. title I. art. B. 4).

The Three Pillars: The treaty additionally introduced a new framework for the EU, that being the Three-Pillar Structure, which included:

First Pillar - European Communities: The supranational ruling pillar is tasked with the supervision of the economic facet of the Union in fields such as the financial and monetary union, sustainable growth, trade, agriculture, competition, and overall economic

policies. Finally, the European Communities held a subordinate role overall to the EU in the necessary fields (European Union 1992. title II. art. G. 5).

Second Pillar - Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The pillar primarily employed in intergovernmental cooperation in matters of international relations, defence and security, where decisions have to be taken unanimously (European Union, Treaty on European Union, 1992, title V, art. 100c). The member states had the final say in affairs about the CFSP, where the Union could not overrule national verdict. The Commission was involved in this operation, however, it never led it once again, showing the intergovernmental aspect of this pillar. Moreover, on the subject of defence, the Western European Union was set up, where it was seen as a potential safeguarding arm of the EU awaiting expansions in the future (European Union 1992. title V. art. J1-J8. 58-60).

Third Pillar - Justice and Home Affairs (JHA): The pillar concerning the inner workings of each member state and their interactions with one another on subjects such as immigration, asylum, criminal justice, external border control, drug trafficking, large-scale fraud, customs, judicial cooperation, police force and so on. The police collaboration to fend off terrorism, drug trafficking, cross-border crime, and further attempts at international crime was fleshed out in an organisation called the European Police Office (Europol) to elevate the level of communication between member states and improve stability. Decisions also required consensus and took into account the autonomy of each nation (European Union 1992. title VI. art. K1-K4. 61-62).

Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro: The Treaty of Maastricht set out the adoption of the “Euro”, a common currency of Member States, by a three-stage program spanning multiple years. The plan's first step had already begun following the Delors Report (1989), which had been proposed in its entirety before being fully ratified and added to the Maastricht Treaty.(European Union 1992. title I. art. B. 4)

Stage 1 (1990): The free movement of capital began on July 1, 1990, marking the beginning of the first stage in line with the targets set by the Single European Act. Joint activities of national central banks were to be the priority under the administration of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the EC. Member states adopted the necessary programmes to ease the process (European Union 1992. title II. art. 109e. 17).

Stage 2 (1994): In the beginning of the second stage, an establishment by the name “European Monetary Institute (EMI)” was founded to ensure the technical provisions for a new currency were met without any trouble. Moreover, it acted as a transitional body until a central bank could be initiated. This particular institute had its own council and had aspirations relating to the Euro, for instance, coordinating the monetary policies of members, encouraging the coherence of cross-border payments, assembling the compulsory bodies for carrying out a shared monetary policy and so on (European Union 1992. title II. art. 109f. 18). Furthermore, a standard was set for member states to fulfil, called “Convergence Criteria”, if they wished to partake in the shared currency. The Criteria were strict on the following aspects: inflation rates, debt, sustainability of the government’s financial situation, fluctuation margins and interest rates. Lastly, national banks were to be stripped of any and all political influence or affiliation (European Union 1992. title II. art. 109j. 20).

Stage 3 (1999): The third stage began with the previously known European Monetary Institute being converted to the European Central Bank (ECB) and the fabrication of a structure called the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) (European Union 1992. title II. art. 4a. 6). The ECB was the sole institution in charge of the monetary policy of member states, whereas the ESCB set uniform guidelines for banks, and it encompassed the ECB and all national central banks of EU states regardless of their participation in the Euro (European Union 1992. title II. art. 106-108a. 14-15). Likewise, the exchange rates between member states taking part in the Euro were irreversibly fixed in accordance with the value of their currencies and the Euro was introduced in a non-physical form and was brought into service in the financial market and the use of cheques (European Union 1992. title II. art. 109l-109m. 21-22). Ultimately, after much preparation and coordination between EU bodies and governments alike, the Euro was launched in a physical guise with banknotes and coins replacing national currencies entirely in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain with newer members soon to follow (Banco de España, n.d.).

Strengthening European Citizenship: The Maastricht Treaty created a subsidiary citizenship pertaining to European Union residents without interfering with national citizenships. It brought a slew of new privileges including but not limited to, the freedom of movement and residence within the EU for some states, the right to vote and apply for candidacy in the European Parliament elections, the right to petition to the Parliament and so forth (European Union 1992. title II. art. 8a-8e. 7-8). The concept of a shared citizenship reinforced the notion of a European identity and brought together a sense of solidarity among its citizens.

Institutional Refinement and the Rise of the Parliament: The jurisdiction of the Council and the Parliament was spread into extra previously explained areas such as Common Foreign and Security Policy or Justice and Home Affairs. The European Parliament gained a legislative role in the European Union instead of its preceding solely advisory function as well. It had the opportunity to reject the proposals in a voting procedure by absolute majority, which was acknowledged as the co-decision process (a predecessor of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure known today). This set a milestone for allowing the Parliament to become co-legislators to the Council of the European Union (renamed version of the Council of Ministers in this treaty) in some limited areas. In addition, the Parliament was appointed with another duty, it could approve or reject the President of the European Commission, this way a more democratic apparatus of executive capacity was put in place (European Union 1992. title II. art. 157-189c. 32-38).

Social Policy and Workers' Rights: The Treaty set up EU-wide health and safety standards for workers and furnished the preliminary work for improving the environment of workers. It held articles regarding gender equality and strived to eliminate instances of discrimination in the workplace, like the wage gap. The employment contract procedure was streamlined, and unions were granted revised representation in dialogue between employees and employers. Finally, Community-level communication was highly encouraged, and agreements were made in accordance with EU practices. (European Union 1992. agreement. art. 1-5. 91-92)

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) emerged shortly after the Maastricht Treaty, amending and touching upon ample points of interest wherever it was essential. Its reforms in the following areas of activity would have ever-lasting consequences on EU policy for years to come.

Structural Overhaul: The formerly explained co-decision procedure was broadened into nearly all aspects of European policy. The mechanism was furnished in the case of any disagreements between the views of the Council and the Parliament, now that it was going to be applied plenty more. A Conciliation Committee would be set up in the event of those disagreements, where members of the Council and the Parliament can have a mediation session instead of letting the proposal fail (European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, part 1, art 2, art. 189b veya point 44 sayfa 45). Institutional conversions were brought into being to take the preparatory measures for future expansions of the Union and to avoid any hiccups along the said enlargements (European Union 1997. part D. art. 1-2. 111).

Expansion of the Schengen Agreement: The Schengen Agreement (1985) was first signed outside the EU framework due to the differing views of member states on the matter of the abolishment of internal borders and freedom of movement within the EU. In the Agreement, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands allowed the gradual removal of controls at their borders with one another, nonetheless, its effect remained minor. The Schengen Agreement would be expanded further with a convention of the same name, which brought along a common visa policy for the same signatories and thereby created the “Schengen Area”. The previously mentioned agreement and convention together make up what is known as the Schengen acquis, the word “acquis” being utilized to refer to any set of legislations merged into European Union law (EUR-Lex n.d). Ultimately, the Schengen

Acquis would be fully incorporated into EU law, accompanied by the opt-outs for Ireland and the United Kingdom, who were determined not to partake in the zone (European Union 1997. protocol B. art. 1-4. 93-95).

Growth of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The CFSP sphere of integration would once again be a subject of discussion and optimisation. First and foremost, a unique position would be formed, called “the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy”. This new role would take on the responsibilities of the EU’s representation in the international scene and ensure policies concerning the CFSP are coherent to a wide range of guidelines, and at the same time acted as the vice-president of the Commission. Some common strategies were to be defined in correlation with the notable dividends of member states’ foreign and security policies. For example, the Council sets common positions for member states on international matters to present a more united front and adopt joint operations on the subject of existing crises (European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, title 5, article J.1-J.5 sayfa 9). Additionally, a new policy devising unit would be founded under the supervision of the High Representative to assess developments in the field of foreign and security policy, coming up with policy alternatives to be displayed to the Council, pinpointing areas in desperate need of CFSP attention. This unit would be known as the Political and Security Committee of the Union in the future (European Union 1997. declaration 6. 132).

Closer Cooperation: An unexplored conviction named “Closer Cooperation” was initiated, wherein member states could decide to integrate much more swiftly without requiring the agreement of all members on a particular policy. The process still demanded the majority of

the Council's favour, but it was specifically applied in the disagreement of one or two members. This way the EU members were able to move ahead on differing areas pertaining to their national interests without having to rely on the voting procedures and complicate the operation further, nonetheless, its scope was solely limited to the First Pillar (European Union 1997. title VIa. art. K.15-K.17. 132).

Up next was the Treaty of Nice (2001), which fleshed out the existing structure and set the stage for the upcoming enlargement of the Union, confirming the institutional framework as need be. The treaty equipped the EU with a way to avoid paralysis in decision-making with an influx of new Central and Eastern European countries.

Developing the Decision-Making Organs: The treaty addressed the challenges with the European Commission, to be specific, its composition. Previously, countries with a higher population in comparison to the remaining members (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) could appoint two commissioners each to the European Commission. Furthermore, thanks to the treaty, each member could nominate one commissioner, allowing more equitable representation. The maximum number of commissioners was set as “27” for the planned memberships. Furthermore, the President of the Commission had their authority raised, having the power to reorganize the responsibilities of the commissioners and even request one's resignation in the instance of difficulties (EUR-Lex, 2018b).

On the Council of the European Union side, the treaty reallocated the constantly changing weighing of the votes to reflect the relative populations of member states and addressed the imbalances pertaining to them. In the occasions where qualified majority voting was

employed, the treaty streamlined it and called for the 73.9% of the votes (each member having a single vote) and at least 62% of the EU population (weights of the votes in relation to the member's population) which was called "double majority". Whereas in the European Parliament, the number of seats was increased to a maximum of 732 for 27 member states with the awaited spread of the Union and the co-decision procedure was extended into a wider range of areas where qualified majority was resorted to (EUR-Lex, 2018b).

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was reformed in a way to better fit the constantly changing competencies of the EU law. The Treaty granted the CJEU to operate in different formations of judges from member states and the Union itself. The Council could demand the establishment of highly specialized courts to attend to distinguishable fields of law. This way, the judicial system was expedited instead of the formerly sluggish version in cases where gaps existed within EU law (EUR-Lex, 2018b).

Enhanced Cooperation: The prospect of "Closer Cooperation" was renamed to "Enhanced Cooperation", and its jurisdiction was boosted to cover the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs pillars. In the CFSP pillar, Enhanced Cooperation excluded policies regarding defence, and each member still had the privilege to veto it altogether. On the other hand, JHA was left with a multitude of adaptability, enhanced cooperation could not be vetoed, and it did not entail the endorsement of other institutions. Moreover, the minimum number of participants in Enhanced Cooperation was lowered from a majority to eight, which meant that EU members could be on partially distinct stages of integration in comparison to one another more often. Besides the obligatory approval of the Commission in the First and Second Pillar, the Council had to necessitate the consent of the

Parliament whenever the decision in Enhanced Cooperation fell under the dominion of co-decision (EUR-Lex, 2018b).

The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) is currently the concluding large-scale phase in European Integration. It sought to flesh out almost every discrepancy within the EU and smoothed out almost all challenges the previous treaties were not able to resolve.

Distinction of Competencies and Supplementing of Policy-Making: The treaty split up the Union's competences toward member states into three fundamental types of jurisdiction. The first type is exclusive competence, meaning the Union solely is responsible for making laws which are enacted by member states, the second section is shared competence, where a Union nation is free to construct legislation when the Union itself has yet to take action, the third part is supporting competence, which is the EU taking the steps in order to enrich the approach of member nations. The clarification of the competences permitted the Union to legislate on troubles by pinpointing them and working toward them without interfering with the inner workings of any member states. In addition, the EU's overall competence now includes sectors like energy, public health, climate change, protection of civil rights and so on. Lastly, the Union gained the ability to take part in international agreements with non-EU states and warranted members to comply with its terms unless they chose to opt out on special occasions (European Parliament, 2024).

The Final Shape of EU Institutions: The treaty amended the existing institutions' role in decision-making and even founded extra ones based on deficiency. First off, the European Council (not to be confused with the Council of the European Union) was formally integrated

into the European Union. It had already been performing its activities outside the formal definition of an EU body since the Single European Act, nevertheless, it was intertwined with the central EU establishments as an official institution. The European Council is not involved in the legislative policy creation in any way, unlike popular conception, instead it conducts meetings on a regular basis where the heads of state/government of the EU member states debate upon the focus of decision-making in the near future and with their input the rest of the main bodies act accordingly and make the proposed general zone their focal point. On top of that, the President of the European Council, who acted as the EU's representative in external matters, was elected via the use of qualified majority with a two-and-a-half-year term (European Parliament, 2024a).

The adjustments in terms of the European Commission remained limited, with the main disparity being that of the Council of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”) nominated a candidate for the Presidency of the Commission by especially keeping in mind the latest European Parliament elections, this ensured the Parliament's role in legislature and gave them a louder voice.

When it came to the Council and the Parliament, considerable adaptations were executed. The requirements for a qualified majority were altered slightly in the Council, now needing 55% of members, which makes up at least 65% of the EU population. Also, an arrangement was put in place to allow the reexamination of a disapproved proposal after some time. The European Parliament was allowed to introduce amendments to proposals arriving from the Council in an evolved version of the priorly applied co-decision procedure titled “the Ordinary Legislative Procedure” which will be illustrated to a greater extent in an upcoming

section. The Parliament expanded its involvement to the budgetary provisions of the Union and international agreements, too. Lastly, in regard to National Parliaments, a mechanism was offered to supervise their compliance, allowing them to oppose EU legislation should they consider it an affair belonging to the national level (European Parliament, 2024a).

Developments in Foreign and Security Policy: The High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was renamed “High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy” and granted a slew of new privileges and attributes. First and foremost, besides coordinating the foreign and security policies of the Union, the High Representative served as the Vice-President of the European Commission and chaired a brand-new configuration of the Council called “the Foreign Affairs Council” (European Union 2007. title III. art.9e. 23). Additionally, the High Representative could directly suggest proposals to the Council without it having to go through the Commission first; this inclusion allowed the Council to make spot decisions on problems necessitating urgent treatment. To facilitate the activities of the High Representative in a more exceptional level, an establishment by the name of “European External Action Service (EEAS)” was launched, cooperating closely with the external services of member states and acting as the EU’s diplomatic hand and projecting its values and interests globally. This organisation would be chaired by the High Representative to sustain a high level of stability (European Union 2007. title III. art.9e-13a. 29). The Common Security and Defence Policy was ultimately recognised as a key portion of European Integration, and multiple objectives were set in the sector of military and security, such as improvement of the combat capabilities of member states, conducting missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and bettering international security. Alongside the coordination of the mentioned missions, the Political and Security Committee was tasked with immediate crisis management and aiding the remaining bodies in joint

operations. An agency dubbed the “European Defence Agency” was initiated as a continuation of the Western European Union of the past, and it took on the assignment of contributing to the defence industry by identifying its weak points and defining European defence policy. (European Union 2007. title III. section 2. art. 28A-28B. 36-37).

General Amendments and Supplements to Preceding Provisions: The EU’s well-known three-pillar structure was merged into a single entity, with practically all the Justice and Home Affairs pillar and part of the Foreign and Security Policy having fallen under a simpler competency. The legal framework turned rudimentary this way, and the overall legislative period moved on smoothly. Moreover, a formal proceeding was set for member states wishing to withdraw from the EU, which outlined a clear legal pathway without diminishing the other EU members (European Parliament, 2024).

Another substantial aspect of the Treaty is its reinforcement of the scope of the co-decision process and changing it into the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, which can be seen as the backbone of European law and decision-making.

b) Functions of the European Union

i) Legislative

The EU’s legislative function falls under the jurisdiction of two fundamental bodies, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

European Parliament: The European Parliament is composed of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are elected by the citizens of EU states. MEPs are originally members of a party in their country of origin. After the European Parliament elections are settled, the newly elected MEPs participate in one of the party groups within the Parliament based on their ideologies and political priorities. MEPs may also choose to stay non-aligned with any party group. Currently, the European Parliament has 720 MEPs. The Parliament manages its endeavours in almost all policy areas, though not all MEPs are pursuing the same field; instead, the Parliament is split into 20 committees such as employment and social affairs, industry, research and energy, culture and education and so forth. Each MEP belongs to a specific committee, with the chance to switch from one to another. The system of committees expedites the legislative aspect of the Union to a high degree, as the sheer number of the Parliament would work against it if all 720 MEPs discussed with one another constantly. After the formation of the proposals, they are also discussed in its definite form in the Parliament. The European Parliament has yet another duty up its sleeve, that being approving or rejecting the candidate for the Presidency of the Commission, and then approving or rejecting the Commission as a whole after the president designates commissioners after interviewing said candidates. Since 2012, the candidates proposed by the European Council are those directly endorsed by distinct political groups in the Parliament, which means the Parliament has a direct say in the Commission's Presidency (European Parliament 2024b).

The Council of the European Union: More commonly known as “the Council”, the Council of the European Union is composed of ministers of EU member states. It is different from the “European Council”, so it is important to remember the distinction of these two entities. The Council has multiple configurations pertaining to different fields, such as Foreign Affairs, Economic and Financial Affairs, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Justice and Home Affairs.

These configurations are based on the agenda on the table and the ministry whose jurisdiction covers the agenda item. For example, if the general agenda of the EU was immigration policies and border security, the Council would have the configuration of Justice and Home Affairs with the ministries of internal affairs as the representatives of member states. The Council utilizes a different voting method in drafting most legislations, which is called “Qualified Majority.” In a qualified majority voting in the Council, a proposal must get the approval of at least 15/27 ministers, and the total population represented by those approving ministers must be over 65% of the entire European Union population. Qualified Majority is also applied when the Council appoints the members of the European Economic and Social Committee, Court of Auditors and the European Committee of the Regions. On top of being the two establishments charged with the legislative role, the Parliament and Council adopt the EU’s yearly budget as well. (European Parliament 2024c).

ii) Executive

The key organisation with executive powers within the EU is the European Commission. The Commission takes on an administrative role during most of the procedures set by the Union’s main treaties.

European Commission: The European Commission is composed of 27 commissioners, each undertaking a specific policy area. The Commissioners are appointed by the elected president of the Commission, with one specific role going to one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission: the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.” The main responsibility of the Commission is to create legislative proposals. Almost all legislative proposals drafted by the Commission then enter the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). Unlike with other institutions, commissioners have their main representation duty and

focus on the Union and the general interest of Europeans rather than their nation and its citizens. The Commission is fully culpable to the European Parliament altogether, and in the event that its performance is found to be impacting the Union negatively, the Parliament can force their abdication with a motion. The draft budget for the EU is discussed numerous times and then decided upon in the Commission, which is then sent to the legislative organs for them to approve or reject. The Commission is the one and only main EU body with the authority to negotiate international agreements, and if the mediation falls under the category of foreign relations or security, it is the role of the High Representative to coordinate its arbitration. On another front, the Commission approves International Agreements after the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, handing them the mandate for it. Lastly, it supervises the application of the hitherto analysed treaties which have transformed the Union to its current position (European Parliament 2024d).

iii) Judiciary

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the umbrella term in which the entire judicial system of the EU falls under. It includes the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest judicial authority in the Union, and the General Court. Together with the General Court, the ECJ safeguards the EU law as its final interpreter and examines its homogenous utilisation in the Union. Both institutions analyse the acts of the remaining fundamental EU bodies, figuring out whether they have conducted their activity in accordance with the legal basis. The institutions are also held accountable in cases of damages they inflicted on individuals or companies through the CJEU.

European Court of Justice (ECJ): The ECJ comprises one judge from every member state and 11 advocates-general. An advocate general is a special role only existing in the EU, with the

responsibility of providing impartial legal opinions on complex cases of vital importance. The judges determine a president and vice president, with candidates being among the members of the Court. Each judge and advocate is appointed by their respective government for a renewable six-year term, and the elected President has a term of three years. It mainly handles cases with the EU Institutions, the member states as a whole and their national courts, such as with preliminary rulings upon conflicting rulings. Ultimately, it inspects the rulings of the General Court and has higher jurisdiction over it in that matter (European Parliament 2024e).

General Court: The General Court is formed by two judges per member state with, again, a 6-year renewable term, although their appointment measure includes an independent panel concluding their appropriateness for the court. It particularly handles cases arriving from individuals and companies such as EU employees. The decisions of the General Court can be appealed to the ECJ if the sides do not find the rulings fitting (European Parliament 2024e).

iv) Elections and political groups of the EU

Elections for the European Parliament are held every five years, where the EU citizens vote for the MEPs (Member of the European Parliament) from their specific state and its parties, with the number of MEPs corresponding to that nation's populace. One thing to note about this correspondence is that it is "degressively proportional" seat quotas are allocated, meaning smaller states are given a larger number of MEPs. A total of 720 MEPs were admitted into the Parliament with the last election in 2024. After being elected, MEPs take part in what is known as a "Political Group". The political group of an MEP reflects their national party's overall ideology, and usually, national parties are already affiliated with one of the groups (European Union, n.d). The Political Groups have a great deal of advantages to them and ease the

legislative process on differing levels, such as with the voting procedures, where they usually take a united stance on most areas of legislative action.

European People's Party (EPP): The European People's Party is the largest political group in the Parliament with 188 seats and, therefore, one of the most influential as well. It is known for representing mainly centre-right and Christian democratic principles. EPP advocates for a united Europe deeply rooted in freedom, whilst national and local identities are upheld. It envisions a competitive social market economy in Europe where the value of human rights and inclusivity are held in high regard. The EPP claims to acknowledge the Christian-Judo heritage of Europe and defends the religious freedom of all within. Some of the prominent parties in the EPP include but are not limited to: Christian Democratic Union from Germany, National Liberal Party from Romania, the Civic Platform from Poland and the People's Party from Spain (EPP n.d).

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D): The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats is another one of the key groups with 136 members in the Parliament. It represents social democratic and centre-left values in a general sense and is committed to building a more feminist, sustainable, social and integrated Europe. It has a strict agenda of higher quality public services, suitable work conditions, environmental accountability and equality of all. S&D highly condemns the growing far-right populism and proposes instead a Europe that is held together by social justice and solidarity. Peace is an additional significant aspect of this group, as it aims to secure peace both within and outside Europe's borders. It often acts in support of the remaining left-wing groups and utilizes progressive coalitions to counter fragmentation. A few of the dominant parties in the group include the Spanish Socialist

Workers' Party from Spain, the Democratic Party from Italy and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Socialists and Democrats n.d).

Patriots for Europe (PfE): The Patriots for Europe political group is the third-biggest group with 84 MEPs. It is one of the newest groups, having been formed at the beginning of the 2024 term of the European Parliament, and most of its members had been in the Identity and Democracy group previously. The PfE group generally supports far-right ideals and unites sovereigntist and nationalist parties under its roof. It is known for the general scepticism and sometimes opposition of European Integration, having been founded in their eyes as a counterweight to the overly bureaucratic EU structure. In the same way, the group is highly against further transfers of power to EU institutions. The group disapproves of the EU's closer drift toward a federation and instead bolsters the cooperation of sovereign states. Its influential parties are Fidesz from Hungary, the National Rally from France and the League from Italy (Patriots.eu n.d).

European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): The European Conservatives and Reformists holds 80 members of the European Parliament. It mainly backs general right-wing ideals and Eurorealism which means a lighter scepticism toward European Integration and its institutions. Much like the Patriots but on a softer level, ECR respects the national sovereignty and own initiatives of national governments and pictures a flexible Union on mostly economic terms. Wherein, economic competitiveness and minimal regulation is put to use with emphasis on free enterprise and low taxation. It is highly antagonistic toward EU integration policies, which address uncritical matters in its views. It spans over 19 EU states and its most sizable

members are Brothers of Italy from Italy, Law and Justice from Poland and Identity and Liberties from France (ECRGroup n.d).

Renew Europe: Renew Europe contains 75 seats in the European Parliament and can be seen as the successor of the ALDE group in some of the previous terms. Looking at their ideology overall, it can be said that they fall under a “centrist” point of view, where they establish themselves as the middle ground in most cases. Additionally, the group reinforces liberal democratic proposals and hopes to achieve a closer European Union in the future by recognising its accomplishments throughout the years.. It is in disagreement with extremism of both ends of the political spectrum. EU-wide solutions on challenges in migration, climate change, digital transformation and so on are another one of the core themes for the group. Its key parties include: Renaissance from France, Progressive Slovakia from Slovakia and Fianna Fail from Ireland (Renew Europe n.d).

Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA): The Greens/European Free Alliance has 53 members in the Parliament. It is composed of environmentally green, progressive, pro-EU and left-wing parties. It supports a vision of Europe rooted in environmental sustainability, endorsement of social justice and human rights and supports democratic reform. Their group policy focuses on imposing change not in a gradual manner but by way of ambitious decisions in topics of climate change and biodiversity. The group agenda is not limited to the environment either as they carry efforts to address problems like social inequality, breach of fundamental rights and freedoms and mass migration. On the topic of migration policies, they call for a humane approach to asylum and integration in light of the authoritarian groups who view Europe as a “Fortress”. Finally, it seeks a feminist and digitally responsible EU which defends

the privacy of its citizens. The group's largest benefactors are: Alliance 90/The Greens from Germany, the GreenLeft from the Netherlands and the Ecologists from France (The Greens-EFA n.d).

The Left: The Left holds 46 seats in the Parliament. The group represents left-wing principles in the Parliament and collaborated with the remaining left groups on most occasions. In its point of view, The Left aims to shift the EU's programme from liberal and elite-driven decision-making to people-centred alternatives. It backs workers' rights, public services, fair wealth distributions whilst opposing privatisation and the empowerment of the rich. It incorporates feminist, environmental, inclusive perspectives and calls for LGBTQI+ rights, action toward climate change and humane migration policies. It is in direct opposition to the militarization of the EU and would prefer the spending of funds on its citizens instead. It acts as the voice of marginalized communities in Europe and incorporates their wants into the legislative procedure. Its largest parties by number of MEPs are: La France Insoumise from France, the Left from Germany and Syriza from Greece (The Left n.d).


Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN): The Europe of Sovereign States is the smallest group currently with 26 seats in the European Parliament. Being a far-right group, it holds national-conservative values to a high regard and rejects the deepening of European Integration and presents national sovereignty and traditional values instead. Keeping in mind the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe in mind, the group defends key terms like national identity, self-determination and conventional portrayal of a family. It highly resists the notion of a "federation" for the European Union and critiques the environmentally friendly policy on account of its strictness. Some of the threats in ESN's view are: uncontrolled mass migration, Islamic extremism and LGBTQI+ undertones in everyday life. Some of the group's most

influential members are: The Alternative for Germany from Germany, New Hope from Poland and Revival from Bulgaria (ESN-Group n.d).

Non-Inscrits (NI): Non-Inscrits are parties who have chosen to not associate themselves with any of the existing groups, and there are 29 seats in that state. The reasons for not participating in any groups changes from the inexistence of any groups matching a party's ideology to preferring to stay neutral (European Parliament n.d.a).

v) Decision-making Procedure (OLP)

The procedure carries on as follows in three readings: In the first reading, the European Commission, the singular institution in charge of creating bills, proposes a bill to the European Parliament. The Parliament then determines whether to adopt the legislation in its entirety or to amend it first. Either way, the proposal reaches the Council, and the Council can approve the initially proposed bill/amended bill right away or introduce their amendments; if amendments are proposed by the Council, the second reading is initiated. In the second reading, the bill arrives at the Parliament again, and the Parliament possesses the power to simply reject the proposal, in which case, the bill fails. On the other hand, if they introduce further amendments, the bill travels once again to the Council, where it can either be adopted or it can simply be turned down and the third reading will be launched if further amendments are proposed by the Council. During the third reading, a temporary conciliation committee is founded with equal representatives from both institutions and the commissioners related to the area of work. The aim of the third reading was to attain a joint document approved by the two sides. After the formation of said document, it is expected to either be approved and rejected by the Parliament and the Council anew. If the document produced by the Conciliation Committee is not approved by both of the institutions, the proposal fails altogether (European Council, 2017).



(European Parliament n.d.b “The Ordinary Legislative Procedure - step by step”)

vi) Accession to the European Union

To become a member of the European Union, a candidate nation has to fulfil certain criteria thoroughly, proving their competence in the eyes of the Union. This specific criteria was first

articulated during the European Council meeting in Copenhagen on June 21-22, 1993. It would be later known as the “Copenhagen Criteria”. The mentioned criteria can be split into three portions for the eligibility of a nation (European Council 1993).

Political Stability and Institutional Groundwork: The candidate nation must have steady government institutions which have been brought up solely with democracy without the intervention of external sources. The rule of law, significance of human rights and protection of minorities should be common values that are not disregarded in the applicant country (European Council 1993).

Functioning and Compatible Market Economy: The nation in question should possess a market economy capable of standing on its own in wake of competitive forces and the current market of the EU. Additionally, a relatively anchored inflation should be in place no recent occurrences of an economic crisis wreaking havoc. The financial practices of the candidate’s market should be compatible with the EU’s single market and their incorporation to it in the future (European Council 1993).


Adherence to EU Membership: The applicant must be able to adopt the common EU law, policy and standards whilst supporting its objectives on the political landscape. The EU law in question includes adhering to any of the previously approved treaties and charters and also future law which could be instigated by the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (European Council 1993).

The Copenhagen meeting of the European Council emphasized the value of fostering a systematic relationship with countries aspiring for membership in a process including the following:


-Political Dialogue: Conducting regular international meetings to align the country's overall standards and policies with that of the EU,

-Economic Partnership: Facilitating economic cooperation with the potential member and ensuring their harmony with the competitive market space of the EU

-Lending of Assistance: Providing support to the applicant in question in terms of building the required administrative and institutional capability to fit into the EU and enforce its laws (European Council 1993).



Whilst Copenhagen Criteria provides a framework for accession, usually each accession is regarded on its own by viewing the full situation of the member state. Every candidacy is examined by keeping in mind the political landscape and the effects of enlargement on the Union and the circumstances of the candidate country. The accession procedure usually takes years for most of the applicants as there are many negotiations with the EU elaborating on various points of consideration. To make this process more organised, it is divided into differing chapters with all of them addressing a general requirement for joining the EU and there have been cases of a chapter being finished and reopened after complications have arisen in that area (European Council 1993).



(Fondation Robert Schuman 2024 “Twenty Years After Largest Enlargement”)

3) Introduction to the Political and Security Committee (PSC)

a) Role and Responsibilities

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) serves as a key element of the European Union in terms of formulating and undertaking the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As mentioned before, the PSC was established under Article 38 of the Treaty of Amsterdam with the general goal of assessing the international scene and assisting in the formulation and implementation of policies and missions associated with the CFSP. It also acts as the backbone of the EU when faced with international crises, carrying out an immediate response to the situation at hand, be it diplomatically or by conducting an operation (EUR-Lex 2011).

By keeping a close eye on the international situation, the PSC safeguards the Union's reaction to unprompted challenges arising on a regular basis. In addition to overseeing worldwide events, the PSC contributes to policy development by drawing up recommendations and articulating options directly to the Council, specifically the Foreign Affairs configuration and other related committees working under the Council which are affiliated with CFSP. These inputs are quite significant in adapting the EU's external sphere and consistency in its policies. Furthermore, in terms of crisis management operations, the PSC exercises nearly complete control over the procedure under the authority given by the Council and the High Representative. It supervises both military and civil missions and ensures any bumps in the process are managed with the utmost care. The committee is also responsible for directing subordinate organizations such as the Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EUR-Lex 2011).

b) Structure and Composition

The PSC is composed of ambassadors from each EU Member State, with every ambassador embodying their respective governments' views on the agenda discussed. The committee is chaired by a representative of the European External Action Service, who assures that the decisions taken correspond to the Union's external strategy at the time. The chairman works toward creating a fruitful environment and attaining consensus between the different ambassadors in order to finalize the concluding remarks of the Committee. Another role of the chairman is to represent the PSC in its relations with other EU institutions and international organisations. On another note, the PSC meets twice a week with the added possibility of increasing the frequency of their meetings. This schedule allows them to compose EU policy much more rapidly in comparison to other Union organs, underlining its value in crisis management (EUR-Lex 2011).

c) Decision-Making Process

Acting as one of the integral decision makers with regard to the CFSP, the decision-making process heavily relies on unanimity, which is particularly rare to see in the EU. Unlike other voting procedures where the approval of the majority is enough and consensus being not a must; in the PSC, ambassadors have to reach consensus on the problem by way of negotiation. This method facilitates a cohesive and collective approach to major operations, with national representatives putting aside their differences to pave the way for the greater good of the Union and therefore their countries. However, this does not mean that disagreements do not exist within the Committee, like any political setting, ambassadors have to keep in mind their national positions as well as the EU's stance and sometimes these two criteria may not match resulting in conflict arising. In such cases of conflict, the primary aim of members of the Committee is to establish a middle ground where enough leeway is present for affected parties. It should also be noted that if not for special occasions, all decisions taken by the PSC first have to be approved by the Council to be put in use. The mentioned special occasions are almost always in times of crucial military operations overseas, where the endorsement of the Council is no longer necessary and the Committee may conduct its plans as it sees fit (Howorth 2009).

d) Interaction of the PSC with Other EU Institutions

The Political and Security Committee collaborates closely with partner institutions to bring about a fairly smooth operational process where all aspects of the operation are carefully examined. One of the most important cooperators to the PSC is the European Military Committee (EUMC), delivering military guidance when necessary. The EUMC is made up of the Chiefs of Defence of each member country and manages the physical scale of military operations. Another organ supporting the PSC's endeavours is the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), handling the civilian portion of the operations to make sure their overall well-being is taken into account. Similarly, the Politico-Military Group (PMG) composes the background work necessary for the PSC especially in terms of Union-

wide defence and its relation to politics. Additionally, it deals with providing constant feedback to the Committee in terms of the implementation of their approved verdicts. Its involvement does not end there, though, it keeps a constant flow of information between third states and substantial organisations such as NATO. Last but not least, the European External Action Service assists the PSC in all fields imaginable with the special counsel of the High Representative. Its most discrete role is to help in the coordination of the mentioned organs to reach the most optimal outcomes on the diplomatic and militaristic side that is coherent to the existing EU framework (EEAS 2024).

e) Key Policies and Actions Taken by the PSC

There have been numerous operations that have taken place since the establishment of the PSC, the most momentous ones of which will be explained in this section.

Operation Artemis (2003): Operation Artemis was the first ever military operation carried on outside the continent of Europe. Its overarching goal was to deescalate the security risks in the city of Bunia of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was established upon the request of the United Nations and the Security Council's resolution authorisation of military involvement. Rather than eliminating the terrorist forces, the European troops' top priority was to protect the civilian population until a joint peacekeeping battalion could be put together by the UN. The main bulk of the soldiers consisted of French origin and to be specific France played a pivotal role in the logistical aspect of it as well. The operation proved successful, showcasing the EU's ability to intervene with its military in crisis situations, and its triumph would warrant future external proceedings (Homan 2007, 151-155).

EUTM RCA (2016): European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) began after an official invitation was delivered to the EU from the Central African Republic to reinforce their Armed Forces in terms of their training. The largest objective of the mission was to help in the creation of a modernised and accountable army for the country, and this aspiration was achieved by providing strategic advice to higher ranking military personnel, educating ordinary infantry on not only improving their prowess but also on values such as human rights. The mission is still ongoing, but it has made noteworthy gains to the Central African Republic Armed forces by founding 6 new battalions and raising many military leaders (EEAS 2021).

EUAM-Iraq (2017): The European Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) was initiated after the Iraqi government had sought aid from the EU on improving its internal security by way of implementing a general reform in that field. The operation strived to execute the reform in a uniform manner by articulating the brand new Iraqi National Security Strategy. The specific request from the Iraqi government could be largely attributed to their inability to prevent terrorism and organised crime. The advisory mission would in turn focus its attention to lessening the mentioned problems in the country first at a provincial scale than at a country-wide degree. The still ongoing operation has helped in mitigating the effects of crime in the nation and additionally fostered better communication between the EU and Iraq (EUAM-Iraq n.d).

Operation ATALANTA (2008): Operation ATALANTA started off to deter and put an end to the maritime robbery present in the Somali coast. It had the primary task of escorting the World Food Program (WFP) ships to ensure their contents would be delivered to the needy in

Somalia without being harmed. In addition, the mission safeguarded the security of the Somalian coast on top of halting efforts of piracy and drug trafficking in the surrounding area. Since the beginning of the operation no WFP vessels have been captured by pirates and thanks to the integrative outlook of the Union crime has been lessened in the region. Without the involvement of the EU, the situation may not have been resolved as at the peak of the crime there were cases of more than 700 people being taken hostages whereas more than 30 ships were captured. This particular operation exhibits the Union's capability in overcoming international level issues on its own (EUNAVFOR n.d).

4) Events happened between 2025 to 2032.

a) Economic developments in Europe and in the world

Before 2025, the Eurozone comprised 20 members, with Croatia being the most recent country to join. In addition, six other countries were using the euro. Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican City had officially adopted the euro through agreements with the European Union, whereas Montenegro and Kosovo were using it unilaterally and informally. Montenegro successfully joined the Eurozone two years after becoming a full member of the EU in 2030. ("The Euro Outside the Euro Area," n.d.)

Bulgaria, one of the two countries participating in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism¹ (ERM II), alongside Denmark, joined the Eurozone in 2026. Although the transition was not entirely smooth at first, Bulgaria managed to integrate without facing a major economic crisis. However, the situation in Poland proved more complex. Despite the presence of a pro-European government, the Polish markets and economic sectors demonstrated a negative reaction to the

¹ The European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was formed in 1979 with the goal of stabilizing exchange rates and preparing European Union (EU) member countries for the adoption of a common currency. To that goal, the ERM established a system of fixed exchange rates, with member currencies anchored within specific bands. This was followed by ERM II in 1999, a scheme that helps non-euro EU countries align their currencies prior to the adoption of the euro.

transition, leading to a months-long recession. Consequently, a new government with a more cautious stance on the Euro assumed power. Nonetheless, due to the lack of an exit mechanism for the Euro, Poland was unable to return to its old currency, the Zloty. In response to these developments, the European Central Bank created help plans with the aim of stabilizing Poland's position within the currency union and facilitating its economic recovery. (“ERM II – the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism,” n.d.)

Sweden's case was distinct from that of other countries. Contrary to Denmark, Sweden did not possess an official opt-out from adopting the euro, signifying that, in principle, it was obligated to adopt the currency. In 2030, 27 years after rejecting the euro in a previous referendum, Swedish citizens narrowly voted in favor of adopting the currency, leading to Sweden officially joining the Eurozone in 2032.

However, other EU member states continue to demonstrate undecisiveness or fail to meet the requirements for adopting the euro. Denmark remains the only country with an official opt-out, whereas most of other EU countries are obligated to join. While public support for the euro is high in Romania, Albania, and North Macedonia, none of these nations currently meet the necessary criteria. Meanwhile, Czechia and Hungary strongly oppose adopting the euro due to concerns stemming from Poland's experience. The rising of mistrust towards the euro is further evidenced by the modest levels of public support in these countries, which casts doubt on the likelihood of any short term expansion into the eurozone.

Outside the European Union, China's economic growth continues, and the GDP gap between China and the United States is gradually narrowing, with projections indicating that China could become the world's leading economy by 2035. While the U.S. economy remains relatively stable, Russia's economy experienced a downturn in the late 2020s. However, following the appointment of a new president (a topic that will be explored in more detail in the subsequent

section), Russia's economy began a gradual recovery in the early 2030s. Persian Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia, have strengthened economic ties with the EU, though some European politicians have expressed concerns that this growing relationship could result in the EU overlooking potential political concerns in the region, such as human rights issues. (Lowy Institute, n.d.)

At the beginning of the 2030s, the collapse of Afghanistan's state structure triggered a chain reaction across global trade networks and financial markets. The power vacuum left in the region facilitated the resurgence of armed non-state actors and transnational criminal networks, leading to widespread instability throughout Central and South Asia. This volatility directly impacted key overland trade corridors—most notably segments of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, and strategic Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure—which serve as essential links between Asian production centers and European markets. Leading European economies, particularly Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, were among the first to feel the economic shocks of these developments. Germany's export-driven industrial structure suffered supply chain disruptions, resulting in a 1.2% GDP contraction by 2029. Italy, already experiencing economic vulnerability, encountered a 2% contraction due to declining consumer confidence and a tourism sector in decline. Compounding the situation was an increase in global energy prices. As instability spread toward Western Pakistan and parts of eastern Iran, threats to regional pipelines and oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz led to market volatility and rising transportation costs. The resulting economic uncertainty across the Eurozone prompted a coordinated response at the institutional level. In response, the European Central Bank was

compelled to implement unconventional monetary policies ²to maintain the stability of the Eurozone economy. (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2025)

On a global scale, the United States reassessed its strategic alliances, diversifying its partnerships across Asia and Europe. Meanwhile, China increased its investments in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to secure alternative trade routes in Central Asia. Facing political and economic pressures on its energy exports to Europe, Russia began seeking new markets, turning its focus toward the Middle East since the European markets are in danger there.

b) Political developments in European countries

The war between Ukraine and Russia, which commenced in 2022 and lasted for seven years, has not resulted in a substantial alteration to the borders. Neither party has attained a decisive military victory. Russia has made significant advances with the annexation of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia regions, in addition to Crimea. With this, Ukraine has not succeeded in re-establishing control over the occupied territories, although it has successfully evaded a potential total annexation.

The election of more skeptical leaders in European countries and the United States has resulted in a decline in political support for Ukraine. Consequently, the United States, under a new Republican president, has advocated for both parties to declare a ceasefire to resolve the impasse. This has led to the transformation of the war into a 'cold conflict,' whereby a ceasefire has been reached but the dispute over the annexed territories persists. A prisoner exchange was agreed upon, and a United Nations peacekeeping force was deployed on the border between

² Monetary policies are the activities taken by central banks to regulate the money supply, interest rates, and inflation. These policies aim to promote economic stability and growth. Open market operations, reserve requirements, and benchmark interest rate setting are some of the tools available for this aim.

Ukraine and the annexed territories. However, both sides agreed to 'disagree' on how to resolve the dispute over Russia's annexation.

Despite maintaining its opposition to Ukraine's accession to NATO, Russia has adopted a more moderate stance towards its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2031. Ukraine has initiated post-war recovery programs with the support of European countries and the United States; however, it is anticipated that considerable time will be required before accession to the EU can be realized. Following the cessation of hostilities, Volodymyr Zelenskyy's presidential term came to a conclusion, and a new technocratic government was established to oversee the development of various programs.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin had succeeded by his successor in 2030 after completing a new six-year term. This new leader, who was prime minister from 2025 to 2030, was seen as a calmer and more neutral figure without close connections. The newly elected Russian president has expressed a desire to cultivate enhanced political and economic relations with European nations and to pursue the lifting of the economic embargo on Russia. However, this leader continues to advocate for Russia's territorial claims within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, while concurrently upholding the independence of the separatist regions of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in Moldova and Georgia.

Following 2028, a number of structural changes were observed in the domestic politics of European countries. In Germany, there was an increase in the political influence of nationalist populist movements, such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. This development compelled the federal government to tighten national security policies and increase defense spending. Meanwhile, in France, Emmanuel Macron's successor pursued policies aimed at deepening European defense policies while also seeking to increase its autonomy within NATO. The French political leadership's endeavors to wield more influence in NATO's

strategic decision-making processes have given rise to diplomatic tensions with the US and other allies, thereby complicating military coordination within the alliance.

Meanwhile, the European Union took steps to strengthen its collective defense capabilities in response to rising geopolitical problems. Initiatives such as the 'Strategic Compass' sought to create a more independent defense architecture inside the EU, a process known as 're-armament'. France has been a firm supporter of these initiatives, taking the lead in both defense industry development and collaborative military operational capability enhancements. While Paris has lobbied for the EU to gain more strategic autonomy from NATO, it has periodically clashed with other member states, including Germany and Italy. ("The ReArm Europe Plan" 2025)

In Italy, the center parties entered a process of political fragmentation due to pressure from left-wing groups demanding far-reaching social security reforms in the face of economic uncertainty, on the one hand, and from far-right formations that pursued politics based on the principle of 'Italian sovereignty,' on the other. Meanwhile, Spain and Portugal strengthened their ties with NATO and increased their support for multilateral security mechanisms to ensure regional security.

c) Political developments in the world

Transatlantic relations the relationship between the United States of America (USA) and Europe, have undergone significant changes over time. From the response of European politicians to George W. Bush's actions in Iraq to the discourse surrounding the nearly dissolution of NATO under Donald Trump, these relations have not always been optimal.

In the 2028 US presidential elections, a new Republican candidate emerged victorious, one who expressed a degree of skepticism concerning the future of NATO and advanced the argument that the United States doesn't need to provide adequate protection for Europe across the

domains of military, political, and economic spheres. This president was subsequently re-elected, which led to a period that witnessed a notable escalation in tensions between the United States and the European Union (EU). Significantly, the President of the United States made statements concerning NATO which received support from European federalist politicians. These politicians advocated for the European Union to establish its own military and to cease its military reliance on the United States.

The collapse of Afghanistan in 2028 caused a reconfiguration of international alliances, with the United States opting to fortify its ties with allies in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East to ensure global stability. Following a reduction in its European engagement, Washington prioritized the establishment of robust strategic partnerships, notably with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, perceiving India as a regional counterbalance to China while simultaneously deepening its relations with Saudi Arabia in the context of energy security and military collaboration. Consequently, Europe has been compelled to adopt a more autonomous stance on security matters, with certain European nations, notably France, initiating new initiatives to bolster the EU's collective defense capabilities.

Concurrently, Russia has sought to capitalize on the global power vacuum³, augmenting its influence in the post-Soviet space through the implementation of political and military pressure, with the aim of expanding its influence over Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Furthermore, Russia has endeavored to consolidate its authority in Central Asia by orchestrating large-scale military exercises along its southern borders. Despite this, Moscow, which is dealing with the

³ A global power vacuum is described as the occurrence of a state or alliance that formerly dominated the world stage but then loses influence or withdraws from its position of international leadership, leaving a void in global governance. This dynamic typically leads to increased instability, regional wars, and rivalry among developing powers vying to fill the resulting gap.

consequences of economic sanctions, has attempted to strengthen economic and military cooperation with Beijing. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2025)

In response to the United States' strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific region, the People's Republic of China has intensified its infrastructure development initiatives in Pakistan and Central Asia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby consolidating its strategic presence in these regions. Concurrently, Beijing has pursued economic collaboration with European nations, notably Romania and France, with a view to fortifying trade relations. Due to ongoing criticisms from Western leaders concerning China's involvement in disputes related to Taiwan and human rights issues in Hong Kong, European states have exercised restraint in improving diplomatic or economic ties with China.

In a bid to ensure regional security, in early 2027 India has initiated the organization of security summits with Pakistan and Central Asian states. The objective of these summits is to establish collective security cooperation mechanisms, thereby creating a counterweight to China's influence in Central Asia. Due to this, India has been assuming a more active regional role in the Indo-Pacific by augmenting its defense cooperation with the United States.

In response to India's regional initiatives, China has taken steps to intensify its diplomatic and economic relations with Central Asian countries through mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In addition, Beijing has sought to expand military cooperation and infrastructure investment with a view to strengthening its strategic position in the region after 2028. China also has initiated measures to reinforce its relationship with Pakistan, in order to counterbalance India's growing alignment with the US in the Indo-Pacific.

In light of these developments, Iran and Turkey have signed a security pact to prevent the spread of radical elements originating from Afghanistan across their borders. Despite this cooperation, both countries have tended to pursue independent foreign policies due to diverging domestic political dynamics. Turkey has sought to rebalance its relations with the EU, while Iran has sought to establish deeper strategic partnerships with China and Russia.

Consequently, the nature of security and strategic relations between the US and Europe has been transformed, as the US has adjusted its global priorities. While Europe has historically pursued an independent security doctrine through the augmentation of its military capacity, new US engagements in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East have resulted in a shift in the global balance of power. In response to these developments, Russia and China have sought to influence this transformation in a manner that aligns with their own interests, while regional actors such as India and Turkey have begun to accumulate significant influence. This new international order has contributed to the shaping of a multipolar world ⁴ order. In this instance, the EU once again found itself in a position of strategic ambiguity, oscillating between the United States and Russia-China. This dynamic gave rise to a sense of resentment among the two allies, as the EU found itself in a difficult position of having to choose between two major powers with their own complex internal dynamics.

By 2028, Turkey had consolidated its position as a regional powerhouse through the implementation of economic diversification strategies. The tourism sector experienced steady growth, facilitated by energy diversification and Turkey's role as a conduit in the trade networks between Europe and Asia. Investments in natural gas and renewable energy like the newly opened nuclear plants have transformed Turkey into an actor reducing its energy dependence

⁴ The term 'multipolar world' refers to an international system in which numerous governments or power groups, rather than a single hegemon, wield major influence over global events. (Kupchan 2024)

and consolidating its position as a transit country. Furthermore, advancements in the defense industry and increased domestic production capacity have increased Turkey's strategic importance both economically and geopolitically.

In order to address these challenges, Turkey engaged in renewed negotiations with the European Union (EU) concerning its migration policies. In contrast to the 2016 migration agreement, Turkey's demands in these negotiations have been more robust, encompassing political and economic concessions in addition to financial support. The country has placed a particular emphasis on the liberalization of visas, the modernization of the Customs Union, and the expansion of energy cooperation with the EU.

However, the political collapse in Afghanistan has exerted unexpected pressure on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Towards the end of 2028, the wave of migration from Afghanistan was much larger than previously anticipated and placed considerable strain on Turkey's borders. The large influx of refugees into Turkey via Iran put the country's infrastructure and social service systems under pressure, leading to deepening crises, particularly in the areas of health, housing, and employment.

Despite Turkey's endeavors to enhance border security with the objective of restricting the migration wave's progression towards Europe, these measures proved inadequate. This was primarily due to the exacerbating issue of overcrowding and the accelerated mobility of migrants within EU member states, such as Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy, during the early months of 2029. The surge in irregular migration across Europe has contributed to the rise in popularity of far-right political parties, leading to the implementation of more tight immigration policies in those countries. For instance, while countries such as France and Germany have sought to address the migration crisis through a unified EU policy, countries like Hungary and Poland have adopted a more stringent anti-immigration stance. For Turkey, the migration issue has

evolved into not only an economic and social crisis but also a bargaining chip in foreign policy. Ankara has strategically employed the migration issue to recalibrate its relations with both the EU and NATO, while concurrently pursuing a more proactive policy in the Middle East. The security cooperation agreement with Iran is intended to enhance border security and has inaugurated a new era in relations between Ankara and Tehran. In conclusion, although Turkey has maintained its economic growth in the post-2028 period, the migration wave triggered by the collapse in Afghanistan has led to a major transformation in the country's domestic and foreign policy. The relationship with Europe has been redefined, with Turkey's migration management strategies emerging as a pivotal instrument in its negotiations with regional and global actors. The measures undertaken by Turkey in this process are twofold: to safeguard domestic stability and to fortify its diplomatic standing on the global stage.

d) New member states and candidate countries in the EU

i) Albania, North Macedonia & Montenegro

The accession of these three countries to the European Union on 1 January 2030 brought the number of member states to 30, an increase from 27. While the relative voting weight of major powers like France and Germany slightly decreased, both countries supported the enlargement. Germany viewed the expansion as an opportunity for economic integration and access to new markets, while France saw it as a chance to strengthen EU defense capabilities and strategic autonomy. Although this development was widely regarded as a success by European politicians, the EU's objective of incorporating all Western Balkan countries by 2030 was not realized. This was due to the persistent tensions between Serbia and Kosovo and the protracted accession process of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Montenegro was the first country to conclude all negotiating chapters and was ratified by all other member states. However, the accession processes of both Albania and North Macedonia were hard. Although both countries concluded their negotiating chapters slightly later than

Montenegro, it took time to obtain ratification from all other member states. Albania's inability to obtain approval from the Dutch, French and German governments, despite concluding the relevant chapter, can be attributed to its substandard scores in corruption surveys published by independent European organizations.

Similarly, North Macedonia encountered challenges with its neighbor, Bulgaria. In 2022, Bulgaria exercised its veto, preventing North Macedonia from participating in accession negotiations, citing concerns that North Macedonian culture is a subculture of Bulgarian culture and that North Macedonia has irredentist claims on Bulgaria. However, a new agreement signed by both sides in 2029 stipulated that North Macedonia did not claim any rights, emphasizing the mutual similarities and differences between the two cultures. With Bulgaria lifting its veto and Albania taking more effective steps to combat corruption, both countries and Montenegro became new states.

ii) Serbia & Kosovo

As outlined in the section entitled 'Political developments in European countries,' both countries are continually confronted with border disputes. However, this section will concentrate more on the potential accession of both countries to the EU.

Due to the recent dispute with Kosovo, Serbia has not kept pace and continued to violate the border with Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, which are scheduled to join the EU in 2030. Despite the closure of half of the chapters, the EU's negotiations with Serbia have been hindered by the Serbian government's discord with the EU regarding its relations with Russia and certain domestic issues, including the economy and the rule of law.

Conversely, Kosovo submitted an application to join in 2028, but Serbia's threat to withdraw its own application if Kosovo's is accepted has impeded Kosovo's progress in its EU integration

process. In response, the EU has established specific arrangements, including the adoption of the euro through a unilateral monetary agreement (like those in place with micro-states⁵ such as Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican) and the inclusion of Kosovo in the Erasmus program. However, pro-EU Kosovo politicians consider these developments insufficient and aspire to more. Both countries seek to join first in order to have a European influence on their side of the conflict, but the EU's aim is the opposite: to force them to join at the same time. Therefore, the EU's primary objective is to reach an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo to prevent future conflicts and to speed up the accession process for both countries.

iii) Bosnia and Herzegovina

Following the Commission's recommendation and the approval of European leaders in 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) commenced accession negotiations. However, only half of the accession chapters have been opened, and none of the opened chapters have been closed, indicating that the country is not expected to join in the foreseeable future.

The most significant challenge confronting Bosnia and Herzegovina pertains to the entrenched division between the three primary communities: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. The demand for autonomy and enhanced rights by Bosnian Croats has gathered support from EU member Croatia, which has indicated its intent to veto Bosnia's accession bid if these demands are not met. Concurrently, the Serbian entity known as "*Republika Srpska*" is contemplating the possibility of secession, a move precipitated by the perceived inefficiency of domestic politics. Despite Serbia's reluctance to provide overt support, certain prominent Serbian politicians advocate for the secession of Republika Srpska. The question of whether Bosnia and

⁵ A microstate, otherwise referred to as a 'ministate', is a sovereign state that possesses a very small population or land area, typically both characteristics. However, the meanings of "state" and "very small" are not well-defined in international law. (Warrington 1994)

Herzegovina can successfully integrate into the European Union without the dissolution of the state remains a complex and open-ended one.

iv) Ukraine

In 2029, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Ukraine and Russia, bringing an end to the ongoing war. However, the dispute over the annexed territories continues. Ukraine argued that the situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine annexed by Russia should not be an obstacle to joining the EU, referencing the example of the Republic of Cyprus, which joined the EU in 2004 despite ongoing territorial disputes. While Russia does not oppose Ukraine's potential accession to the EU to the same extent as it opposes NATO membership, the possibility of Ukraine's accession could lead to a border dispute between the EU and Russia.

In the wake of Volodymyr Zelenskyy's declaration that he would not seek re-election in 2029, a technocratic government was established to initiate development and reconstruction programs in Ukraine, a nation that has sustained significant damage due to the ongoing conflict. A new president and government were elected, and a pro-EU agenda was established, with three primary objectives set for 2040: the reacquisition of occupied territories, the reconstruction of Ukraine, and the pursuit of EU accession.

However, the path towards EU accession has been met with challenges, as member states hold divergent views on Ukraine's readiness for membership. France, Germany, and Italy advocate for Ukraine's accession, acknowledging its potential as a future member of the European Union. Nevertheless, concerns regarding Ukraine's large population, its protracted recovery from the war, and the ongoing territorial dispute have been raised as obstacles. The Visegrad Group⁶ has

⁶ The Visegrad Group (V4) is a regional alliance of four Central European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The organisation was founded in 1991 with the primary objective of encouraging political, economic and cultural collaboration, particularly within the framework of European integration.

also expressed divergent views, with Poland and the Czech Republic in favor and Hungary and Slovakia opposed. Hungary has expressed reservations regarding Ukraine's accession, contingent on the provision of enhanced rights for the Hungarian minority residing in Ukraine. In contrast, Poland, in conjunction with the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, has emerged as a staunch proponent of Ukraine's EU integration. While European politicians have expressed their commitment to Ukraine's eventual accession to the EU, the precise timing of this event remains ambiguous. Ukraine, for its part, has set the year 2040 as its target for EU membership.

v) Moldova and Georgia

In the 2032 the negotiations between Moldova and Georgia and the EU is ongoing, which have been candidate countries for almost twenty years, as they continue to engage in the accession process and await fulfillment of the necessary criteria. The analysis identifies the presence of significant challenges within both nations' political institutions and the prevalence of corruption as primary factors contributing to the stagnation in their negotiations. Notably, the ongoing territorial disputes with separatist entities, such as Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, are identified as a major hindrance to progress.

In a manner similar to Ukraine, both countries aspire to EU accession before resolving their territorial disputes; however, the challenges do not end there. Corruption and a paucity of development also play a major role in the stagnation of their negotiations. While the mainstream parties in Georgia are pro-EU, Moldovan politics is divided between pro- and anti-EU parties, and the current Moldovan president favors EU membership, but no development can turn the country in the opposite direction.

vi) Türkiye

Following a protracted period of stagnation in the relationship between Turkey and the European Union, membership negotiations were resumed in 2030, with certain previously frozen chapters being reopened. Despite the prevailing positive atmosphere, it is not anticipated that Turkey will accede to the EU in the immediate future.

Northern European, Mediterranean, and Eastern European countries have expressed support for Turkey's membership, while Germany (under the new right-wing government) is opposed, arguing that this will lead to increased Turkish migration to Germany. Italy and Austria are also against Turkey's membership but are in favor of establishing closer relations between the EU and Turkey.

France, while not overtly opposed, acknowledges that Turkey has a considerable journey ahead to meet the necessary criteria for membership. Cyprus, in particular, has been the most vocal opponent to Turkey's accession, asserting that the Cyprus issue must be resolved before any consideration can be given to Turkey's EU membership. Conversely, Greece perceives that the advancement of Turkey's EU accession process will create a more conducive environment for the resolution of ongoing disputes, including those concerning Cyprus and the Aegean region.

The eventual accession of Turkey to the European Union is, it can be concluded, contingent not only on the decisions taken by the Turkish government but also on the actions of the European political establishment.

e) Timeline of these events

2025

- **Russia** appoints a new **Prime Minister**, a moderate technocrat with a background in economics and a reputation for pragmatic governance. His rise is seen as a calculated

move by the Kremlin to prepare a successor to Vladimir Putin while calming international markets.

- The **U.S. government**, under its second Trump administration, begins **phased withdrawals from European defense spending**, calling for greater burden-sharing within NATO. The Defense Budget Authorization Bill cuts funding for U.S. bases in Germany and Poland by 20%.
- **China** finalizes new strategic infrastructure agreements in **Pakistan (CPEC 2.0)** and **Kazakhstan**, focusing on dual-use (civilian-military) rail and highway corridors.
- **India's GDP growth** reaches 7.1%, outperforming expectations due to infrastructure reforms and defense-industrial expansion. Delhi begins preliminary talks with **Tajikistan** and **Uzbekistan** on establishing regional security cooperation.
- **The EU Commission** published a new Migration Pact draft, introducing a tiered quota system for refugee resettlement.
- **Eurozone inflation** remains high at 3.8%, prompting the **European Central Bank (ECB)** to continue its gradual tapering of pandemic-era bond purchasing programs.

2026

- **Bulgaria joins the Eurozone**, becoming the 21st member. Initial inflation spikes (peaking at 8.2%) but are brought under control through ECB intervention.
- **AI-based fintech adoption** in EU banking accelerates, particularly in Estonia, Germany, and Spain. Concerns over algorithmic bias and data security lead to new legislation under the **Digital Markets Regulation II**.

- **French-German proposals** for a European Defense Fund expansion are debated in Brussels. Italy and Eastern European countries express concern over centralization of procurement.
- **U.S. midterm elections** show growing bipartisan fatigue with European military spending, paving the way for a populist conservative candidate in the next presidential race.
- **Green tech investment** in the EU increases by 30%, driven by revised targets under the European Green Deal.

2027

- **India organizes the first "Central Asia Security Summit"** in New Delhi, hosting foreign ministers from Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The summit agrees on intelligence-sharing and the establishment of a joint anti-terrorism coordination cell.
- **Germany** witnesses the **Alternative for Germany (AfD)** rising to 20% in national polls. In response, Berlin passes the **Homeland Stability Act**, allocating 2.5% of GDP to defense.
- **France** proposes reforms to NATO's strategic decision-making, demanding more equitable influence for European nations. Tensions with Washington intensify.
- **Russian economy** enters a technical recession (-0.4%) due to prolonged sanctions and falling gas exports. To circumvent sanctions, Russia accelerates the "Digital Ruble" project and starts conducting cross-border trade with Iran and China in national currencies.

- **Ukraine**, despite continued conflict, sees GDP growth of 2.3% in the western regions through reconstruction funds and diaspora investments.
- **ECB** announces its intention to introduce a **Digital Euro Pilot Program** by 2029.

2028

- **U.S. presidential elections** result in the victory of a conservative Republican candidate with an "America First" platform. NATO funding is slashed by 25%, with a warning for Europe to become self-reliant.
- **Afghanistan collapses** entirely; the Taliban lose control to rival factions, prompting massive refugee flows toward Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.
- **Turkey and Iran** sign a security pact to seal their borders and conduct joint patrols. Over 1.5 million refugees enter Turkey by year-end.
- **ECB activates emergency credit lines** to Italy and Spain after recession indicators deepen. Germany initiates bilateral trade pacts with Eastern Europe to stabilize regional markets.
- **France and Germany launch the European Security Initiative (ESI)**, aimed at reducing dependency on NATO. Plans include drone fleets, naval modernization, and rapid reaction forces.
- **Turkey's defense industry output** grows 18% year-on-year. Its UAV exports to African and Central Asian countries increase significantly.
- **EU introduces Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)** enforcement; this draws WTO scrutiny and leads to trade tensions with China and India.

2029

- **Russia and Ukraine sign a ceasefire**, formalizing a "frozen conflict." A demilitarized zone is established with the assistance of a **UN peacekeeping force**.
- **President Zelenskyy steps down**; a transitional technocratic government is formed. Reconstruction begins in Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odesa regions.
- **Spain and Portugal** sign new defense agreements with the UK and Norway, forming a sub-regional maritime defense compact.
- **Far-right parties** in Hungary, Poland, and Austria block EU migration reforms. Hungary erects new border barriers with Serbia and Romania.
- **European GDP growth slows to 1.1%**, primarily due to supply chain disruptions and migration pressures.
- **Kosovo's EU application** is blocked by Serbia, but the EU initiates a unilateral economic partnership with Pristina modeled on EEA principles.

2030

- **Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro officially join the EU**. Enlargement to 30 members leads to institutional reform debates.
- **Poland enters a deep recession (-2.5%)** post-euro adoption. ECB deploys a €60 billion stabilization fund.
- **Sweden holds a second referendum** on euro adoption; the vote narrowly passes (51.2%), initiating a two-year preparation process.
- **Turkey and the EU reopen accession talks** on Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom, and Security) and Chapter 15 (Energy).
- **Russia's new President** signals openness to economic normalization with the EU but maintains control over Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

- **Germany and France lead an initiative to establish a pan-European arms procurement agency**, streamlining the defense supply chain.

2031

- **Ukraine launches its 2040 Strategy**: reclaim occupied territories, rebuild economy, and finalize EU accession.
- **France, Italy, and Germany** support Ukraine's integration, while Hungary and Slovakia object due to minority rights issues.
- **ECB introduces Digital Euro pilot in 8 countries**, with Estonia and Netherlands leading adoption.
- **China strengthens BRI presence** by completing the Pakistan-Afghanistan Beltway and funding a new port in Turkmenistan.
- **India and Japan** announce the "Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Corridor" to rival the BRI, attracting funding from the U.S. and EU Investment Bank.

2032

- **Sweden officially joins the Eurozone**, becoming the 24th member.
- **Moldova and Georgia remain candidate states**, but corruption and frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) stall progress.
- **Turkey becomes Europe's second-largest natural gas transit hub**, following a new trilateral deal with Azerbaijan and Romania.
- **EU implements Defense Procurement Framework**, with shared logistics and manufacturing hubs in Poland and Belgium.
- **France proposes the creation of a European Space Defense Command**, signaling EU ambitions in satellite security.

- **Eurozone GDP stabilizes at 1.7% growth**, thanks to digital innovation, green industries, and post-conflict reconstruction in Eastern Europe.

5) Problems need to be addressed in the Council

In May 2022, the most serious security crisis to date erupted against the European Union presence in Afghanistan. On the morning of 14 May, the European Union Civilian Mission in Kabul (EUPOL-K) was targeted by an armed group. The radical organization, calling itself the ‘New Emirati Guard’ (NEP), quickly seized the diplomatic compound and took 32 European Union staff hostage with 15 officials in it.

The NEP introduced a new layer to Afghanistan's security situation. This faction, acting independently of the Taliban, has begun to attack foreign embassies, capitalizing on the central authority's confusion. The attackers articulated three primary demands of the European Union: that it suspend development initiatives within the nation, cancel migrant readmission agreements⁷, and refrain from extraditing alleged Western accomplices. It is evident that these requests encompass not only the issue of hostages, but also European policies in the region.

At the time of the crisis, the European presence in Afghanistan was largely civilian in nature and security protection relied on limited local elements. NATO's reduced activities in the region and limitations in the UN's mandate left European missions vulnerable. The lack of EU diplomatic security capacity and the cumbersome nature of the PSC's response mechanisms highlighted the urgent need for coordination.

⁷ Readmission agreements are defined as binding bilateral or multilateral agreements between States that establish and facilitate the bases, procedures and modalities for one State to promptly and in an orderly manner return non-nationals who do not or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry or stay on its territory. (European Commission n.d.)

In the aftermath of the incident, a serious state of alert emerged in European foreign policy and security circles. An extraordinary meeting of the PSC was called by the EU High Representative. EEAS provided information about the hostages, while Frontex and the Crisis Response Centres started working on evacuation and rescue scenarios. s

a) Inadequacy of Diplomatic Security Infrastructure in Conflict Zones

The events surrounding the May 2022 hostage crisis in Kabul have exposed critical vulnerabilities in the European Union's approach to diplomatic and civilian missions operating in conflict zones. The attack on the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-K), which resulted in the capture of 32 personnel, including high-ranking diplomats, highlights the structural weaknesses in existing security frameworks. The EU's capacity to protect its personnel overseas has been significantly undermined by its reliance on local protection forces and the absence of rapid response mechanisms.

This incident has prompted an urgent debate regarding the adequacy of current security arrangements for EU external missions, particularly in fragile states where traditional security guarantees—such as NATO presence or local stability—are absent or unreliable. The EU's global presence, as evidenced by its civilian missions, is of paramount importance for achieving external engagement and development objectives. However, it is imperative to recognise the absence of robust protective capacities that would provide adequate support to these endeavours.

Furthermore, the divergent security expectations of member states have complicated the development of a cohesive protection doctrine. While certain actors advocate for increased utilisation of EU rapid response forces or coordinated deployments through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), others maintain a degree of caution regarding the militarisation of diplomatic engagements. The present model is heavily reliant upon host-nation

support, private contractors, and symbolic on-site security measures. However, the efficacy of these measures has been called into question in the face of highly organised, ideologically motivated threats, such as the "New Emirate Guards."

b) Limitations of the EU's Crisis Response Mechanisms

The Kabul hostage situation has once again highlighted the structural and procedural shortcomings of the European Union's current crisis response infrastructure. Despite the prompt activation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) crisis platforms, the Union's ability to respond quickly and decisively was hampered by procedural constraints, fragmented authority, and a lack of operational readiness on the ground.

While the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides a legal and institutional framework for coordinated action, its procedures are not designed for rapid crisis management. The deployment of the EU's Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), which was established as a key component of the Strategic Compass, continues to require Member States to reach an agreement and is frequently delayed due to divergent national interests, legal considerations, and political prudence. Delays in time-sensitive emergencies, such as hostage situations, have the potential to undermine EU foreign policy's efficacy and legitimacy.

c) Engagement with Armed Non-State Actors

The appearance of the "New Emirate Guards" (NEP) has brought back a long-running discussion within the European Union over its policy on armed non-state actors (ANSAs) operating in collapsing nations. The collapsed Afghan central government's incapacity to preserve territorial integrity or provide basic security has created a complicated security vacuum

in which traditional diplomatic channels have limited usefulness and threats are increasingly coming from unregistered and ideologically driven organizations.

The European Union currently lacks a defined approach to dealing with ANSAs. This discrepancy is particularly pronounced in hostage situations, where ethical, legal, and strategic concerns intersect. While some Member States advocate for strict non-engagement principles to prevent future incidents and maintain the EU's normative stance, others prefer pragmatic approaches based on humanitarian protection, negotiation, or backchannel communication, especially in the absence of a viable military solution.

This lack of unanimity weakens the Union's bargaining strength and threatens the coherence of its foreign policy. Furthermore, interaction with ANSAs typically overlaps with larger regional dynamics, including the role of third-party mediators (e.g., Qatar, Turkey), who may maintain informal communication channels with such entities. In the absence of a coordinated strategy inside a united EU framework, a multitude of contradicting signals might emerge, resulting in reputational harm and a loss of strategic power.

d) Extradition of local accomplices and Border Management Risks

A particularly concerning aspect of the May 2022 hostage situation is the New Emirate Guards' (NEP) demand for the return of Afghan and Taliban-affiliated inmates now jailed in numerous EU Member States and neighboring countries. The group has indicated that it intends to incorporate these people into its military forces, presenting the demand as both a condition for the release of hostages and a larger claim of ideological legitimacy. This position presents serious legal, security, and ethical challenges for the European Union and its partners.

From a legal position, the European Union is obligated by international principles that prohibit extradition in situations where there is a significant danger of torture, persecution, or use in

armed conflict. These requirements would very probably apply if inmates were transferred to NEP custody. Adherence to such demands would not only violate the Union's legal commitments, but might also set a dangerous precedent, encouraging the use of hostage-taking as a tactic of prisoner retrieval in the future. In contrast, a clear denial might jeopardize the security of EU individuals held prisoner and intensify the NEP's hostility toward Europe.

Beyond the immediate hostage situation, consequences for border administration are significant. According to intelligence reports, NEP networks have actively exploited permeable border zones between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to assist the transit of militants and resources. Forced release or escape of associated persons, especially combined with the possible militarization of returnees, has the potential to create instability across an already unstable border corridor and aggravate migratory pressures on Europe's southern borders. In this environment, Turkey, Iran, and Central Asian states may see an increase in the number of displaced people, returns, and extremist actors seeking to hide behind mixed migrant patterns.

6) Conclusion

The period between 2025 and 2032 has been characterised by a fundamental evolution in the European Union's internal and external posture. The accession of Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro, growing multipolarity in global politics, challenges to the Eurozone, and the weakening of transatlantic guarantees have all contributed to a geopolitical environment where the EU must act not only as a regulatory power, but as a coherent geopolitical actor. In this new international order, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) emerges as the institutional nerve centre for the Union's security, diplomacy, and crisis management architecture.

The May 2032 hostage crisis in Kabul is widely regarded as a defining moment in this trajectory. For the first time, a coordinated armed group, operating independently of the host state, directly targeted a European civilian mission. This event exposed serious vulnerabilities

in the EU's diplomatic security frameworks, operational capabilities, and strategic readiness. The attack and subsequent demands from the New Emirate Guards (NEP) have exposed the increasing complexity of operating in fragile environments where the distinction between ideological insurgency and transnational terrorism is becoming increasingly indistinct.

The crisis posed a multifaceted challenge to both the PSC and the broader EU foreign policy establishment. This incident has given rise to a number of pressing questions concerning the adequacy of security infrastructure for civilian missions operating in high-risk zones. The study revealed the inertia and fragmentation that can paralyze the EU's crisis response mechanisms during time-sensitive emergencies. It compelled policymakers to confront the Union's absence of a coherent doctrine regarding engagement with armed non-state actors – actors who increasingly determine conflict dynamics in regions where formal state authority is either absent or ineffective.

Perhaps most critically, the crisis brought renewed urgency to the debate on strategic autonomy. Despite the EU's rhetorical commitments to acting independently in matters of defence and security, the Kabul incident demonstrated that significant work remains before such autonomy can be operationalised. The Union's capacity to protect its interests and personnel abroad is limited by three factors. Firstly, the inability to project a rapid and unified response. Secondly, the absence of pre-authorised rules of engagement. And thirdly, the continued political divergence among Member States. The Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) has been recognised as a symbol of importance; however, there is a paucity of evidence to support its practical effectiveness under live operational pressure.

Moreover, the broader ramifications of the NEP's demands – most notably the demand for the extradition of Taliban-affiliated detainees – underscore the increasingly delicate balance the EU is compelled to maintain between its human rights obligations, counterterrorism objectives, and

the intricacies of asymmetric conflict. Concurrently, intelligence suggests that the release or escape of such individuals could trigger cascading effects, ranging from new recruitment waves to the destabilisation of border regions and increased irregular migration flows toward the EU. These risks further exacerbate an already overloaded migration management system and expose internal divisions within the Union regarding burden-sharing and asylum policy.

The crisis has also necessitated a re-evaluation of EU engagement models in post-conflict and failed states. Civilian missions, once regarded as the foundation of the Union's soft power, necessitate a re-evaluation through a more security-informed lens. Protection protocols, evacuation contingencies, and hybrid mission models that combine development with protection must be given serious consideration. The EU is no longer in a position to differentiate between its humanitarian and security policies; external factors have rendered such distinctions untenable.

7) Country Stances in 2032

- **Austria**

In 2032, Austria continues to exhibit a centrist political structure, though there has been a considerable increase in the influence of right-wing populist forces in recent years. While the governing coalition remains committed to European integration and active participation within EU institutions, there has been a shift in rhetoric towards a more cautious and security-driven posture, particularly in relation to migration and enlargement. The Republic of Austria has publicly expressed its opposition to Turkey's accession negotiations, citing concerns regarding cultural cohesion, migratory influxes, and public scepticism. Concurrently, it has articulated its strong support for the establishment of a more robust and unified European security apparatus.

From an economic perspective, Austria has demonstrated resilience in the face of recent economic turbulence. The country's green technology sector, export-driven industrial base, and well-regulated financial institutions have contributed to modest yet stable growth, with GDP expanding by approximately 1.5% in 2032. The country's robust performance in the tourism and logistics sectors continues to consolidate its regional influence. However, the prevailing themes in Austria's economic discourse have been shaped by two key factors. Firstly, the demographic stagnation that is prevalent in the country, and secondly, the ongoing domestic debates surrounding fiscal responsibility in relation to EU-level support mechanisms. This is particularly pertinent in the context of Polish economic stabilization. With these internal debates, Austria remains a staunch supporter of the Eurozone, though it consistently resists deeper fiscal integration mechanisms without stronger oversight and conditionality.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Austria advocates for a robust internal security agenda, emphasising the necessity for reinforced external borders, harmonised asylum procedures, and legal clarity in extradition and hostage negotiation protocols. Vienna continues to exercise caution regarding military deployments beyond European borders, favouring diplomatic and preventive approaches over kinetic responses.

- **Belgium**

In 2032, Belgium continues to advocate for the advancement of European integration and multilateralism. Under the leadership of a progressive-liberal coalition, with members aligned with the Renew Europe group, Belgium has persistently advocated for institutional reform, more robust EU-level coordination in defence and foreign policy, and the operational empowerment of the Political and Security Committee. The nation's political elite, while adept at navigating linguistic and regional divisions within the domestic arena, harbour a broad

consensus on the imperative for a unified European response to the looming geopolitical challenges.

Belgium has established itself as a pivotal player in the PSC, often serving as a facilitator between the northern, western, and southern Member States. It has been demonstrated to facilitate the expeditious activation and augmentation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), and the establishment of streamlined command structures to enable more efficient PSC-to-ground force coordination in future crisis scenarios has been advocated. Belgium also encourages structured engagement with trusted regional actors, including through EU-NATO complementarity frameworks and informal cooperation platforms with countries like Turkey and Qatar in fragile zones.

From an economic perspective, Belgium continues to reap considerable benefits from its status as a pivotal logistical and diplomatic hub within the European continent. Brussels' role as the seat of both the EU and NATO's core institutions confers upon it a symbolic and practical function in shaping continental responses to global challenges. Despite moderate economic growth – estimated at around 1.2% in 2032 – the Belgian economy remains predominantly service-oriented, with strategic investments in digital governance, legal technology, and diplomatic services. Inflationary pressures have been comparatively negligible in comparison to Eurozone averages, and the country supports fiscal tools that promote European solidarity, particularly in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and resilience-building in Eastern Europe.

- **Bulgaria**

In 2032, Bulgaria persists in its measured yet unwavering progression towards integration within the European political and economic framework. Following its entry into the Eurozone in 2026, the country experienced a period of transitional instability, characterised by short-term inflation and structural adjustments. However, by 2032, Bulgaria had achieved relative macroeconomic stability, aided by substantial support from the European Central Bank and targeted investments under the European Cohesion Funds⁸. The national economy has demonstrated moderate growth, particularly in sectors such as digital infrastructure, logistics, and renewable energy. Notwithstanding entrenched regional income disparities and systemic challenges in public administration, Sofia's integration into the Eurozone has facilitated access to a more extensive array of financial instruments and concomitantly increased investor confidence.

The Bulgarian political landscape is characterised by a centrist coalition that maintains a pro-European orientation, led by a technocratic prime minister who has received endorsement from the European People's Party. Despite the persistence of Eurosceptic voices, particularly in rural regions, the prevailing political consensus leans towards the consolidation of relations with European institutions. Within the Political and Security Committee, Bulgaria has adopted a pragmatic and loyalist posture, frequently aligning with French proposals while voicing the concerns of southeastern Europe. Furthermore, Bulgaria has advocated for a heightened PSC emphasis on hybrid threats, cyber defence, and the instrumentalisation of migration by hostile third parties. This advocacy is underpinned by the recognition of regional vulnerabilities, which have been compounded by instability in Afghanistan and the Caucasus.

- **Croatia**

⁸ The Cohesion Fund supports EU Member States with a gross national income per capita below 90% of the EU-27 average, helping to strengthen the EU's economic, social and territorial cohesion. (European Commission n.d.)

In 2032, Croatia's strategic position within the European Union is notable for its consolidation of a stable and cooperative membership, a development that has been evident since its accession to the Eurozone in 2023. The Croatian economy, while modest in scale, exhibits indications of robust growth, particularly in the domains of tourism, maritime logistics, and energy transit. The government has identified the enhancement of regional infrastructure connectivity as a priority, utilising EU funding for projects within the Adriatic-Baltic corridor and cross-border digital networks. With inflation having been stabilised and public finances being managed with a degree of caution, Croatia has been benefiting from increased foreign investment and is playing a modest but reliable role in regional economic resilience. Nevertheless, structural challenges, including youth emigration and uneven rural development, persist in impeding long-term sustainability.

It is evident that under the leadership of a moderate and pro-European figure who aligns with the European People's Party, Croatia has maintained a distinct Atlanticist orientation while concurrently expressing support for the EU's endeavours to achieve strategic autonomy. In the Political and Security Committee, Zagreb supports enhanced EU-NATO cooperation, particularly in the Western Balkans and southeastern Europe. Croatia has expressed its strong advocacy for a more assertive PSC stance toward frozen conflicts in the EU's periphery, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Black Sea region. The organisation has expressed its strong support for the EU's enlargement agenda; however, it has made it clear that stability and legal conditionality must be upheld as prerequisites for accession. Croatia's position on the matter is that the Rapid Deployment Capacity should be used in a targeted manner, and that initiatives supported by the PSC should be encouraged in order to enhance crisis preparedness against irregular migration, disinformation, and interference by proxy states.

- **Cyprus**

In 2032, Cyprus remains a member state of the European Union that is acutely aware of its security needs. The country's perspective on regional instability is shaped by unresolved geopolitical disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite the persistent service orientation of the Cypriot economy, which is characterised by its dominance in the fields of finance, shipping and tourism, there has been a discernible shift towards the promotion of renewable energy development and digital regulation. This transition is particularly significant in the context of the EU's overarching green transition agenda. The economy is performing moderately, with GDP growth stabilising around 1.4%. However, the country remains vulnerable to external shocks, particularly those linked to regional maritime security and energy transit corridors. Continued investment from European recovery instruments and bilateral cooperation with Greece and Italy has contributed to infrastructure modernisation and a moderate rebound in tourism following years of geopolitical uncertainty.

In terms of politics, the Republic of Cyprus is governed by a centre-right coalition that is aligned with the European People's Party. This results in a firm stance on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rule of international law. Within the Political and Security Committee, Cyprus has adopted a consistently hardline position regarding Turkey's role in the region, vocally opposing the reopening of Ankara's EU accession chapters without prior resolution of the Cyprus issue. The PSC's position on Turkish involvement in crisis regions, such as Afghanistan, remains guarded, as it perceives that such arrangements may potentially serve to legitimise Ankara's assertive regional conduct. Cyprus has expressed support for the expansion of the Rapid Deployment Capacity, particularly in maritime contexts, and has strongly advocated for increased EU naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it promotes a more robust PSC approach to energy security and the protection of offshore infrastructure, regarding these as existential national priorities.

- **Czechia**

In 2032, the Czech Republic is governed by a conservative-liberal coalition with a pronounced Atlanticist orientation, marked by a strong commitment to transatlantic security cooperation and a firm alignment with NATO. Despite the nation's active engagement in EU affairs, its leaders maintain a stance of caution towards deeper political integration, particularly in domains that are regarded as encroaching on national sovereignty. Despite its integration within the EU's core economic structures, the Czech Republic has not adopted the euro, and continues to oppose accession to the Eurozone. This position is underpinned by the economic challenges Poland encountered during its transition, which are regarded as a cautionary example. Moreover, public sentiment remains predominantly opposed to the euro, thereby reinforcing the government's decision to delay further monetary integration indefinitely.

The Czech Republic has demonstrated a consistent economic growth trajectory, characterised by a diversified industrial structure, with prominent sectors including automotive manufacturing, advanced machinery, and information technology services. The country has effectively established itself as a pivotal supply chain node within Central Europe, capitalising on robust trade relations with Germany and Austria. Despite a reduction in inflationary pressures, long-term challenges such as labour shortages and regional development disparities persist. The government has concentrated on digitalisation, energy diversification, and vocational education to enhance long-term competitiveness, while exercising caution with regard to expanding fiscal obligations within the EU framework.

Within the Political and Security Committee, the Czech Republic adopts a pragmatic and realist stance. Czechia remit is to facilitate a coordinated EU response to external threats, with a particular emphasis on cyber defence, disinformation, and hybrid warfare. However, it is notable that the organisation consistently emphasises national sovereignty in security decision-

making. Czechia has expressed its support for the EU's involvement in Eastern European security, including Ukraine's reconstruction and Moldova's stabilisation. However, it has also demonstrated its resistance to PSC initiatives that imply federalised military command or binding strategic alignment.

- **Denmark**

Denmark in 2032 continues to uphold a distinct position within the European Union, maintaining its formal opt-out from the Eurozone while aligning closely with EU foreign and security policy objectives. From a political standpoint, the nation is governed by a social-liberal administration that is firmly committed to the principles of the rule of law, democratic governance, and multilateral cooperation. Despite the emergence of more pronounced domestic debates surrounding defence expenditure and immigration, Denmark continues to adopt a broadly pro-European stance, expressing support for the deepening of institutional structures, particularly in the domains of climate, digital, and external security policy.

Denmark is considered to be among the EU's most resilient and innovation-driven economies. With a marked emphasis on green technology, biotech, and digital infrastructure, the country has a consistent record of high rankings in competitiveness and sustainability indices. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been observed to be consistent at approximately 1.8%. Denmark's monetary policy remains anchored to the euro through its participation in ERM II, a strategy that enables the country to sustain macroeconomic stability while circumventing complete adoption of the euro to ensure the survival of Danish Krone. Moreover, the country plays a leading role in EU-wide energy transition projects, particularly in the domains of offshore wind and clean hydrogen.

Denmark's foreign policy is consistent in its support of a rules-based international order and a coordinated EU foreign policy. However, the country maintains a clear preference for legal transparency and proportionality in military engagements. Copenhagen's position on the matter is nuanced: while it is in principle supportive of the EU's strategic autonomy, it insists on ensuring full compatibility with NATO frameworks. Denmark has played an active role in encouraging the PSC to enhance its rapid crisis assessment tools and has advocated for the strengthening of ties between civilian and military instruments. Denmark's approach to high-risk external deployments is characterised by a degree of caution, with the country's support being contingent upon the selective utilisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity. This support is particularly pronounced in the context of operations that encompass humanitarian protection, anti-piracy measures, and maritime security.

- **Estonia**

In 2032, Estonia continues to be a leading European Union member state in terms of digital advancement and security awareness. The country is governed by a centre-right, pro-EU coalition that is aligned with the European People's Party and Renew Europe. The government's priorities include transatlantic unity, deterrence against Russian aggression, and the advancement of EU digital sovereignty. It is evident that Estonia is among the strongest voices within the Union advocating for expanded defence cooperation, increased cyber readiness, and accelerated integration of Eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Moldova.

The Estonian economy continues to demonstrate resilience, with a strategic emphasis on the development of digital services, e-governance infrastructure, and defence technology innovation. Despite its diminutive size, the country has been found to have one of the highest per capita investments in cybersecurity and AI-driven governance in the EU. It is estimated that

GDP growth will reach 2.1% in 2032, a figure supported by strong digital exports, energy diversification, and EU structural funds aimed at boosting resilience in the Baltic region. Estonia has been selected as a pilot state for the Digital Euro initiative, a move which has been met with a high level of domestic acceptance and regulatory preparedness.

In the Political and Security Committee, Estonia's role is disproportionate in relation to its population size. The country has positioned itself as a key advocate for rapid and collective EU responses to emerging threats. Tallinn's position on the matter is unequivocal: it is a staunch advocate of the activation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity and a proponent of pre-authorisation models for emergency intervention, particularly in the context of hybrid or cyber-attacks. It is wary of prolonged negotiations in crises and frequently advocates for expeditious, rules-based action. The Estonian position on engagement with armed non-state actors is characterised by a degree of scepticism, with a particular emphasis placed on the necessity of maintaining legal clarity and upholding international humanitarian norms.

- **Finland**

In 2032, Finland is regarded as a leading proponent of strategic pragmatism and institutional reliability within the European Union. Following its 2023 NATO accession and deepened alignment with EU defense initiatives. The present government, under the leadership of a centre-left coalition with the support of liberal and green parties, maintains a robust pro-EU orientation, emphasising the rule of law, border resilience, and environmental security. The prevailing sentiment among the public regarding multilateral engagement and collective defence remains exceedingly strong, a viewpoint that is reinforced by the ongoing instability in Eastern Europe.

Finland's economy is recognised as one of the most stable within the European Union, with a foundation supported by robust fundamentals in education, technology, and green industrial production. The GDP growth forecast for 2032 is 1.6%, with significant contributions expected from clean energy exports, forestry innovation and defence-related manufacturing (including raw material providers). The country has become a pivotal node in EU-Nordic energy cooperation, particularly regarding cross-border electricity transmission and sustainable mining, which are critical to the green transition. The present state of affairs is characterised by moderate inflation, balanced public finances, and Finland's continued integration within the Eurozone framework.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Finland has adopted an assertive yet measured stance, advocating for enhanced EU readiness in the face of hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, and cross-border incursions. It is a staunch proponent of the Rapid Deployment Capacity and has advocated for enhanced flexibility in its implementation. Finland also promotes the concept of enhanced synchronisation between the European Union and NATO. The Finnish government issues warnings against the occurrence of duplication or divergence, as these could potentially compromise the collective capacity to deter aggression. Helsinki endorses methodical, ethical participation in crises, whilst concurrently maintaining a degree of scepticism with regard to the legitimisation of armed non-state actors. It emphasises the necessity of safeguarding international law and EU values.

- **France**

In 2032, France maintains its status as a primary strategic actor within the European Union, advocating for a vision of a self-governing and autonomous Europe that is capable of defending its interests independently. In the context of a presidency characterised by centrist ideologies and alignments with pro-European federalist principles, France has adopted a proactive stance

in promoting the integration of defence mechanisms, the establishment of collaborative strategic planning processes, and the advancement of military capabilities with a pronounced EU-centric orientation. Paris views the Political and Security Committee as a central forum for advancing these objectives and has called for expanding its mandate and operational flexibility.

The French economy is regarded as one of the most significant within the European Union, with a projected moderate growth of 1.4% anticipated in 2032. France has sustained its investments in defence industries, space technologies, and nuclear energy, thereby maintaining a robust industrial base that is supported by public procurement and EU-level initiatives. Fiscal pressures from domestic social programmes persist, but inflation and unemployment remain within manageable parameters. Paris plays a leading role in joint defence procurement and is a key driver behind initiatives such as the European Security Initiative and the establishment of shared strategic assets. The economy of the United States of America is notable for its high level of diversification, with strong export sectors in the domains of aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products.

Within the PSC, France is a proponent of assertive and rapid EU responses to global crises, and is a principal advocate for the deployment of the Rapid Deployment Capacity in high-risk zones. Paris is willing to engage with armed non-state actors in a limited capacity when such engagement is deemed to be strategically necessary but insists on maintaining clarity of purpose and clearly defined end-state objectives. Furthermore, France advocates for a more pronounced EU presence in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and the Eastern Mediterranean, perceiving these regions as pivotal to European geopolitical influence. Despite its commitment to NATO, France has been vocal in its calls for a reduction in Europe's military reliance on the United States, advocating for a recalibrated transatlantic relationship founded on parity and autonomy.

- **Germany**

Germany, in the year 2032, finds itself at a politically intricate crossroads, navigating internal fragmentation while endeavouring to uphold its position as a pivotal actor within the European project. The present government is characterised by a centre-right coalition that is distinguished by a heightened nationalist and security-oriented tenor in comparison to preceding decades. This shift is primarily attributable to mounting populist pressures and evolving voter concerns pertaining to migration, energy dependency, and geopolitical instability. Despite this shift, Berlin remains fundamentally pro-EU, albeit with a greater degree of caution toward fiscal transfers and enlargement initiatives that could generate domestic backlash.

Germany's economy, still the largest in the Union, has gradually recovered from the export disruptions experienced in the late 2020s. It is projected that GDP growth will remain consistent at 1.3% in 2032, a figure that is predicted to be bolstered by significant investments in automation, electric mobility, and green hydrogen. The country continues to lead in advanced manufacturing and industrial digitalisation, though it faces persistent demographic challenges and political pressure to reduce fiscal contributions to EU-wide stabilization mechanisms.

In the Political and Security Committee, Germany emphasises strategic stability, multilateral coordination, and institutional predictability. Whilst historically displaying a degree of caution with regard to military engagement, Berlin has exhibited an increasing propensity to advocate for a more robust EU security character, notably through the implementation of structured defence initiatives and the facilitation of long-term capacity building. It endorses the utilisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity in accordance with explicit legal directives and advocates for the enhancement of PSC operational planning mechanisms. Germany's position on informal

or ad hoc engagement with armed non-state actors is one of opposition, with a strong emphasis on legal rigor and respect for international humanitarian law. Germany continues to advocate for the complementarity of the EU and NATO, emphasising the value of durable partnerships over unilateral assertiveness. Despite internal tensions, Germany remains an indispensable actor in shaping PSC consensus and EU strategic direction.

- **Greece**

In the year 2032, the Greek government continues to demonstrate a resolute dedication to European integration, notably within the domains of defense, migration policy, and regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek capital is governed by a center-right administration aligned with the European People's Party, and it has positioned itself as both a stabilizing actor in southeastern Europe and a key interlocutor in managing EU relations with the broader Middle East. It is evident that Greece has historically demonstrated a consistent and unwavering commitment to the promotion of a robust and cohesive foreign policy within the European Union. This commitment is underpinned by a profound emphasis on the significance of international law and the necessity of fostering collaborative endeavors in the domain of energy.

From an economic perspective, the Hellenic Republic has been undergoing a gradual post-crisis recovery, with growth stabilizing at approximately 1.6% in 2032. Investments in renewable energy, maritime transport, and digital infrastructure have led to economic diversification, while structural reforms and enhanced tax collection have strengthened fiscal resilience. The country has also become a critical hub for EU energy transit, particularly through its natural gas infrastructure and emerging role in green hydrogen distribution. Tourism is a pivotal economic pillar, yet Athens has proactively sought to mitigate seasonal dependency by promoting the technology and logistics sectors.

Furthermore, Greece has expressed considerable support for the expansion and operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capacity, with a particular emphasis on its application in crisis scenarios involving maritime zones or border security. Athens is a vocal advocate for a more assertive EU presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans, urging the PSC to adopt a firmer stance on issues of sovereignty, especially in light of continued tensions with Turkey. However, in contrast to Cyprus, Greece considers ongoing engagement with Ankara—including on migration and regional stability—to be strategically imperative. Consequently, Greece endorses conditional cooperation, subject to the oversight of the European Union. Greece is opposed to the recognition or negotiation with armed non-state actors, citing long-standing concerns over regional destabilisation. The country prioritises strict legal frameworks for any crisis engagement.

- **Hungary**

Hungary in 2032 continues to be one of the most vocal and assertive proponents of sovereignty within the European Union. Under the ongoing leadership of a right-wing nationalist government, Hungary has consolidated its position as a vocal critic of deeper political integration, migration quotas, and what it terms "overreach" by EU institutions. Budapest continues to pursue a foreign policy that emphasises national autonomy, cultural identity, and pragmatic bilateralism, particularly with countries such as Serbia, Russia, and China. Despite maintaining its commitment to EU membership, Hungary has repeatedly diverged from the prevailing positions of the Council and the PSC, particularly with regard to issues concerning foreign intervention, human rights, and enlargement.

From an economic perspective, Hungary has demonstrated consistent growth, with an average annual growth rate of approximately 2% in 2032. This growth has been propelled by substantial foreign direct investment in the manufacturing and energy sectors, particularly from China and

the Gulf states. Budapest has prioritized nationally decided industrial policy, infrastructure development, and energy diversification, including nuclear and regional pipeline projects. Nevertheless, the Union has faced criticism from within for its selective alignment with non-EU partners, particularly about procurement transparency and political conditionality. It is evident that public finances are relatively stable; however, concerns have been voiced regarding judicial independence and rule-of-law standards, which have had a detrimental effect on specific EU funding flows.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Hungary adopts a consistently cautious and transactional approach. Budapest government expresses opposition to the expansion of the Rapid Deployment Capacity in ways that imply shared military authority and rejects the idea of pre-authorised intervention frameworks. Budapest has adopted a particularly critical stance towards PSC initiatives that involve engagement with armed non-state actors, perceiving such endeavours as a potentially perilous process of legitimising these actors. With regard to Ukraine, Hungary has adopted a reserved stance on the matter of accelerated accession, with the caveat that this will be contingent upon the establishment of adequate minority rights protections for ethnic Hungarians in Zakarpattia. More broadly, Hungary uses its seat at the PSC to advocate for a vision of European security grounded in national sovereignty, controlled borders, and non-interventionism.

- **Ireland**

Ireland continues to exemplify a liberal, globally oriented, and institutionally committed member of the European Union. Dublin is currently governed by a centrist coalition that is rooted in social democratic and liberal traditions. The capital maintains strong support for multilateral cooperation, human rights, and the rule of law, positioning itself as a reliable and constructive actor within EU foreign and security policy. Ireland's long-standing tradition of

military neutrality remains unchallenged; however, its commitment to collective security and humanitarian action through EU frameworks has been strengthened, particularly in areas such as cyber defence, conflict mediation, and civilian crisis response.

The Irish economy is recognised as one of the most dynamic within the Union, with projections indicating growth of 2.3% in 2032. The primary factors contributing to this growth include sustained direct foreign investment in technology and pharmaceuticals, a thriving fintech sector, and a competitive corporate tax regime. In addition, Ireland has benefited from its post-Brexit role as a gateway to the EU for transatlantic business, thereby further strengthening its service-based economy. Notwithstanding the ongoing challenges of economic inequality and housing affordability, public confidence in EU membership remains at an all-time high within the bloc.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Ireland has expressed support for enhanced coordination in strategic planning and operational readiness, while upholding a principled stance on conflict resolution and adherence to international law. The Irish capital has historically demonstrated a favorable stance towards the Rapid Deployment Capacity when it is presented within the context of humanitarian, peacekeeping, or evacuation mandates. However, it maintains a cautious approach towards robust military intervention, unless there is a clear UN alignment. Ireland's position on engagement with armed non-state actors is characterised by a strong opposition to any form of engagement that does not ensure legal accountability. The country places significant emphasis on preventive diplomacy and the resilience of civilian missions.

- **Italy**

Italy is currently experiencing a highly volatile political landscape, characterised by profound polarisation and the erosion of traditional centrist parties. The government is characterised by a precarious coalition, wherein populist right-wing forces are balanced by progressive factions that advocate for augmented social protections and heightened EU integration. This internal fragmentation has complicated Rome's ability to present a unified stance in European forums, though the country remains officially committed to the EU's core principles and strategic initiatives.

From an economic perspective, Italy is still grappling with a number of structural challenges, including sluggish productivity, high public debt, and significant regional disparities between the industrialised north and the less developed south. Notwithstanding these constraints, growth has stabilised at approximately 1.2% in 2032, bolstered by EU recovery funds and heightened tourism. Nevertheless, concerns regarding fiscal sustainability and institutional reform persist, and political instability has at times undermined investor confidence. Italy's position on Eurozone cohesion is one of support, yet it maintains a degree of caution regarding the prospect of enhanced fiscal integration, which could potentially entail the implementation of more stringent central oversight or the introduction of conditional mechanisms.

Within the ambit of the Political and Security Committee, Italy assumes a role of balancing the scales. The initiative has been devised to bolster the defence capabilities of the European Union, with a particular emphasis on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity, particularly in the context of crisis management in the Mediterranean and North African regions. Rome advocates a proactive PSC approach to irregular migration, maritime security, and state fragility in the EU's southern neighbourhood. Furthermore, Italy is advocating for enhanced strategic autonomy with a view to reducing its reliance on transatlantic actors. The

Italian delegation has historically adopted a cautious stance towards formal engagement with armed non-state actors, emphasising the necessity for explicit mandates and adherence to international legal principles. Concurrently, Italy is advocating for pragmatic solutions to humanitarian crises, including the implementation of temporary coordination measures if civilian lives are at stake.

- **Latvia**

Latvia is regarded as one of the EU's most security-focused and Atlanticist member states. This is due to the country's geopolitical proximity to Russia and historical experience with regional instability. The nation is governed by a centre-right coalition, maintaining close strategic alignment with both the objectives of the European Union and NATO. The political discourse of Latvia is characterised by its emphasis on defence, energy independence, and digital resilience. There is a pervasive public support for robust deterrence and proactive foreign policy engagement, particularly in Eastern Europe.

From an economic perspective, Latvia has exhibited consistent growth, with an average annual growth rate of 2% in 2032, primarily driven by investments in digital services, cybersecurity, and renewable energy. The country has positioned itself as a regional hub for information technology and logistics, capitalising on EU support for infrastructure and cross-border digital integration. The issue of energy security continues to be a matter of paramount importance at the national level. Significant progress has been achieved in the decoupling process from Russian imports, while concurrently efforts have been made to strengthen the links with Nordic and Baltic partners. Notwithstanding the challenges posed by demographic decline and emigration pressures, targeted innovation policies have been instrumental in maintaining Latvia's economic competitiveness within the regional context.

Within the PSC, Latvia is among the most assertive advocates for a strong, united, and responsive EU security posture. It has been observed to fully support the use and expansion of the Rapid Deployment Capacity and has called for clearer pre-authorised intervention mechanisms in response to hybrid threats, border provocations, and hostage scenarios. Riga perceives the PSC as a primary institution in the counteraction of malign influence and disinformation, particularly with regard to Eastern Partnership countries. Latvia continues to adopt a highly sceptical stance towards any engagement with armed non-state actors, contending that such strategies carry the potential to jeopardise state legitimacy and international norms.

- **Lithuania**

Lithuania is a staunch advocate of a proactive and values-driven European Union, particularly with regard to Eastern security, democratic resilience, and strategic autonomy. The nation is governed by a centre-right coalition that is firmly aligned with both the European People's Party and NATO. Vilnius maintains an assertive foreign policy stance, emphasising the need for deterrence, support for EU enlargement, and unambiguous defence commitments to Eastern partners.

From an economic perspective, the country has demonstrated consistent growth, with a GDP growth rate of approximately 2.2% recorded in 2032. The economy is driven by robust performance in the ICT sector, digital finance, and renewable energy. The country has placed a high priority on infrastructure development and defence-related technological innovation, benefitting from targeted EU investment and coordinated Baltic integration projects. Lithuania has nearly eliminated its energy dependence on Russia and plays a key role in regional energy security through LNG infrastructure and electricity grid synchronization with continental

Europe. While emigration and ageing remain structural concerns, sustained public investment and EU support have helped mitigate demographic pressures.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Lithuania is a leading advocate for rapid, firm, and principled EU action in the face of external threats. It is imperative to emphasise the comprehensive operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity, particularly in the context of missions pertaining to hybrid warfare, cyber defence, and the collective defence of partner countries under threat. Lithuania adopts a stringent policy towards any form of recognition or engagement with armed non-state actors, contending that such actions might legitimize terrorism and undermine the established international rules-based order. The document under review continues to advocate for an increased focus on the eastern flank by the PSC, greater support for Ukraine's EU accession, and stronger coordination between the PSC and NATO to deter aggression and counter regional destabilization.

- **Luxembourg**

Luxembourg continues to uphold its established role as a proponent of multilateralism and a staunch advocate of the European project. Luxembourg, a nation governed by a pro-European centrist coalition, has historically demonstrated a commitment to institutional cohesion, legal clarity in foreign policy, and the advancement of a values-based EU external agenda. Despite its diminutive stature, the country deploys its diplomatic acumen and financial clout to function as a bridge-builder within the Political and Security Committee, frequently mediating between member states that adopt more assertive or cautious positions.

Luxembourg's economy has been characterised by a consistent per capita income and robust fiscal management, with GDP growth maintaining a steady rate of approximately 1.9% in 2032. The economy is characterised by a predominance of financial services, green investment funds,

and digital governance infrastructure, underpinned by Luxembourg's status as a hub for EU institutions and regulatory innovation. The government has made substantial investments in sustainable finance and space technologies, thereby aligning national priorities with EU strategic goals in the areas of digital sovereignty and climate leadership. Trust in EU governance is among the highest in the Union, supported by transparent institutions and stable social policy.

Within the PSC, Luxembourg consistently promotes diplomatic resolution, adherence to international law, and enhanced civilian crisis management capabilities. The document supports the use of the Rapid Deployment Capacity in humanitarian and stabilisation missions, but it also urges strict legal mandates and multilateral coordination, preferably with UN endorsement, before deployment. Luxembourg's position is one of opposition to any engagement with armed non-state actors outside of the established legal frameworks, and it strongly advocates for the safeguarding of the integrity of EU foreign policy norms. Furthermore, it is a staunch proponent of Ukraine's reconstruction and the integration process into the European Union. It has been instrumental in promoting increased financial solidarity and the conditionality of the rule of law in the Union's eastern neighbourhood.

- **Malta**

In 2032, Malta continues to adhere to a foreign policy that is firmly grounded in neutrality, diplomatic engagement, and a commitment to humanitarian initiatives. This approach is consistent with the country's constitutional obligations and its historical orientation. The Maltese government, under the leadership of a centre-right administration, has a strong commitment to European integration. This commitment is particularly evident in the areas of migration management, maritime security and regional stabilisation in the Mediterranean.

Despite its lack of military might, the country has established itself as a vocal proponent of diplomatic conflict resolution and multilateral governance within the EU institutions.

The Maltese economy is performing steadily, with GDP growth of approximately 1.7% in 2022, driven by the tourism, maritime services and digital finance sectors. The government has made substantial investments in environmental sustainability, clean energy, and digitisation, partially through targeted EU funding. Despite its diminutive size, Malta continues to attract financial and technological investment due to its business-friendly environment and its strategic geographic position.

In the context of the Political and Security Committee, Malta underscores the significance of legal principles, proportionality, and civilian protection in the EU's crisis response strategy. Malta's position is that it supports the deployment of the Rapid Deployment Capacity for evacuation, humanitarian, and peacebuilding purposes, but remains cautious about offensive military engagements. Malta's position on the matter is unequivocal: there should be no recognition or negotiation with armed non-state actors. The country's concerns are twofold: firstly, such actions could erode international norms; secondly, such actions could set dangerous precedents. It is recommended that the PSC give priority to conflict prevention, maritime rescue coordination, and diplomatic de-escalation mechanisms, particularly in the context of North African instability and Mediterranean migration routes. Malta's role as a bridge between southern Europe and the MENA region has led to its ongoing advocacy for a human-centred EU security approach grounded in solidarity and respect for international law.

- **Netherlands**

The Netherlands continues to play a central role in shaping European Union policy through its commitment to the rule of law, open markets, and pragmatic multilateralism. The Dutch

political landscape, as shaped by a centre-right, pro-European coalition, is characterised by a strong emphasis on fiscal responsibility, democratic accountability, and effective external action. The Netherlands has established itself as a leading proponent of transparency and legal coherence in EU foreign and security policy, frequently assuming a moderating role within the Political and Security Committee.

The Dutch economy is recognised as one of the most competitive and diversified within the European Union, with GDP growth projected to be approximately 1.9% in 2032. Key sectors include logistics, advanced agriculture, green technology and financial services. The Netherlands has been at the vanguard of the adoption of the digital euro, having been among the first countries to pilot its integration into financial systems and to promote regulatory innovation at the EU level. The government's commitment to responsible fiscal policy at both the national and Union levels is unwavering, and the soundness of public finances is consistently upheld. Infrastructure resilience, climate adaptation, and energy transition remain national priorities, supported by sustained investment and European Green Deal funding.

Within the PSC, the Netherlands supports the strengthening of the Union's operational capabilities, particularly through the Rapid Deployment Capacity, whilst insisting on clear mandates, legal oversight, and parliamentary accountability. The strategy under discussion here is one that supports the concept of EU strategic autonomy, insofar as it is able to complement the activities of NATO and avoid the duplication of effort. The Dutch delegation adopts a circumspect stance on engagement with armed non-state actors, emphasising preventive diplomacy, robust civilian missions, and rule-of-law conditionality in external action. The Netherlands is a key proponent of cybersecurity cooperation, digital infrastructure security, and hybrid threat preparedness. This reflects its broader strategic interest in protecting both open societies and technological sovereignty.

- **Poland**

The government of Poland is currently constituted by a centre-right coalition. While this administration is, in principle, pro-European, it remains significantly influenced by nationalist and sovereignty-first rhetoric. The political landscape underwent significant changes following the economic turbulence triggered by the country's adoption of the euro in the late 2020s. This period was characterised by a prolonged recession and a sharp decline in public confidence. Despite the transition having since stabilised, economic scars and political polarisation continue to shape Warsaw's cautious approach towards deeper integration. The government continues to advocate for an individual maneuver room in the context of state sovereignty within the EU, while expressing resistance to perceived federalist trends.

From an economic perspective, Poland has experienced a gradual recovery from the initial impact of adopting the euro. GDP growth is projected to reach 1.5% by 2032, supported by targeted ECB stabilization funds and increased public investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. Nevertheless, it is evident that inflationary aftershocks and labour market disruptions have exerted enduring political repercussions. The country continues to serve as a critical hub for European defence logistics, energy transit, and manufacturing, particularly in the context of Ukraine's reconstruction and NATO operations on the eastern flank. Notwithstanding the ongoing discord with NATO regarding judicial autonomy and media oversight, Poland maintains a strong economic integration within the Union's primary industrial and security frameworks.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Poland adopts an assertive stance, particularly with regard to matters related to Eastern European security, Russian deterrence, and support for Ukraine's EU accession. Warsaw has expressed support for the utilisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity, particularly in scenarios pertaining to border defence, hybrid warfare,

and territorial violations. Nevertheless, it is imperative to emphasise the preservation of national command sovereignty within the context of multinational deployments. Poland has adopted a firm stance of rejection in regard to any form of engagement with armed non-state actors, a position that is underpinned by the necessity of upholding the principles of a rules-based international order. It continues to advocate for an expanded PSC focus on the eastern flank, resilience against Russian influence, and closer defense-industrial cooperation with like-minded Member States, particularly the Baltic States and Romania.

- **Portugal**

Portugal maintains a stable and constructive presence within the European Union, governed by a centre-left coalition aligned with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. The country champions multilateral cooperation, rule of law, and human rights, and remains a consistent advocate for EU cohesion and institutional solidarity. Lisbon has been proactive in promoting a balanced approach to EU external action, integrating diplomacy, development aid, and security operations. Furthermore, it has consolidated its role as a conduit between southern Europe, the Atlantic community, and Lusophone Africa.

From an economic perspective, Portugal has demonstrated a pattern of sustained yet moderate growth, with an expansion in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 1.5% recorded in 2032. The government's strategic approach to economic modernisation has been characterised by a focus on sustainable tourism, renewable energy sources, particularly wind and solar power, and digital innovation. The strategic investment in maritime logistics and Atlantic trade infrastructure has enhanced Portugal's geopolitical relevance within EU energy and supply chain diversification efforts. Public debt has been in steady decline, and unemployment remains below pre-pandemic levels, supported by EU funding and structural reforms.

Within the PSC, Portugal advocates for a measured, legally anchored, and multilateral approach to security policy. It is evident that they supports the use of the Rapid Deployment Capacity for humanitarian operations, civilian protection, and post-conflict stabilisation, particularly in Africa and the southern neighbourhood. It is evident that Lisbon adopts a generally cautious approach with regard to military escalation. Indeed, the Portuguese capital insists on robust legal oversight, clear exit strategies, and strong diplomatic engagement alongside any deployment. The organisation's position is that negotiation with armed non-state actors outside recognised frameworks is to be strongly discouraged. This is due to the fact that such actions are viewed as a threat to international norms. Portugal also supports enhanced PSC focus on maritime security, climate-related instability, and the nexus between migration and regional development, emphasising preventive engagement and long-term resilience-building.

- **Romania**

Romania has emerged as a proactive and increasingly influential actor within the European Union, especially on matters related to Eastern security, energy independence, and regional cooperation. The country is governed by a stable centre-right administration, which has maintained a robustly pro-European orientation, advocating for greater integration within various sectors, notably defence, infrastructure, and the expansion of the European Union. Bucharest perceives the EU as both a guarantor of national security and a platform for projecting regional stability, a perspective that is particularly salient in light of the ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Moldova.

The Romanian economy has been demonstrating consistent growth, with a projected GDP increase of 0.3% anticipated in 2032. Key sectors include energy, transit, digital infrastructure, agriculture, and defence manufacturing. Romania has become a pivotal partner in the EU's endeavours to diversify its energy sources, functioning as a significant conduit for natural gas

and renewable electricity between the Black Sea region and Central Europe. The EU structural funds have contributed significantly to infrastructure development and public investment. Whilst corruption and administrative inefficiencies persist, public confidence in EU institutions remains high, due to Romania's growing strategic role.

Within the PSC, Romania advocates for a robust and forward-leaning EU security posture. It has been observed to support the Rapid Deployment Capacity and has called for its prioritisation in Eastern flank operations, Black Sea maritime security, and hybrid threat response. Bucharest is among the strongest supporters of Ukraine's EU accession, including countering Russian-backed destabilization efforts in Transnistria. Romania's position on the matter is clear: it opposes any engagement with armed non-state actors and insists on a firm commitment to territorial integrity and legal consistency in all PSC operations. Furthermore, it is conducive to the enhancement of the alignment between the PSC and NATO, as well as the promotion of defence-industrial cooperation with Poland and the Baltic States. This positions the country as a significant contributor to security in southeastern Europe.

- **Slovakia**

In 2032, Slovakia maintains a cautious yet committed stance within the European Union, a position influenced by domestic political shifts and mounting regional security concerns. The present government is characterised by a centrist coalition with moderate conservative leanings, a stance that finds expression in a balanced approach to pro-European rhetoric alongside an increased sensitivity to sovereignty and national identity issues. The prevailing sentiment within the public domain continues to be one of support for EU membership, though there has been an observable escalation in scepticism in recent years, particularly in the context of migration policy and perceived disparities in the manner of decision-making within the EU.

Slovakia is formally aligned with the European People's Party, yet it has occasionally sided with Visegrád partners on issues of subsidiarity and cultural sovereignty.

The Slovak economy is stable, with growth projected at 1.6% in 2032. The industrial base of the region remains robust, particularly in the domains of automotive manufacturing, electronics, and energy infrastructure. The Slovak Republic has made significant progress in the areas of digitalisation and green transition initiatives, with support from both EU funding and private investment. Inflation is under control, and unemployment remains low, though long-term demographic challenges and regional disparities persist. Despite its commitment to the euro, Slovakia has adopted a fiscally cautious stance, exhibiting resistance to the adoption of debt-sharing mechanisms or large-scale economic transfers on a pan-European level.

Within the PSC, Slovakia advocates a pragmatic, consensus-based approach to EU foreign and security policy. The document under discussion here endorses the utilisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity in circumstances where there is clear legal precedent, particularly in the context of defensive missions or those of a humanitarian nature. The city of Bratislava has historically adopted a cautious stance towards high-risk external interventions, maintaining an opposition to any formal engagement with armed non-state actors. This position is underpinned by the conviction that legal clarity is paramount and that any engagement could potentially compromise state sovereignty. The document under discussion here expresses support for robust PSC-NATO collaboration and calls upon the EU to concentrate on the development of resilience in Central and Eastern Europe. This includes responses to hybrid threats and the protection of infrastructure.

- **Slovenia**

Slovenia continues to position itself as a constructive and balanced voice within the European Union, advocating for dialogue, regional cooperation, and strategic cohesion. Slovenia is governed by a centre-left coalition, and the country maintains a firmly pro-European orientation, supporting deeper integration in areas of foreign policy, climate resilience, and crisis management. Ljubljana's geopolitical positioning in the Western Balkans renders it an active proponent of EU enlargement, particularly about having a mediator role between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, where Slovenia maintains historical and political ties.

The Slovenian economy has demonstrated stability, with GDP growth estimated at 1.7% in 2032. The key economic drivers that have been identified in this study include green technology, sustainable tourism, and advanced manufacturing. Slovenia has effectively utilised EU structural funds to modernise its infrastructure and transition towards a low-carbon economy. Trade relations with both Western Europe and the Western Balkans remain robust, with the country serving as a pivotal intermediary between Central Europe and Southeastern Europe. Fiscal discipline is maintained, and public investment remains focused on innovation and education.

Within the PSC, Slovenia advocates a diplomatic and rules-based approach to crisis response. The document under review here supports the Rapid Deployment Capacity, especially in the context of civilian protection, peacekeeping, and stabilisation missions. However, it also emphasises the need for strict legal mandates and multilateral coordination. Ljubljana has adopted a cautious approach in its engagement with armed non-state actors, expressing concerns about the potential establishment of a precedent. However, it has also demonstrated support for indirect humanitarian access strategies when deemed necessary. Slovenia advocates for sustained PSC attention on the Western Balkans, calling for EU leadership in preventing

renewed ethnic tensions and promoting regional security architecture that complements EU enlargement objectives.

- **Spain**

Spain continues to play an active and prominent role within the European Union, advocating for strategic autonomy, multilateralism, and a robust humanitarian component in EU external action. The Spanish government, which is centre-left and aligned with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, has a socially grounded foreign policy. This foreign policy emphasises conflict prevention, development cooperation and human rights.

The Spanish economy has exhibited a resumption of moderate growth, with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expanding by approximately 1.8% in 2022. Key sectors include renewable energy, high-speed logistics, digital services, and tourism, bolstered by EU recovery funds and substantial public investment in green and digital transitions. Spain has established itself as a leader in continental Europe with regard to solar energy and sustainable infrastructure. Notwithstanding the evident challenges concerning youth unemployment and regional economic disparities, public confidence in EU membership remains high, particularly in view of the tangible benefits of cohesion funding and international market access.

Within the PSC, Spain endorses the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity for humanitarian, stabilisation, and crisis response missions, with a particular focus on the EU's southern neighbourhood. The report calls for a stronger PSC focus on Mediterranean security, migration governance, and climate-related instability in North Africa and the Sahel. Madrid has historically adopted a cautious approach when it comes to engaging with armed non-state actors, opting to do so only under strict humanitarian or UN-backed frameworks. This is due to concerns regarding the potential long-term implications for EU legitimacy. Spain also promotes

the enhancement of civilian-military coordination, the integration of border management strategies, and the expansion of the EU's diplomatic presence in the Global South. The policy under discussion here is one of a two-pronged nature, with the first prong being a commitment to complementarity between the EU and NATO. The second prong is a firm advocacy for greater strategic autonomy on the part of the EU in the region of its near abroad.

- **Sweden**

In 2032, Sweden will continue to uphold its reputation as a principled and strategically engaged member of the European Union. This will be achieved by maintaining a balanced approach between its historical emphasis on neutrality and diplomacy, and an increasingly assertive security posture. Following its accession to NATO in the mid-2020s and the Eurozone in 2032, Sweden has positioned itself as a key actor in bridging Nordic-Baltic concerns with broader EU strategic goals. The nation is governed by a centre-left coalition that is influenced by green ideologies, and is firmly aligned with the principles of international law, human rights, and multilateralism.

The Swedish economy is recognised as one of the most stable and innovation-driven in Europe, with growth projections of approximately 2% in 2032. Core sectors include green technology, defence systems, pharmaceuticals, and advanced telecommunications. Sweden has emerged as a global leader in the realm of climate-smart infrastructure and digital governance. The nation has demonstrated a commitment to robust investment in cyber resilience and AI regulation, underscoring its position at the forefront of technological advancement. The adoption of the euro proceeded in a relatively seamless manner, facilitated by meticulous fiscal planning and a high level of public confidence in institutional decision-making processes. The country even joined as one of the test countries for the digital euro. Furthermore, the country plays a leading role in EU research initiatives and development financing.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Sweden's position is to advocate for a robust and values-based EU foreign policy framework. The document advocates for the utilisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity in humanitarian protection, peacekeeping, and civilian evacuation missions. However, it also urges the establishment of clear legal guidelines, human rights safeguards, and full parliamentary oversight for any engagement. Stockholm has adopted a cautious stance regarding formal negotiations with armed non-state actors, expressing concerns about the potential erosion of international norms. However, it supports the concept of indirect engagement, specifically for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian access. Sweden emphasises hybrid threat preparedness, digital sovereignty, and civil resilience within PSC agendas, and pushes for greater EU strategic autonomy that complements.

- **Albania**

Albania, as one of the newest EU member states, has adopted a robust pro-European agenda and demonstrated a commitment to demonstrating its reliability as a partner in foreign and security policy. The Albanian government, a coalition of centrist and reform-oriented political parties aligned with the Renew Europe and the European People's Party, has continued to prioritise institutional modernisation, regional stability, and integration into the EU's security and defence structures. Its accession in 2020 was widely regarded as a strategic indication of the EU's renewed commitment to the Western Balkans.

The Albanian economy is currently in a transitional growth phase, with an estimated GDP growth rate of 3.2% in 2022—the highest among recent entrants to the European Union. Key sectors include tourism, hydropower, agriculture, and a growing digital services industry. The country has derived considerable benefit from EU structural funds, investment in public infrastructure, and regulatory alignment with the EU single market. Nevertheless, challenges persist in the realms of corruption control, judicial reform, and rural development. The

government's ongoing efforts are centred on the alignment of its administrative and legal frameworks with EU standards, while concurrently positioning Albania as a regional nexus for energy and transport, with the objective of establishing a linkage between the Western Balkans and Central Europe.

Within the Political and Security Committee, Albania adopts a cooperative and Atlanticist stance, aligning closely with EU positions on regional stability, border control, and the rule of law. It has been observed to offer considerable support to the Rapid Deployment Capacity, and indeed, it has been advocated for its utilisation in the Western Balkans and Mediterranean regions, particularly in the context of counterterrorism, organised crime, and natural disaster response. Albania's position on engagement with armed non-state actors is one of firm opposition, a stance informed by the nation's historical experience with conflict and state fragility. The report calls for a more pronounced PSC focus on the Western Balkans, advocating for enhanced security cooperation, institutional resilience, and the EU's credibility as a peacekeeping entity in post-conflict regions.

- **North Macedonia**

North Macedonia is regarded as a committed and constructive EU member state, actively working to solidify its place within European institutions after its accession in 2030. The nation is governed by a pro-European coalition, and the country perceives EU membership to be a geopolitical guarantee and a vehicle for domestic reform. The government's foreign policy is characterised by a focus on fostering good neighbourly relations, ensuring regional stability, and aligning with the EU's legal and security frameworks. This strategic approach positions North Macedonia as a cooperative and principled actor within the Union, contributing to the enhancement of regional security and the promotion of European values.

The economy is experiencing robust post-accession growth, with GDP projected at 3%. Key sectors include agriculture, textiles, renewable energy, and digital services, with EU investment accelerating infrastructure modernisation and public sector reform. Notwithstanding the challenges that still persist in public administration, such as corruption and the brain drain, North Macedonia has made notable progress in the areas of judicial reform and regulatory harmonisation. The euro has not yet been adopted by the country, but it is participating actively in ERM II, with its fiscal policy closely aligned with EU standards. The city of Skopje has demonstrated a commitment to the pursuit of long-term economic convergence and enhanced regional connectivity, a commitment that is facilitated by the implementation of a series of EU-funded projects.

Within the PSC, North Macedonia adopts a cooperative and Atlanticist posture, closely aligned with the strategic priorities of the EU and NATO. It is evident that the Rapid Deployment Capacity is to be utilised in the stabilisation operations in the Western Balkans and beyond, particularly in response to hybrid threats and organised crime. Drawing from its own post-conflict experience, Skopje is a vocal advocate for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and institutional resilience in fragile environments. The country opposes engagement with armed non-state actors, warning that such actions risk undermining legitimate governance and regional trust. Furthermore Skopje is engaged in a proactive campaign to garner heightened PSC attention towards the Western Balkans, whilst concurrently encouraging the EU to assume a leadership role in the prevention of geopolitical fragmentation within the region.

- **Montenegro**

Montenegro has firmly positioned itself as a pro-European, Atlanticist member of the European Union following its accession in 2030. The nation is governed by a centrist coalition and is focused on consolidating democratic institutions, deepening rule-of-law reforms, and aligning itself closely with EU foreign and security policy. Montenegro regards its EU membership as a strategic milestone and a protective anchor amid ongoing geopolitical competition in the Western Balkans.

The Montenegrin economy is currently experiencing an accelerated growth phase, with GDP projected at 3.1% in 2032. This growth is primarily driven by the tourism, renewable energy, and port logistics sectors. In the context of the EU's structural and pre-accession funds, a strategic realignment has occurred, with these financial resources being reallocated towards public infrastructure, the enhancement of administrative capacity, and the promotion of regional connectivity. Notwithstanding the advances achieved, challenges persist in the domains of corruption control, public sector transparency, and overdependence on seasonal sectors. The government continues to advocate for economic diversification and is engaged in aligning its fiscal and regulatory frameworks with Eurozone convergence criteria, though it has not yet adopted the euro.

Within the PSC, Montenegro is a reliable and consensus-oriented actor, closely supporting EU-led security initiatives and emphasising the importance of regional stability. The country has expressed its strong endorsement of the Rapid Deployment Capacity, particularly with regard to its utilisation in crisis management within the Western Balkans and at Europe's southeastern border. Drawing on its recent post-accession reforms, Montenegro supports the PSC's focus on hybrid threats, countering illicit networks, and safeguarding democratic processes. The organisation's position is unequivocal in its opposition to any form of engagement with armed

non-state actors. The rationale underpinning this stance is twofold: firstly, the potential for regional instability that such engagement could engender; and secondly, the imperative to strengthen legitimate state institutions as a means of ensuring stability. Montenegro advocates for a robust EU role in deterring external influence in the Western Balkans and supports coordinated efforts to integrate the region into the EU's security and defence structures.

8) Further Reading

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

- <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors>
- <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>



9) Bibliography

- CVCE.eu. 2016a. “The origins of the Schuman Plan” Accessed February 9, 2025.
<https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/53babf84-f8e0-4810-bb80-2ed15706efad>
- CVCE.eu. 2016b. “The signing of the ECSC Treaty.” Accessed February 9, 2025.
<https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/59a178d2-782d-4736-b64b-7e5df1df82b0>
- CVCE.eu. 2016c “The Hague Summit (1–2 December 1969): completion, enlargement, deepening.” Accessed February 9, 2025.
<https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/d1cfaf4d-8b5c-4334-ac1d-0438f4a0d617/01b8a864-db8b-422c-915e-a47d5e86593e>
- McKesson, John A. “The Schuman Plan.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 67, no. 1, 1952, pp. 18–21. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2145296>. Accessed 9 Feb. 2025.
- The Federalist. 2005. "The Messina Conference and the Advance of European Unification." Accessed February 13, 2025.
<https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/en/notes/2160-the-messina-conference-and-the-advance-of-european-unification>.
- EUR-Lex. March 14, 2017. “The Treaty of Rome (EEC).” Accessed February 13, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-of-rome-eec.html>.
- BMUV. November 30, 2022. “Euratom.” Accessed February 13, 2025.
<https://www.bmuv.de/en/topics/nuclear-safety/overview-nuclear-safety/europe/euratom>
- European Union. March 25, 1957. “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.” Accessed February 17, 2025.

https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_3_antlasmalar/1_3_1_kurucu_antlasmalar/1957_treaty_establishing_eec.pdf

- Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory. n.d. “The Legacy of the Luxembourg Compromise.” Accessed February 17, 2025. <https://www.lhlt.mpg.de/research-project/the-legacy-of-the-luxembourg-compromise>.
- European Union. June 29, 1987. “Single European Act.” Accessed February 17, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11986U/TXT>
- EUR-Lex. 2018a. “The Treaty of Brussels (Merger Treaty).” Accessed February 17, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-of-brussels-merger-treaty.html>
- Cini, Michelle. 2007. European Union Politics. Oxford U.A.: Oxford Univ. Press.
- European Union. June 6, 1992. “Treaty on European Union.” Accessed February 20, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>.
- Banco de España. n.d. “The introduction of the euro.” Accessed February 21, 2025. <https://www.bde.es/wbc/en/sobre-banco/actividad-europea/eurosistema-sebc/historia-eurosistema/euro/introduccion-euro/>
- European Union. November 10, 1997. “Treaty of Amsterdam.” Accessed February 25, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT>
- EUR-Lex n.d. “Schengen Agreement and Convention.” Accessed February 28, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/schengen-agreement-and-convention.html>
- EUR-Lex. 2018b “The Treaty of Nice.” Accessed March 1, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legisum:xy0012>

- European Parliament. 2024a. “The Treaty of Lisbon.” Accessed March 3, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Lisbon%20gives,are%20compatible%20with%20EU%20law.>
- European Parliament. 2024b. “The European Parliament: organisation and operation.” Accessed March 3, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/20/the-european-parliament-organisation-and-operation>
- European Parliament. 2024c. “The Council of the European Union.” Accessed March 3, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/24/the-council-of-the-european-union>
- European Parliament. 2024d. “The European Commission.” Accessed March 3, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/25/the-european-commission>
- European Parliament. 2024e. “The Court of Justice of the European Union.” Accessed March 5, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/26/the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union>
- European Parliament. n.d.a. “Seats by political group and country - 2024-2029.” Accessed March 5, 2025. <https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/seats-political-group-country/2024-2029/>
- EPP. n.d. “Our Mission and Values.” Accessed March 5, 2025. <https://www.eppgroup.eu/who-we-are/our-mission-amp-values>
- Socialist and Democrats. n.d. “Our President.” Accessed March 5, 2025. <https://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/who-we-are/our-president-and-bureau/president>
- Patriots.eu. n.d. “Manifesto.” Accessed March 7, 2025. <https://patriots.eu/manifesto>
- ECRGroup. n.d. “ECR.” Accessed March 7, 2025. <https://ecrgroup.eu/ecr>

- Renew Europe. n.d. “What we stand for.” Accessed March 7, 2025. <https://www.reneweuropengroup.eu/what-we-stand-for>
- Green-EFA. n.d. “Our Vision.” Accessed March 7, 2025. <https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/what-we-stand-for/our-vision>
- The Left. n.d. “What we stand for.” Accessed March 7, 2025. <https://left.eu/what-we-stand-for-2/>
- ESN-Group. n.d. “Statutes.” Accessed March 8, 2025. <https://esn-group.eu/statutes>
- European Parliament. n.d.b “The Ordinary Legislative Procedure- step by step.” Accessed March 8, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/olp/en/ordinary-legislative-procedure/overview>
- European Council. June 21, 1993. “European Council in Copenhagen.” Accessed March 8, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>
- Fondation Robert Schuman. April 30, 2024. “Twenty Years After the Largest Ever Enlargement.” Accessed March 8, 2025. <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/747-twenty-years-after-the-largest-ever-enlargement>
- EUR-Lex. August 19, 2011. “Political and Security Committee (PSC).” Accessed April 20, 2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:r00005>
- Howorth, Jolyon. 2009. Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Intergovernmentalism? Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Accessed May 18, 2025. <https://1library.net/document/ynn1r4py-decision-making-security-defence-policy-supranational-intergovernmentalism.html>.
- EEAS. May 5, 2024. “CSDP structure, instruments and agencies.” Accessed May 19, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en

- EEAS. September 15, 2021. “About the Military Training mission in the Central African Republic.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eutm-rca/about-military-training-mission-central-african-republic-eutm-rca_en?s=334
- Homan, Kees. 2007. “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” In *Faster and More United? The Debate about Europe’s Crisis Response Capacity*, edited by Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj, The Hague: Clingendael Institute. Accessed May 20, 2025. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20070531_cscp_chapter_homan.pdf.
- EUAM-Iraq. n.d. “About EUAM Iraq.” Accessed May 20, 2025. <https://www.euam-iraq.eu/en/about>
- EUNAVFOR. n.d. “Mission.” Accessed May 20, 2025. <https://eunavfor.eu/mission>
- Australia, Scheme=AGLSTERMS.AglsAgent; corporateName=Reserve Bank Of. 2025. “Unconventional Monetary Policy | Explainer | Education.” Reserve Bank of Australia. March 3, 2025. <https://www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/unconventional-monetary-policy.html>.
- Berndt, Ernst R. 1982. “FROM TECHNOCRACY TO NET ENERGY ANALYSIS: ENGINEERS, ECONOMISTS AND RECURRING ENERGY THEORIES OF VALUE.” <https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/2023/SWP-1353-09057784.pdf>.
- Cambridge Dictionary. 2025. “Power Vacuum.” In . <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/power-vacuum>.

- “ERM II – the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism.” n.d. Economy and Finance. Accessed June 8, 2025. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/adoption-fixed-euro-conversion-rate/erm-ii-eus-exchange-rate-mechanism_en.
- European Commission. n.d. “An Effective, Firm and Fair EU Return and Readmission Policy.” Migration and Home Affairs. Accessed June 8, 2025. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/irregular-migration-and-return/effective-firm-and-fair-eu-return-and-readmission-policy_en.
- Kupchan, Richard N. Haass and Charles. 2024. “The New Concert of Powers: How to Prevent Catastrophe and Promote Stability in a Multipolar World.” *Foreign Affairs*, September 5, 2024. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-03-23/new-concert-powers>.
- “The Euro Outside the Euro Area.” n.d. Economy and Finance. Accessed June 8, 2025. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/use-euro/euro-outside-euro-area_en.
- “The ReArm Europe Plan.” 2025. IRIS. March 14, 2025. <https://www.iris-france.org/en/the-rearm-europe-plan-squaring-the-circle-between-integration-and-national-sovereignty/>.
- Warrington, Edward. 1994. “Lilliput Revisited.” *Asian Journal of Public Administration* 16, no. 1 (June): 3–13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02598272.1994.10800284>.
- World Bank Group. 2019. “Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors.” *World Bank*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors>.
- European Commission. n.d. “Cohesion Fund (CF).” European Commission. Accessed June 12, 2025b. <https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu->

[funding-programmes/cohesion-fund](#)

[cf_en#:~:text=The%20Cohesion%20Fund%20provides%20support,dedicated%20national%20or%20regional%20programmes.](#)

