

# STUDY GUIDE

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# Political and Security Committee

Open Agenda



# Political and Security Committee (PSC) Study Guide

European Union Simulation in Ankara (EUROsimA) 2022  
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## **Letter from the Secretary-General**

My name is Batuhan Bera Karagüzel and I am a senior student of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University. As the Secretary-General of the EUROsimA 2022, it is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to the 18th annual session of our conference on behalf of our Director-General Ms. Beyza Güler, and the entire EUROsimA 2022 team.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a permanent body of the European Union that has extensive functions and duties within security and defence policy competences of the EU. Consisting of the permanent ambassadors of the member states in Brussels, PSC is crucial for policy coordination and effective implementation of decisions as the committee convenes regularly. Hence, we decided to simulate this committee in the EUROsimA 2022 as a “crisis committee” in order to reflect the dynamic nature of the discussions of the committee. Given the fact that the European Union is facing immense security challenges and is involved in various operations worldwide, the Political and Security Committee in the EUROsimA 2022 conference, will be a very entertaining and instructive experience for its participants.

The complexity and difficulty of preparing such a committee is only matched by the sophistication and dedication of the Academic Team members who are responsible for PSC, namely Mr. Faik Yetgin, Ms. Deniz Tetik and Ms. Alara Tümer. Our Crisis Director Mr. Faik Yetgin utilized his creative spirit and years of experience and played a crucial role in designing the debate topics for this committee. Under-Secretary-General of PSC Ms. Deniz Tetik prepared an excellent study guide that reflects her academic skills as well as her dedication to our conference. Our extremely talented Academic Assistant Ms. Alara Tümer exceeded my expectations in every task that she was assigned and became an indispensable member of our Academic Team.

I highly encourage participants of the PSC to carefully examine this study guide in order to be fully prepared for the high level debates that you will encounter during the conference.

Kindest Regards,

Batuhan Bera Karagüzel Secretary-General of EUROsimA 2022

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## Letter From Under-Secretary-General

Most Distinguished Participants,

My name is Deniz Tetik, and I am a third year student of Political Science and Public Administration at Middle East Technical University. It is an honor to be the Under Secretary General of the Political and Security Committee at EUROSima 2022. By saying this, I would like to welcome you to this one-of-a-kind conference, which has been improving for 18 years. The Political and Security Committee is a body being implemented under the roof of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. With its authority to supervise all the EU-led Crisis Management Operations, the PSC has the capability to conduct the missions and operations, and give advice to the other military bodies of the European Union for better strategies. The PSC, as a crisis committee, will be discussing the military actions of the EU in certain regions: Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine. The ambassadors, who have the utmost ambition to solve the crises that the world is facing, will be having deep discussions to touch upon the current crisis occurring in those regions by also referring to the five phases of war; respectively sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. Furthermore, while trying to stabilize those regions, the ambassadors will face the decision of whether they will pursue their relations with the other organizations mainly, the United Nations, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization to solve those crises by also bearing their states' interests in mind.

Now, I would like to take the opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to Mr. Bera Karagüzel for being on my side whenever I needed his guidance, and for his endless support throughout the process of writing this guide. Also, I want to thank Mr. Faik Yetgin, who serves as the crisis director, for clearing each complication I experienced while planning surprise elements of our committee. Lastly, I want to acknowledge the extraordinary work done by Ms. Alara Tümer, and give the warmest hug, and thanks to her for not leaving me alone during this 6 months long journey of EUROSima. I have the greatest luck, and honor of working alongside these incredible people, all of whom are very talented and dedicated, also of being a part of the EUROSima team which is full of the most fun, and loveliest people that could ever come together.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me;

Sincerely,

Deniz Tetik, Under-Secretary-General of EUROSima 2022

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## **Table of Contents:**

<b>List of abbreviation</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>I. Introduction to the political and security committee</b>	<b>7</b>
The Evolution of the EU's Foreign, Security and Defense Policies	7
Political and Security Committee (PSC)	12
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)	13
The Role of the EEAS within the EU	15
Organization of the EEAS Relating to the CSDP	15
<b>II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER ACTORS</b>	<b>16</b>
Transatlantic Relations	16
The EU-NATO Relationship on the Matters of CSDP	17
Where Do the Members Stand on CSDP?	19
A) ATLANTICISM	20
i) Key Atlanticist Member State	21
ii) Geographical Dimension of Atlanticism	21
iii) Historical Dimension of Atlanticism	22
iv) The Debate Upon “The End of Atlanticism”	22
B) EUROPEANISM	23
i) Key Europeanist Member States	24
ii) Historical Dimension of Europeanism	25
C) ATLANTICIST AND EUROPEANIST MEMBER STATES	26
D) THE SPLIT BETWEEN ATLANTICISTS AND EUROPEANISTS: EXPLAINED	27
<b>III. DEFENSE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION CONCERNING THE CSDP</b>	<b>27</b>
A) Defense Industry	27
B) Defense Structure of the EU	27
C) Strategic Autonomy	30
<b>IV. THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT PROCEDURES OF CSDP</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>V. SOME OF THE CSDP PAST MILITARY OPERATIONS</b>	<b>33</b>
a. Concordia	33
b. Artemis	33
c. EUFOR Althea	34
d. EUFOR RD Congo	35
e. EUFOR Tchad/RCA	35
f. EUNAVFOR Atalanta	36
<b>VI. ONGOING SITUATIONS</b>	<b>37</b>
a. Afghanistan	37
i. The Background of the Crisis	37
ii. The Relations with the EU	38
iii. Current political crisis	39
iv. The Humanitarian Situation	39

b. Libya	40
i. Background	40
ii. Current Situation	43
ii. Naval Operations	43
c. Ukraine	45
i. Background	45
ii. Cyber and Information Warfare	48
iii. Current Situation and Relations with the EU	49
<b>VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>51</b>

## **List of Abbreviation**

**ANPDF:** Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework

**CBRN:** Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related

**CDP:** Capability Development Plan

**CETA:** Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

**CFSP:** Common Foreign and Security Policy

**CivCom:** Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

**CMO:** Crisis Management Operations

**CPCC:** Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

**CSCE:** Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

**CSDP:** Common Security and Defense Policy

**DDoS:** Distributed Denial of Service

**ECSC:** European Coal and Steel Community

**EDA:** European Defense Agency

**EDC:** European Defense Community

**EDF:** European Defense Fund

**EEA:** European Economic Area

**EEAS:** European External Action Service

**EEC:** European Economic Community

**EPC:** European Political Cooperation

**ESDP:** European Security and Defense Policy

**EUMC:** European Union Military Committee

**FYROM:** Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia

**GFAP:** General Framework Agreement for Peace

**GNA:** Government of National Accord

**GNU:** Government of National Unity

**JHA:** Justice and Home Affairs

**LOT:** Liaison and Observation Team

**MPCC:** Military Planning and Conduct Capability

**PESCO:** Permanent Structured Cooperation

**PMG:** Politico Military Group

**PoCo:** Political Committee

**PSC:** Political and Security Committee

**SACEUR:** Supreme Allied Commander Europe

**SEA:** Single European Act

**SHAPE:** Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO Central Planning HQ)

**TEU:** Treaty on European Union

**TTIP:** Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

**WEU:** Western European Union

**WFP:** World Food Programme

**WPS:** Women, Peace and Security

## **I. Introduction to the Political and Security Committee**

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the responsible body of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).<sup>i</sup> The PSC prepares a consistent response to EU-related crises in the international arena.<sup>ii</sup>

### **A. The Evolution of the EU's foreign, security, and defense policies**

The initial step towards defense and security policy of the Union is the European Defense Community (EDC). This policy is one of the initial steps of the European integration process, which was started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The purpose of the ECSC was to decrease the possibility of military conflict between Germany and France, by integrating their coal and steel industries.<sup>iii</sup> Both coal and steel were vital materials for the developed countries. On the one hand, coal was an essential energy source that comprised a significant proportion of Europe's energy production. On the other hand, steel was an indispensable material for the industry. Both of them together were needed for constructing weaponry.<sup>iv</sup> The second step, on the other hand, was to establish EDC in 1952 to strengthen the European army against the Soviet threat while utilizing distrusted and occupied (Western) Germany.<sup>v</sup> The EDC was about defense integration, and it was signed by the six founding member states of European integration namely; Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands in 1952. The history of the EDC goes back to the adoption of the Schuman Declaration proposing the establishment of ECSC under the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The Schuman Declaration pointed to the victims of the manufacture of munitions of the war during the Second World War, hence it aimed for security and economic improvement within those six member states. Therefore, the proposal of the EDC emerged due to the European and global security concerns, and existing economic integration among the European States.<sup>vi</sup> The EDC was mainly about defense, the Article 2 of the EDC Treaty articulate that "it shall ensure the security of the member states against any aggression by participating in western defense within the framework of North Atlantic Treaty and by

accomplishing the integration of the defense forces of the member states and the rational and economic utilization of their resources."<sup>vii</sup> This article signaled the formation of a European army and the linkages with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The supranational feature of the EDC had to be assessed within the context of the changing balances of the political environment. The involvement of Germany and its rearmament was a matter of question, and although major players accepted the situation including the United States; France was tense against the provisions of the Treaty and the participation of Germany. Later on, in 1951 the delegations from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France gathered in Petersburg with Germany in order to discuss the integration of German forces into the Western defense mechanisms.<sup>viii</sup> The abstainer attitude of France towards Germany and to the provisions on the Treaty led to a rapid collapse of an ambitious Treaty.

After the failure of EDC, the French President De Gaulle, raised the Fouchet Plan in 1961 to establish a "Union of States" aiming to reconcile, co-ordinate, and unify the European states on foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs, and defense. De Gaulle sought to turn the European Economic Community (EEC), adopted under the Treaty of Rome, into a voluntary union of member states with national veto powers that could act in unanimity in policies regarding foreign and defense affairs. De Gaulle put a significant effort to 'intergovernmentalize' the EEC, however, it was rejected by the EEC five because some did not approve the idea that the plan excluded the United Kingdom, and others thought it was a French move against NATO.<sup>ix</sup>

In the aftermath of the Fouchet Plan, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States started to meet regularly to discuss foreign policy on an intergovernmental basis. With the approval of the Luxembourg Report, the **European Political Cooperation (EPC)** was established, hence the member states agreed upon consulting the EPC on the foreign policy-related topic, yet not on defense.<sup>x</sup> Even so, the EPC became more industrialized over time, and also the European positions were tested by some crises; for instance, the invasion of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the relations with the US on the Cyprus crisis, and the Iranian revolution. Since the EPC had no resources and staff

on its own, and the decisions were made by consensus; one state could have failed the proposal. Hence the cooperation remained unassertive.

**a. EPC to CFSP**

In the progress of time, the EPC started to be more successful in the political arena. With the acceptance of the Copenhagen Report in 1973, the debates on security was taken into table, even it was in a narrow context within the member states; that including the Helsinki Final Act held in 1975; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) paved the way for the discussions on fundamental rights within the efforts of EPC.<sup>xi</sup>

An important development occurred when the Single European Act (SEA) amended the Treaty of Rome, and with these arrangements, ‘security’ related phrases were added to the primary law for the first time.<sup>xii</sup> The important provisions regarded security were covered in Article 30(6) as:

- (a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.
- (b) The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security . They shall work to that end both at national level and , where appropriate , within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies.
- (c) Nothing in this Title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.

The Single European Act paved the way for intensifying the role of security more pronounced in the following treaties. Hence, it was persuasive for the member states to settle on a common foreign policy. With the establishment of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty (also known as the Treaty on European Union/TEU) in November 1993, the introduction of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**

(CFSP) which was the successor of the EPC was signaled.<sup>xiii</sup> The Maastricht Treaty was to form the second pillar of the European Union which was to be intergovernmental, it was not involving much from the European Commission nor European Parliament.<sup>xiv</sup> The EU was, consequently, constituted of three pillars; respectively, the first pillar was the European Community, the second was Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third was Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). All these three pillars were to form a one, unitary institutional structure.<sup>xv</sup>

#### **b. The Structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**

The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) set ground for the establishment of the European Union, and created a unique area for the common foreign policy by giving the CFSP a distinct area for decisions-making processes.<sup>xvi</sup> The CFSP was introduced as the second pillar to the three pillar system of the TEU aiming for “preserving peace, strengthening international security, promoting international cooperation and developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”<sup>xvii</sup> Later on the Treaty of Nice was introduced that brought some changes to decision making processes formed by TEU. The treaty with those changes also mandated the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which was formed to conduct the EU crisis management operations. Over and above, TEU allowed the European Union to call upon the Western European Union (WEU), which was established in 1948, for military purposes on the behalf of the EU.

While the decision making mechanism was at the hand of the Council Presidency at first, the Council gave the strategic direction to the CFSP. The agenda was set by the Political Committee (PoCo), and the ministers gathered on a monthly basis at the General Affairs Council to overview and for decision making.<sup>xviii</sup> As the foreign policy took an important part of the European agenda, new treaties and systems were structured; staff from the Council, Commission, WEU, and member states’ diplomatic services were brought together within the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’s launch.<sup>xix</sup> This was a call for the “nascent EU Foreign ministry” for some, yet the foreign European action was deemed inefficient due to their lack of military effectiveness in Bosnia and then Kosovo without the US intervention.<sup>xx</sup> All these unwarrantable consequences led the Cologne European Council to form a new

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 which were likened to the military structure of the WEU.<sup>xxi</sup> The new dimensions aimed by the European member states included the ‘civilian and conflict prevention’ into the ESDP’s formation. Moreover, the politico-military aspect of the ESDP had to be rearranged alongside its civilian aspects. Hence, a ‘Military Committee’, formed by advanced military personnel who were representing their national chief of staff was introduced. The Political Committee (PoCo) was re-formed as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) reflecting the political side of the CFSP.<sup>xxii</sup> The ambassador level representatives located in Brussels were meeting regularly, twice a week, making political decisions on the military operation if the Council agreed upon.<sup>xxiii</sup>

### **c. The Common Security and Defense Policy**

In a wider scope, the members of the European Union discussed the necessity of a separate and independent European security and defense policy after the NATO bombing in Kosovo (Kosovo Crisis) that occurred between 1998-1999. At first the institution was called ESDP, then changed as CSDP with the Treaty of Lisbon.<sup>xxiv</sup>

As it may be seen that the aforementioned works of the European Union are composed of only of the foreign policy but also of security and defense. Therefore, the provisions of the CSDP are integrated with the CFSP at the Treaty on European Union (TEU).<sup>xxv</sup> Indeed, article 42(1) of the TEU states that “The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy.” Since both the CFSP, and CSDP involve ‘security’ it may cause confusion, but the treaty does not limit the concept to military security. “It acknowledges environment and economic security, international crime and terrorism.”<sup>xxvi</sup>

Furthermore, the Treaty emphasizes the importance of the unity among the member states by it in the article 42(7) stating that:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.”

The CSDP has the capability to conduct both the military and civilian missions under its provisions. The Union launched its first ever civilian mission called EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina under CDSP provisions on January 1, 2003.<sup>xxvii</sup> Thereafter, on March 31, 2003, the Union deployed its initial military mission “Operation Concordia” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to support the endeavor of NATO to ensure a secure and stable environment.<sup>xxviii</sup> The European Union has more than twenty CSDP operations mainly in Africa, and in the Western Balkans since 2003.<sup>xxix</sup>

#### **d. Political and Security Committee (PSC)**

The Political and Security Committee is the highest decision making body of CSDP/CFSP. The ambassadorial meetings are generally held twice a week. The Committee is responsible for the implementation of the policies and political, and strategic control of the operations related to EU’s crisis management under the authority of the High Representative and the Council. Also, the Committee supervises the international situations located in the CFSP region, and strengthens the Council by advising policies. The PSC is a crucial body to CSDP in regard to adopting recommendations and decisions. The missions and operations are to be discussed under the PSC roof in the duration of the reports that are issued on a six-monthly basis, and the appointment of the Mission/Operation Commander. One of the most important functions of the PSC is to prepare a coherent EU response to the crisis, and being in cooperation with the EEAS bodies in the cases of crisis situations. The ambassadors at the PSC take advice from three advisory bodies namely; The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), Politico Military Group (PMG), and Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom).<sup>xxx</sup>

## **The Evolution of the European Foreign Policy**

1951	The Schuman Declaration proposing the establishment of ECSC under the Treaty of Paris was adopted
1952	EDC Treaty was signed by six founding states of the EEC
1954	The French Parliament rejected the EDC Treaty
1961-1962	The Fouchet Plan advocating the intergovernmentalism was rejected
1970	European Political Cooperation was established
1975	The EPC became pioneer on the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE
1986	Single European Act agreed
1990-1991	The events of German Unification (1990), and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) took their places in history
1992-1993	The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) agreed and the European Union established within the provisions on CFSP.
1999	The ESDP was introduced in 1999 as a project that dealing with civilian and conflict provisions
2001	The PSC was established as a replacement of former Political Committee
2007	The Lisbon Treaty, which brought some changes to the institutional structure of the EU, was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, on the margin of the EU Summit.
2009	The CSDP replacing the ESDP was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as an integral part of the CFSP <sup>xxxii</sup>

### **B. Introduction to the European External Action Service (EEAS)**

The idea of a consolidated body which would be responsible for the conduct of the external relations of the European Union including the Common Foreign and Security

Policy -also including the European Security and Defense Policy-, external trade, developmental co-operation and such; was already formed before The Lisbon Treaty.<sup>xxxii</sup> However, it was The Lisbon Treaty that paved the way for the establishment of the EEAS as the European Union's key external policy institution.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Stressing that these matters mentioned before are all responsibilities of the European Commission, the purpose of the formation of such an idea was to create a body that would assist the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in which the further functions and responsibilities would be decided by the European Council.

Albeit the establishment of the EEAS was viewed as “one of the most significant changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon” by the then UK Minister for Europe David Lidington<sup>xxxiv</sup>, the treaty did not specify the functions of the service in key points such as but no limited to the competencies -especially regarding development policy-<sup>xxxv</sup>, the distribution of posts among the Council, the Commission and the Member States; the scope of the policies it oversees, the definition of the lines of authority between the Union institutions involved; and its precise role in the conduct of the Union's foreign affairs<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

Even though the key functions of the EEAS were not defined by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 27(3) of the Treaty on European Union sheds light to the questions of the responsibilities, organization and functioning of the EEAS. The article states that “... the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.”<sup>xxxvii</sup>

## **a. The Role of the EEAS within the EU**

The EEAS takes part in the EU Global Strategy and its multilateral relations, provides security, defense and crisis responses; deals with the problems relating with climate, environment and energy, plays an active role in refugee protection and migration in addition to protecting human rights, handles the issues of development cooperation, EU enlargement and Neighborhood; deals with economic relations, and many more.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

To explain the EEAS's role in global security, Former Deputy Secretary General of the EEAS Maciej Popowski states that "Some people still wonder what has the European Union to do with security and defense. Since the year 2003, the European Union has deployed 18 missions in operation civilian and military sending soldiers, prosecutors, policemen and civilian advisors abroad to deal with crisis situations in places as different as Mali, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia or more recently Central African Republic. We need the Common Security and Defence Policy to complement what we do in other areas by engaging politically and by being the largest provider of development assistance. We deploy personnel and assets, capabilities provided by the Member States. The recognition has been very clear: the EU is slowly but steadily growing into its role as a security provider in particular in our own neighborhood to the east and to the south of Europe."<sup>xxxix</sup>

## **b. Organization of the EEAS Relating to the CSDP**

#EUinAction is the project of the EU aiming to provide a stable world and a safer Europe<sup>xl</sup> by playing a critical global role via dealing with the aforementioned matters. The CSDP is the sub-body of the EEAS for planning and crisis response purposes<sup>xli</sup> regarding this project of the EU. The CSDP and Crisis Response is divided into two main bodies listed as "Integrated Approach for Security and Peace", and "Security and Defence Policy".<sup>xlii</sup> The directors of these two bodies of the CSDP and Crisis Response, and the director of the "Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability" (CPCC) are appertain to the Deputy Secretary General of CSDP and Crisis Response (currently Charles Fries).<sup>xliii</sup> The Deputy Secretary General is tasked to inform the

Secretary General (currently Stefano Sannino), who assists the High Representative of the EEAS (currently Josep Borrell Fontelles) in accordance with the reports gained from the directors.<sup>xliv</sup> As the EEAS is in charge of the management of the CSDP to achieve this project of the EU aiming to provide safer life conditions to all people, the committee directors will be from the EEAS, as the personnel from this specific body of the EU play an important role in this committee's agenda.

## **II. Relations with other Actors**

*'If your ultimate aim is to provide for your own defense, then the time to tell us is today!'* – President George H. W. Bush to his European allies, NATO summit, Rome, October 1991

### **a. Transatlantic Relations**

Not only do the common military capabilities pave the way for a healthy cooperation but the political and strategic interests shape the communications as well. For that purpose the relations with the U.S. has always been critical and important for the further deliberations on NATO.

The Transatlantic relations among the United States and European Union under the scope of the establishment of the CSDP have fluctuated under different presidents. There are three sets of dimensions that should be kept in mind while examining the relations;

One of the issues should be mentioned is the view of the American political class towards the new CSDP project. The US position has changed through an encouragement to the CSDP within fifteen years. At the same time, there is a concern for seeing the European Union as a partner on the US side.

The other issue is that there is a split between the European members that the CSDP impacted, namely the '**Atlanticists**' and '**Europeanists**'. For the countries bound to the former Soviet bloc, it was easier to be a member of NATO to secure themselves compared to being a member of the EU. Most of them saw their alliance to the US as

a safety belt (via NATO) to entrench their future. That put those members in a different place to see NATO from other Europeans. Yet, through time, some of them have shifted their vision on ‘Atlanticists’/‘Europeanists’ allegiance in favor of the latter.<sup>xlv</sup>

The last issue is regarding the cooperation among NATO and EU’s new security policy. The EU and NATO signed a declaration on the CSDP in December 2002 regarding their ongoing partnership, and joint views. However, the relations did not continue stable due to the imbalances of those two institutions’ views and objectives on the world order.<sup>xlvi</sup> Especially after the 2011 Libyan operation in which the CDSP stayed on the side, and NATO existence with the US lead caused a new literature on re-considering the cooperation between those two institutions.<sup>xlvii</sup>

In the 2020s the main focus shifted to the strategic and political levels within the roof of challenges to transatlantic military cooperation. For this reason both of the sides namely the U.S. and the EU have some expectations from each other to pursue the relations. One of the most sensitive topics affecting the view of the EU is that the former U.S. presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump drew attention to the U.S. withdrawal from NATO during their terms of office. Furthermore, Donald Trump made some harsh implications on how the U.S. would not comply with the article 5 of NATO explaining the mutual defense among all signatories.<sup>xlviii</sup> Therefore, what the EU needs to be promised is the full commitment of the U.S. on the topics regarding security. On the other hand, the U.S. expectations are accumulated under three points; cash, capabilities, and contributions.<sup>xlix</sup> Cash refers to the funding that the EU assigns to defense and security. The second one refers to the military capabilities that the EU invests in defense equipment and building new, necessary capabilities. The third one, contributions refers to operational commitments such as risk and burden sharing.

#### **b. The EU-NATO Relationship on the Matters of CSDP**

The European Union with the principles of CSDP and CFSP carries on several international missions. Those missions are sometimes conducted solely by the EU under the responsibility of the Council, but the others are within the cooperation of

some other international institutions like the United Nations (UN), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

On one hand, the relations with NATO may be tense from time to time, on the other hand, both of the actors put emphasis on the importance of cooperation. On 17 March 2003, a comprehensive agreement called **Berlin Plus** was adopted in the NATO Washington Summit between NATO and the EU. The agreement basically introduces the EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management operations. With the agreement, the EU ‘‘assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations’’, ‘‘availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO)’’.<sup>1</sup>

Berlin Plus Agreement comprise some key elements;

- It is a security agreement that allows the exchange of mutual classified information,
- Ensures the EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for EU-led CMOs,
- Ensures EU to operate in NATO facilities, such as, communication units, and headquarters for EU-led CMOs,
- Collaboration for utilizing NATO's defense planning system of military needs and capabilities by confirming the availability of the well-equipped forces, in the case of requirements that may occur for both the EU-led and NATO-led military operations.<sup>li</sup>
- Clarifies the Terms of Reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR who is always a European and will command EU-led crisis operations within the scope of Berlin Plus Agreement.<sup>lii</sup>

Berlin Plus Agreement underlines the provisions on how NATO and the EU may conduct an operation together, or in the situations that the EU uses the facilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organization when NATO is not a part of the operation. Other than structural cooperations like Berlin Plus creates, the EU and NATO together form partnerships in different areas for research, information sharing, training purposes. A Joint Declaration that was held in 2016 for wider association in terms of strategic cooperation exemplifies these purposes. The Declaration enlarged the areas that two organizations work together: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation in the

maritime domain; cyber security and defense; defense capabilities; defense industry and research; exercises; resilience of partners.<sup>liii</sup>

“In 2018, a second Joint Declaration was signed for a rapid improvement in four more areas: military mobility; counter-terrorism; resilience to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related (CBRN) risks; and Women, Peace and Security (WPS).”<sup>liv</sup>




Figure: Areas of EU-NATO Cooperation<sup>lv</sup>

### c. Where Do the Members Stand on CSDP?

#### The Issue between Atlanticists and Europeanists

To understand the division of Atlanticists and Europeanists regarding European integration and CSDP missions, it is crucial to understand both of the concepts in terms of their history and followers.

### **a) Atlanticism**

It is possible to state that the concept of “Atlanticism” dates back to the end of the Second World War since the concept could be summarized as “American effort to rebuild Europe via Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and NATO”<sup>lvi</sup>. The famous saying that outlines the purpose of NATO “To keep the Americans in (Europe), Russians out and Germans down” of the first NATO Secretary General Hastings Ismay, could also be used to describe what the concept of Atlanticism is.<sup>lvii</sup> By the saying “Germans down”, what Ismay actually means is to prevent another rise of totalitarianism, which could also be addressed as “denazification” but “Atlanticism” seems to be a more appropriate way of speech and therefore used as a cover of what the real intention is.<sup>lviii</sup>

According to the research report named “The revival of Atlanticism in NATO: Changing security identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark” written by political scientists Nina Græger and Kristin M. Haugevik; Atlanticism is explained and summarized as “Broadly speaking, Atlanticism can be defined as the ‘common heritage and a shared destiny’ of all the states bordering the North Atlantic. In a more limited sense, however, it can be seen as a collective term for the identities of European NATO members who wish to ensure US involvement in Europe and safeguard NATO’s position as the cornerstone of European security and defense policy.”<sup>lix</sup> As it could be seen, the meaning of the concept of Atlanticism seems to change from situation to situation. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper from 1962 states: “It is sometimes used to refer to an extension of the NATO concept, adding economic, cultural and, perhaps, political dimensions to the existing partnership. At other times, it refers to long-range aspirations, as yet not officially expressed, to create a closer economic and political community, perhaps with constitutional implications, among the nations bordering the Atlantic. The phrase is also used in connection with efforts to strengthen the relations between the western allies by short-term programmes, particularly in the educational and cultural fields.”

Looking back at time and how the relations with the US and European countries during the Cold War turned out, it is possible to state that the birth of the concept of Atlanticism was indeed, not a surprise. Not only was this concept a key for reshaping

Europe, it was a means of bringing idealistic American power to the continent which would certainly benefit the USA.<sup>lx</sup>

### **i) Key Atlanticist Member State**

- **Denmark**

Denmark is one of the Member States that is against further integration within the CFSP.<sup>lxi</sup> However, with the recent events concerning Ukraine and Russia, Denmark faces the big question of whether to join the CSDP or not. Current Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen states “Historic times call for historic decisions”<sup>lxii</sup> after all of the times that they have been against CSDP and its missions. Joining the CSDP would mean that Denmark has to join the operations conducted by the CSDP, which would be a massive change of position for Denmark. A referendum is going to be held on 1st of June whether to participate in the CSDP or not.<sup>lxiii</sup>

### **ii) Geographical Dimension of Atlanticism**

Taking into consideration the root of the word “Atlanticism”, it is no surprise that the concept has geographical dimensions. Even though the concept began to evoke policies that may be referred to as “anti-Russian” and/or “pro-American” and “pro-NATO” as time passed by; the concept of “Atlanticism” was mainly considering geopolitics and security policy during the Cold War era. Although not a Member State, the position of **Norway** in this sense may be scrutinized as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). The main reason why Norway followed an Atlanticist view and established close relations with the USA back at the time was mainly because of its geopolitical position; having borders to both the Atlantic Ocean and the Soviet Union.<sup>lxiv</sup> Former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland stated “Norway is a country with her back to Europe and facing the Atlantic”, summarizing the viewpoint of Norway and why they acted with an Atlanticist view.<sup>lxv</sup> To scrutinize a Member State’s actions with regards to Atlanticism is also important regarding this issue. Denmark, in this case, also possesses a geopolitical location like the UK and Norway. The easy access it presents with no natural barriers is the main reason why the country wanted to defend themselves against external aggressors.<sup>lxvi</sup> This feature and political view of the country eventually caused the membership to NATO and also close relations with the USA.<sup>lxvii</sup>

### **iii) Historical Dimension of Atlanticism**

As for the historical dimension of the issue, it could once again be remembered as the famous saying of former Secretary General of NATO Hastings Ismay “To keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down,” since the establishment of NATO was directly associated with security and security concerns.<sup>lxviii</sup> What the USA promised its European allies was “territorial integrity, political independence and security”, which was also a wartime strategy of the USA as this “guarantor role” of theirs resulted in cooperation with allies and became a part of NATO’s defense strategy.<sup>lxix</sup> Through this act of the USA, the country was connected with its individual European allies through many fields such as but not limited to the “cooperation on procurement, military education exchange programmes and military and foreign policy matters”, according to political scientist Bernhard Stahl.<sup>lxx</sup> Bearing in mind that Brexit has occurred within the year 2020, it is concluded that the relations of the UK and the USA shall also be scrutinized regarding the historical dimension of Atlanticism since it had a great impact on both countries. Winston Churchill started what he had called a “special relationship” between Britain and the USA as the British started to lose its major world power while the USA and the Soviet Union gained a considerable amount of strength within the year 1946.<sup>lxxi</sup> This act of Churchill would result in a “pivotal position of the United States in British politics”, as Stahl puts it, for half a century, and the bond between these two countries would evolve into a stronger bond thanks to the similarities in culture and political systems alongside with the historical bonds they had and result in an unbreakable platform for cooperation.<sup>lxxii</sup>

### **iv) The Debate Upon “The End of Atlanticism”**

At the beginning, as the concept of Atlanticism paved the way for the USA to be the “guardian” and “protector” of Europe, it was reasonable for the Member States to follow this ideology.<sup>lxxiii</sup> The concept served both sides as well; since the USA also used Europe as a confrontation with the Soviet Union as their “locus” and “focus”.<sup>lxxiv</sup> Later on, the relations between Europe and the USA never seized the chance to achieve tranquility. George H.W. Bush was the cause of anger within Europe because of the war in the Gulf, but then later on Clinton showed commitment to NATO with

Bosnian airstrikes, and then George W. Bush came and invaded Iraq which nearly tore the alliance apart.<sup>lxxv</sup> Although Barack Obama managed to bring the positive view regarding the concept of Atlanticism back when he stated “Look at Berlin, the determination of a people met the generosity of the Marshall plan and created a German miracle; where a victory over tyranny gave rise to NATO, the greatest alliance ever formed to defend our common security,” even though his policy was not particularly an Atlanticist one,<sup>lxxvi</sup> The arrival and actions of Trump resulted in the rising of questions whether the end of Atlanticism was near or not, once again. Him withdrawing from the landmark nuclear deal with Iran<sup>lxxvii</sup> and such “aggressive” and “dangerous” acts of his could be given as an example of why such questions arose. It is therefore possible for us to say that Biden and his acts carry a crucial power either to further damage Atlanticism or help regain its fame.

Even though there are still countries that follow the concept of Atlanticism such as Denmark, the shifting of interests is a fact that cannot be glossed over. This shift is described as “Sometimes even the best of marriages end in divorce,” in one of the papers of The Brookings Institution.<sup>lxxviii</sup> The Marshall Plan could be given as an example of why Atlanticism was seen to be reasonable for both of the parties – the Europeans and the USA – and could also explain the historical and political shift of interest. The Marshall Plan was seen as the “cornerstone of Atlanticism”.<sup>lxxix</sup> Via this plan and the propaganda, videos, posters, institutions, etc. helped spread the greatness of liberal-markets over state-controlled markets; the USA claimed “American value of hard work” over “the Soviet threat”.<sup>lxxx</sup> In return, Europe got the chance to get the guarantee of money, protection and peace; the values they valued the most back at the time.<sup>lxxxi</sup> Now, however, with the concept of “Europeanism” gaining strength and the shifting of interests, it is quite natural for the question of “Is the concept of Atlanticism coming to an end?” to come up from time to time.

### **b) Europeanism**

Former French Government Official Régis Debray, in an attempt to praise European autonomy, states; “NATO is useless because it is anachronistic. At a time when every major nation is playing its own hand... When religious pride or cultural identities are being asserted or reinforced, signing up to NATO is not building for the future. What

matters now is ad hoc coalitions, bilateral cooperation and practical arrangements, not a simplistically dualistic worldview. NATO is a survivor from a by-gone age”.<sup>lxxxii</sup> This statement of Debray is quite a good example to show what the standpoint of the Europeanists is.

The concept of Europeanism is a concept that claims universality within the European context, meaning, European values that form a very crucial part of the EU are made sure to be used within political relations between governments, political parties regardless of what side they are representing, NGOs and EU institutions.<sup>lxxxiii</sup> Not only does this concept result in universality within the European context, it also enables the equalizing of the EU and Europe in one.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> What this means is that whatever the EU does, those actions of the EU become “European” as if it represents the whole continent.<sup>lxxxv</sup> It is also underlined that Europe (and therefore the EU), has the privilege to be the “highest, most advanced and fairest level of socio-economic cooperation in the international system”,<sup>lxxxvi</sup> according to the Associate Professor for the Department of Government and International Studies in Hong Kong Baptist University Krzysztof Sliwinski, within this concept of Europeanism.

Such a broad context also has broad consequences if European integration cannot be achieved. For Europeanist Member States, the concept of Europeanism is considered to be a concept that can only go forward and strengthen as time passes by.<sup>lxxxvii</sup> According to them, if this constant strengthening of European integration stops, the EU is obligated to fall apart.<sup>lxxxviii</sup>

## **i) Key Europeanist Member States**

### **• Belgium**

Belgium has always been a strong supporter of the formation of the EU. Former Prime Minister Guy Maurice Marie Louise Verhofstadt states in his speech in Humboldt University, Berlin, 2003 “...In fact, we should go further, by introducing qualified majority voting for fiscal and social matters, and for the common foreign and security policy. This brings me to the second point of the discussion: foreign policy. The creation of the position of European Minister of Foreign Affairs is good, but it is not enough. If, in the long run, we want to have a genuine foreign policy, then we must also create the possibility of enhanced -cooperation and structured

cooperation on defense,”<sup>lxxxix</sup> He even advocated the need for a “European Federation” for the sake of European integration when he stated “...we need to reform Europe to make it a real federation; capable to act not only in the economic field but also by establishing a European investigation, capacity by establishing a real European border and coast guard to protect our external borders...” within his speech he made about his book “Europe's Last Chance: Why the European States Must Form a More Perfect Union” to the Carnegie Council.<sup>xc</sup>

- **France**

Current French President Emmanuel Macron is one of the key figures regarding European integration. He had called the European voters to reject nationalism and Eurosceptic parties to support a stronger EU within the European parliamentary elections in the year 2019.<sup>xc<sup>i</sup></sup> The reason why he urged the EU citizens to perform such an act was to protect and strengthen Europe.<sup>xc<sup>ii</sup></sup>

## **ii) Historical Dimension of Europeanism**

Although currently the concept of Europeanism is seen as a means of praising European power and integration, the historical development of Europeanism as an ideology dates back to the twentieth century.<sup>xc<sup>iii</sup></sup> The background of this ideology dates back to the First and Second World Wars’ consequences of struggle between nationalism and internationalism.<sup>xc<sup>iv</sup></sup> This struggle also included European diplomacy, trade, art, and every other aspect of European life economics and politics.<sup>xc<sup>v</sup></sup> The concept of Europeanism as an ideology, therefore faced different phases throughout time. Within the first phase, proposals for European unification were constantly being proposed by European thinkers, conservatives and socialists, and even fascist and communists.<sup>xc<sup>vi</sup></sup> The second phase was formed by Christian and Social Democrats, dominating Europeanist organizations.<sup>xc<sup>vii</sup></sup> This phase was the reason for the establishment of the first European tier of institutions because of the flurry of treaties between national governments.<sup>xc<sup>viii</sup></sup> Lastly, the final phase occurred because of the “steady eclipsing of the old movements as Europeanist ideological leaders by a rapidly growing cast list of national governments and European institutions, increasingly tinged by liberal commitments”<sup>xc<sup>ix</sup></sup> as stated by social and political theorist Marius S. Ostrowski. He also states that the aforementioned phases endowed

Europeanism with new conceptual interpretations and applications that helped shape the evolution of the Europeanist ideological family right up to the present day.”<sup>c</sup>

### **c) Atlanticist AND Europeanist Member States**

For some Member States, it is hard to identify them as either Atlanticist or Europeanist because such strict and unbreakable naming would result in the condoning of certain characteristics and actions of those countries. Therefore, the adding of this section into this study guide was seen to be necessary.

- **Austria**

It is possible to state that Austria has engaged with all the steps needed to be taken for a European integration.<sup>ci</sup> Austria especially considers the problems within the social dimension of the integration such as but not limited to youth unemployment and illegal migration.<sup>cii</sup> However, having signed the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)<sup>ciii</sup> which are quite the opposite of European integration regarding the field of economics, they are considered to engage in Atlanticism as well. Still, Austria rightfully sees themselves as “Europe’s core” because of their efforts towards a European integration and because of the increasing approval rates they have regarding EU membership.<sup>civ</sup>

- **Germany**

Within the field of security, Germany chooses to cooperate both with France and the USA as its “preferred partners”<sup>cv</sup> and for “preferred security cooperation” regarding institutions, they also are seen to be teaming up with both NATO and the EU, alongside with Western European Union (WEU).<sup>cvi</sup> However, although showing both Atlanticist and Europeanist characteristics, lately, the “*Trotz alledem: Amerika*” (*Despite it all: America*)<sup>cvi</sup> *The policy of Germany seems to be fading away and forming a rather European stance regarding security issues.*<sup>cvi</sup>

#### **d) The Split Between Atlanticists and Europeanists: Explained**

After scrutinizing both of the concepts, a summary of why the supporters of these concepts are against each other could be given as: the search of the Europeanists for balancing the US global influence and an alternative for NATO via promoting an independent, European security and defense system; simply irritates those nations who support Atlanticism and who are committed to the USA's presence in security and defense projects because they fear that an independent security and defense system like the CSDP would undermine NATO.<sup>cix</sup>

### **III. Defense within the European Union Concerning the CSDP**

#### **A) Defense Industry**

The defense industry holds particular importance within the EU since it is an industry that affects the fields of economy, technology and strategy of the EU. Economic wise, the defense industry is known to bring €119 billion a year and more than 462,000 highly skilled jobs to the Union.<sup>cx</sup> As the economy generates competitiveness within the field of technology, it also results in the development within areas such as but not limited to aviation, space technology and electronics.<sup>cx</sup> In order for the EU to fulfill its strategic autonomy, it needs to have credible defense potentialities and an industrial base that is capable of developing technology; therefore, an “innovative and competitive European Defense Industry” is a must-have for the EU in order for them to reach their ideal potential of “Europe that protects”.<sup>cxii</sup>

#### **B) Defense Structure of the EU**

An organization of defense and defense policies is crucial for the EU and for the Member States to be able to follow projects that mirror their interests.

##### **a) European Defense Agency (EDA)**

The EDA itself states that they are a resemblance of a European “hub” that allows Ministries of Defense to cooperate with expertise and networks while engaging in projects of interest (the Member States are given the right to choose which project to participate in depending on their needs), which result in a defense cooperation within Member States without force.<sup>cxiii</sup> With the Global Strategy adopted in the year 2016, the EU aims to raise the ambition level on security and defense issues within the EU and in order to fulfill this purpose, they have established new “cooperation tools” named Capability Development Plan, Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, Permanent Structured Cooperation, and last but not least, European Defense Fund; all of which EDA plays a central role in since it ensures coherence amongst these “tools”.<sup>cxiv</sup>

### **b) Capability Development Plan (CDP)**

The CDP may be referred to as a key reference for capability development since it is devoted to increasing coherence between the Member States considering the issue of defense planning via providing “a full capability picture” that backs up decision-making processes both on a national and EU level with regards to military development.<sup>cxv</sup> The main purpose of the CDP is to address the challenges the EU is facing regarding the fields of security and defense with a perspective of –as its name suggests- European capability development, and determine the future of the operational environment and define the priorities of capability development agreed by the Member States.<sup>cxvi</sup>

EDA also plays a key role on future possibilities by using the capability trends that foresee the year 2035 and beyond, requirements for each capability, and perspectives on future capability environments; and the information gained from those inputs are introduced to and discussed with the Member States to become in an agreed form of “EU Capability Development Priorities”.<sup>cxvii</sup>

The “EU Capability Development Priorities” taken in the year 2018 recommended that the EU Member States prioritizes “enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operation”, “space-based information and communication services”, “information superiority”, “ground combat capabilities”, “enhanced logistics and medical

supporting capabilities”, “naval maneuverability”, “underwater control contributing to resilience at sea”, “air superiority”, “air mobility”, “integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector” and “cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level of ambition”.<sup>cxviii</sup>

### **c) Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)**

The idea of launching such a cooperation was taken on 22nd of June, 2017 and the decision to launch PESCO was made within 11<sup>th</sup> of October, 2017.<sup>cxix</sup> Formed of a secretariat that consists of EEAS, EU Military Staff and EDA members<sup>cxx</sup>; PESCO currently has 60 projects that are being operated within the areas of “training”, “capability development”, and “operational readiness in the field of defense”.<sup>cxxi</sup> PESCO hopes that this way, an enhanced cooperation will occur between the Member States that will eventually result in a decrease within the number of a variety of weapons’ systems in Europe and therefore allow the strengthening of operational cooperation between Member States, increasing interoperability and industrial competitiveness.<sup>cxxii</sup> Other than strengthening operational cooperation in addition to increasing interoperability and industrial competitiveness; PESCO also aims to reinforce the strategic autonomy of the EU in order for the EU to act individually or with partners when in need.

Although with PESCO, the EU managed to develop their defense system; the EU has also led to the raising of questions about the relationship they had with NATO; because before all these developments, the principle of the EU was to “better tackle the threats in cooperation with, and to the benefit of, NATO”,<sup>cxxiii</sup> and with the changes regarding the field of defense, it is quite possible to state that these principles are yet to face changes.

According to Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union, “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework...”<sup>cxxiv</sup>

### **d) European Defense Fund (EDF)**

Unlike the other “cooperation tools”, the EDF was formed under the European Commission in hopes to support research and development in addition to ensure a competitive industrial base for the sake of collaborative defense.<sup>cxxv</sup> With a budget of nearly €8 billion for the years 2021-2027; what the EDF tries to achieve is to ensure cooperation between research actors and companies in the fields of “state-of-the-art and interoperable defense technology and equipment”<sup>cxxvi</sup>. The EDF is guided by the EDA and the EU Military Staff with regards to its priorities over the projects coming from the CSDP and CDP, and when necessary, from NATO.<sup>cxxvii</sup>

### **C) Strategic Autonomy**

The “strategic autonomy of the EU” and “European Sovereignty” are two concepts that faced (and still are facing) many debates since the year 2010, the year the EU realized that they are open to external threats and shocks they cannot escape. It was the year when French President Emmanuel Macron called for a “European Sovereignty” and German former-Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the EU can no longer rely on the USA.<sup>cxxviii</sup> Donald Trump withdrawing from the landmark nuclear deal with Iran –which the EU had invested a considerable amount of political capital on- and the tension between the US and China in fields of politics and economy were other stimuli for the EU to realize the importance of these concepts of “strategic autonomy” and “European Sovereignty”.<sup>cxxix</sup> Both of these concepts lead the way to the understanding of an independent EU in fields such as but not limited to trade, defense, policies regarding digital world and industry, economics, health, etc.<sup>cxxx</sup> and therefore are also considered to have the power to strengthen the EU in those fields. Taking into consideration the situation of today’s world, we might as well have the right to state that those concepts have earned an even more important position for the EU. Joseph Borrell states that the concept of “strategic autonomy” is salient more than ever now because the world has changed into a place where it is “difficult to claim to be a ‘political union’ able to act as a ‘global player’ and as a ‘geopolitical Commission’ without being ‘autonomous’,”<sup>cxxxii</sup>. Borrell also states the importance of the COVID19 pandemic within this situation and states; “The Covid-19 crisis has revealed the fundamentally asymmetrical nature of interdependence, and the

vulnerability of Europe. Science, technology, trade, data, investments are becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics".<sup>cxxxii</sup>

#### **IV. The Planning and Conduct Procedures of CSDP**

The CSDP has led 37 military operations and civilian missions since 2003. As of today, there are 18 current operations and missions ongoing within the framework of CSDP, 11 of them civilian missions, and 7 of them are military operations. Around 4.000 civilian and military personnel deployed to those missions and operations in three continents for making operational regions safer and stable.<sup>cxxxiii</sup>

The planning and conduct procedures can be examined under four headlines:

**Decision making:** All the decisions that are related to launching missions and operations shall be approved by each member state through the Council Decision.<sup>cxxxiv</sup>

**Force Generation:** The member states provide personnel and assets for both the military and civilian missions and operations.

**Command and Control Structures:** The Political and Security Committee conducts the EU crisis management operations by exercising political control and strategic direction. The PSC gives direction to both civilian and military missions and operations. The progress of those missions and operations are supervised by the Council and the High Representative. All of the missions and operations are attached to a single chain of command for better implementation.<sup>cxxxv</sup>

- The military operations with an executive mandate are generally based in a headquarter of a member state. EUNAVFOR MED IRINI conducted in the Mediterranean is such an operation.

- Some EU operations are executed with the cooperation of NATO under the agreement of Berlin Plus. The operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of such a cooperation
- Under the CSDP, the EU conducts military training missions in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Mozambique. Those training missions are operated from the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) located in Brussels.
- Under the provisions of EEAS, each of the civilian missions and operations are led by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

**Financing Mechanism:** Civilian missions and military operations are separated in terms of financing. While civilian missions are funded under CFSP, “military operations are covered by Member states through the European Peace Facility”<sup>cxxxvi</sup>




Figure: European Union CSDP Missions and Operations<sup>cxxxvii</sup>

## V. Some of the CSDP Past Military Operations

### a. Concordia

The European Union launched its first military mission **Concordia** on 31 March 2003 in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Except Denmark and Ireland, all of the member states gathered 357 troops in total, and approximately 180 additional troops from other 14 participating nations. The Union succeeded in maintaining peace between lightly armed irregulars and the Macedonian army. This was a symbolic operation in terms of politics, but a straightforward military operation.<sup>cxviii</sup> The significance of the operation was that it was the first practical implementation of **Berlin Plus** procedures: Previously, NATO and the EU worked in close cooperation in FYROM, with Javier Solana (European Union's former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy), and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. They jointly counteracted the tension between Albanian rebels and the Macedonian authorities by using the Stabilization and Association Agreement, and NATO forces.<sup>cxix</sup> After the first phase of the operation, NATO kept overseeing the disarmament of the irregulars, and the PSC exercised political control of the mission. NATO followed the mission from behind, yet Concordia was carried on at the SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO Central Planning HQ)).<sup>cxl</sup>

### b. Artemis

After the first military mission with the cooperation of NATO conducted in FYROM, the EU launched its first autonomous mission Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. This operation features being the first operation outside Europe, and first EU operation featuring the UN Charter Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). The EU aimed to secure the Bunia region from the aggression continued since 1998 between Ugandan and Congolese armed forces backed by local tribal militias. The UN forces were inefficient to stop the conflict that over 50.000 people have been massacred in the area since 1999, hence calling upon international cooperation. The EU operation was driven by France in lead which supplied 1,785 of the 2,200 troops, and the UK in

Africa. The outcome of the operation was not limited to securing the area but also improving the humanitarian situation in Bunia, sustaining stability of the airports and refugee camps, and protecting the people in the area including the UN staff.<sup>cxli</sup> Even though the NATO procedures were implemented, there was no NATO cooperation in this operation.

### c. EUFOR Althea



As being the third operation the EU conducted, the operation Althea was initiated in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 December 2004. The EU forces launched the operation Althea with the UN's adoption of the UN Security Council of resolution 1575 authorizing the EU to conduct the operation right after the NATO's conclusion of its SFOR operation in the region.<sup>cxlii</sup> Within the scope of operation Althea, the EU deployed 7,000 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the continuation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), and to sustain a peaceful, and secure environment. The operation was carried out with the principles of Berlin Plus meaning that the EU benefited from the NATO assets and capabilities.<sup>cxliii</sup> Operation Althea has been reconstructed four times, last in 2012 due to the security application in the region; yet it is still under close observation within the framework of the UN Security Council Resolution 2183 (2014). Althea keeps the presence in the country via Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT), and supports the local authorities based on the Dayton Agreement by executing activities such as; "countermines activities, military and civilian movement control of weapons, ammunition and explosive substances, as well as the management of weapons and ammunition storage sites."<sup>cxliv</sup> Also, the units located in Butmir are composed of the troops of Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. It should be noted that the operation is controlled by the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) in terms of political control and strategic direction, within the roof of the European Council.

#### **d. EUFOR RD Congo**



EUFOR RD Congo is the operation that was held in June 2006 by the request of the UN for the support of their operation MONUC during the presidential elections. The operation was conducted with the full cooperation of the Congolese government, and has the feature of being an autonomous EU mission under ESDP that was located in the German Permanent Joint HQ. The allocated number of troops was 2,400, which was commanded by German Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck. 21 EU member states and Turkey and Switzerland sent one third of the troops and the rest was gathered by France and Germany.<sup>cxlv</sup> The main implementation of the operation was to contribute to MONUC to stabilize the country while securing the civilians and protecting the Kinshasa airport. Furthermore, the troops remained alerted for any rescue missions.

#### **e. EUFOR Tchad/RCA**




The EU operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic was held on 28 January 2008 until 15 March 2009 under the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1778.<sup>cxlvi</sup> The operation was conducted within CSDP by the agreement reached between the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic. The EU operated within the cooperation of the UN, and this mission was the most multinational operation conducted in Africa until then.<sup>cxlvii</sup> The main purpose of the mission was to secure the civilians, especially the refugees from the neighboring region Darfur, as well as the operation forces of the UN. The initial date that was planned for deployment was noVERMBER 2007, however, the EU had trouble in sending the promised amount of troops on time as it also supported NATO's operation in Afghanistan.<sup>cxlviii</sup>

“The countries who contributed to the operation with the specified number of troops were; France (2,000), Ireland (450), Poland (400), Austria (210), Sweden (200), Romania (120), Belgium (120), Spain (80), Netherlands (60), Finland (40), and Slovenia (15).”<sup>cxlix</sup> The Operation was carried out at the French permanent headquarters by Irish Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash with the contributions of

officers from 22 EU member states.<sup>cl</sup> Other than the military assistance the EUFOR contributed to the development of the security by rebuilding the return zones for displaced people.<sup>cli</sup> Furthermore, the European Commission funded approximately 30 million EUR to Chad for the wellbeing of the people by practicing activities like purification of water, securing the food, providing healthcare, placing emergency shelters, providing education, and so on.

*Figure: EUFOR TChad/RCA<sup>clii</sup>*



#### **f. EUNAVFOR Atalanta**

The first naval mission conducted under the roof of CSDP was EUNAVFOR Atalanta. EU Naval Force Somalia was launched in 2008, in the Gulf of Aden in order to support the Federal Government of Somalia for the effort of sustaining peace and stability; and improving maritime security in the region.<sup>cliii</sup> Due to the unstabilized conditions in Somalia, the incidents of piracy have increased rapidly, and threatened both the local fishery industries and European fishing vessels.<sup>cliv</sup> In 2011, there had been 176 pirate attacks capturing 146 million dollars in ransom payment.<sup>clv</sup> Since the operation was deployed, the EU Naval Force has been securing the World Food Programme's (WFP) vessels carrying aid to displaced persons in Somalia, deterring piracy, and protecting shipping off to Somalia. The EU declares that the operation's success rate is 100%, since none of the 160 WFP vessels have been attacked since the EU deployed its navy in the region, and almost 3 million tonnes of food and aid have been delivered to Somalia.<sup>clvi</sup>

## **VI. Ongoing Situations**

### **a. Afghanistan**

#### **i. The Background of the Crisis**

The situation in Afghanistan may be examined in three phases; respectively, the consequences developed aftermaths of the September 11 attacks, the U.S. strategies on overthrowing Taliban existence in the region, and rebuilding the institutions (2002-2008) , lastly the current Taliban governance in Afghanistan.

The invasion of the U.S. to Afghanistan begun by the refusal of Taliban governance to surrender the terrorist leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden for the charges of implementing the attacks of September 9, 2001. At first, with the existence of the U.S. on Afghanistan soil, the Taliban had to retreat to the southern part of Afghanistan, and to the borderline of Pakistan. However, the group did not collapse, in fact, the forces started to be regrouped and initiated insurgency towards the U.S. and its ally forces. Until 2009 the Taliban succeeded to gain popular support by providing certain services to the people, but also by intimidating them. Seeing the activities of the Taliban, the Obama administration decided upon providing a significant amount of funds, and deploying 100.000 military personnel to the region. Yet, both the Obama administration and Trump administration afterwards, observed that increasing the tension by deploying troops would not end the crisis, in fact , the solution to end the conflict could not be handled by clashing the forces. Therefore, both of the presidents demanded to sit on a negotiation table with the Taliban on their terms. Back in 2010, the Obama administration tried to maintain dialogues with the Taliban with an agreement including establishing an office for Taliban to remain in Qatar, but neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban agreed upon a solution. By 2015, the Afghan forces started taking responsibility for securing the nation, but was still dependent on the air power, and logistical support of the U.S. After the Trump administration was formed, the Taliban published an open letter addressing Donald Trump, demanding the withdrawal of the U.S., and its allies' forces. With the realization of a non-ending crisis, Trump called upon the Taliban to negotiate without inviting the Afghan government. The negotiations finally concluded in 2020 with the agreement including

the withdrawal of the U.S. and allied forces by May 2021, and ‘‘the Taliban’s or other parties related to Taliban (including al-Qaeda) not using the Afghan soil to threaten neither the U.S. nor its allies.’’<sup>clvii</sup> However, after a time the U.S. affirmed that the Taliban was not fulfilling the agreement especially concerning Al-Qaeda, but still none of the U.S. military personnel was recorded as dead or wounded. Therefore, the negotiation remained still. The U.S. has been withdrawing its military forces since February 2020; and when the Biden administration was formed, the full withdrawal date was set on August 31, 2021.

## **ii. The Relations with the EU**

The European Union has a long time relation with the people in Afghanistan to support them with various ways of assistance since 2002. Since then, the EU provided aid to Afghan people worth €4 billion in order to sustain peace, security, and prosperity; that makes Afghanistan the biggest beneficiary of the EU support.<sup>clviii</sup>

The EU strategic objective of implementing policies in this region is defined in three sectors; namely, ‘‘Peace, stability and democracy’’, ‘‘Sustainable growth and jobs’’, and ‘‘Basic social services’’. Those priorities were planned to be met with the cooperation of Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) that was the government’s five-year strategic development plan (2017-2021).<sup>clix</sup>

- Peace, stability and democracy: The European Union supported the formation of a peaceful and inclusive Afghan society by increasing the application of secure, just, accountable, and democratic governance. The increase in the security situation was implemented through strengthening the enforcement of law and order, and police force. Lastly, enhancing the institutions, and legitimacy of the governance was critical for improving service delivery, and public financial management.
- Sustainable growth and jobs: The EU put a great emphasis on encouraging, and contributing to the small and medium enterprises to promote economic growth.
- Basic social services: The EU supported the closer relationship among the citizens and the state considering the delivery of quality social services, such as; health, nutrition of the Afghan people. Also urged the government

programmes that are basically ensuring that every corner of the country access to basic needs, like, water, electricity, roads, health, and education.<sup>clx</sup>

Also the areas that the EU had an impact on are; health, agriculture, rule of law and police, public finance management, reintegration of migrants, climate change mitigation and adaptation.<sup>clxi</sup>

### **iii. Current political crisis**

Before the settled date that the Biden administration decided to withdraw every single personnel from Afghanistan, the Taliban entered Kabul with a rapid military advance that shocked every side present in Afghanistan. With this update, the U.S. supervised the evacuation of 120.000 people from Kabul's airport including the both U.S and international diplomatic personnel and other partners from Afghanistan.<sup>clxii</sup> Since the Taliban took over the governance, the protests against Taliban have been suppressed, and since February 2022, there are no longer armed oppositions remaining in Afghanistan. There are still opposition groups seeking the support of the U.S., and others who seek to leave the country, but are being scrutinized.<sup>clxiii</sup> Furthermore, Afghanistan encounters some humanitarian and economic crisis due to some reasons including Covid-19 Pandemic, the harmed economic base, the U.S. 's holding on Afghanistan's central banks assets, cut in international assistance, and U.S. sanctions towards the Taliban.<sup>clxiv</sup>

### **iv. The Humanitarian Situation**

As the United Nations reported that the return of the Taliban is the worst scenario that could happen to Afghanistan in the manners of humanitarian and economic crisis. According to the World Food Programme, the proportion of people who cannot reach sufficient food had increased from 80% (December 2021) to 98% with the takeover of

the Taliban.<sup>clxv</sup> Also UNICEF warned that more than 1 million children are on the verge of dying due to malnutrition.

Regarding the conditions women face, it can be seen that the Taliban governance changed their attitude with this take over compared to their rule in 2001. According to the Taliban officials, they pursue the promise of protecting women's rights under the rules of sharia. Nevertheless, the observers note that with the Taliban rule, the violence against women gained impulsion especially towards the women living in rural areas. The Taliban has closed the Ministry of Women's Affairs which causes fear on the idea that the women's rights may even get worse, such as women not being allowed to travel long distances without any guardian.<sup>clxvi</sup> Another fear is that the Taliban de facto banned the girls' education in some provinces claiming that they seek to create a safe environment for the girls which brings the idea that they may not allow the education to girls.

Another important issue is that the ethnic and religious minorities are subjected to unlawful killings and displacement. The Hazaras who are the Shia Muslims comprise the 10-15% of the Afghan population. In September 740 Hazara families were forced to evacuate their homes in the province Daykundi.<sup>clxvii</sup>

## **b. Libya**

### **i. Background**

Libya, before and after Gaddafi, has been under critical conditions in a negative manner. Through the 42 years of the presence of Gaddafi, the people were ruled under dictatorship. After the death of Gaddafi along with the uprising, the parties that overthrew him fell into each other. The country has been facing two rival administrations claiming that they are the ruler of the country.

After dethroning King Idris within the Free Officers Movement in 1969, Gaddafi ruled Libya by taking his own initiatives, claiming that people of Libya were equal for

42 years.<sup>clxviii</sup> He allocated the oil resources of the country to provide infrastructure, investment, goods and services as he deemed necessary. Throughout his administration the Libyan people were promised that the power was vested in their hands. With these words, the expectations were on equality, elimination of all kinds of exploitation, and equal distribution of national wealth.<sup>clxix</sup> Instead they faced a system that Gaddafi used to his advantage. The country's institutions were underdeveloped, and the so-called democracy was in practice only on a local level. The political parties were banned in 1972, Gaddafi never paved the way for carrying the realm of 'rule by the people' to a national level.<sup>clxx</sup> Gaddafi's inconsistent foreign policy made him isolated from other Arab leaders in the region. On the other hand, his internal policies were seen as arbitrary and oppressive; even though he shared the economic wealth of Libya with the people to meet their basic needs. However, his regime increasingly became corrupted, since he used most of the wealth for his own advantage. But the unforgettable event that was the start of the end of Gaddafi's regime was the 1996 massacre at Abu Salim Prison.<sup>clxxi</sup> 1270 prisoners including some political activists were slaughtered and their bodies were cleared away so as not to leave a trace.<sup>clxxii</sup>


After the 'Arab Spring', with the civilian movements the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown; Libya as a neighboring country got affected from the close events in the region as well.<sup>clxxiii</sup> On February 17, 2011, Libya experienced the beginning of another insurrection that spreaded to Tripoli by February 20.<sup>clxxiv</sup> The conflict escalated really fast between the opponents and Gaddafi administration. The same year in March, the UN, with the Security Council Resolution 1973, declared the Libyan airspace a no-fly zone due to the Libyan Air Force's striking civilians.<sup>clxxv</sup> The same month the U.S., French, and British forces struck Libya. Later on, NATO took over the operation in order to ensure the protection of the civilians. After 8 months of the beginning of the revolt, Gaddafi was killed in his hometown Sirte. The National Transitional Council was recognized as Libya's legitimate representative by 100 countries which was established as a de facto government for the transition period of the Libyan War.<sup>clxxvi</sup> Within the chaos that emerged after the death of Gaddafi, new armed groups came out, also Islamism became a new political force. The Libyan people voted for a secular government at the first elections, but the transition process

was on the limb by clashes between secular parties, Islamist groups, independents, and armed groups.<sup>clxxvii</sup>

In May 2014, Haftar who was the former Chief of Staff working for Gaddafi until became his opponent, launched an operation against the radical Salafist militias in Benghazi called "Operation Dignity" which was supported in eastern Libya.<sup>clxxviii</sup>

Meanwhile, the security situation in the country got out of hand, the UN personnel left Libya, embassies were shutted down. In 2014, the conflict escalated between the Tobruk-based (Haftar) administration in the east of Libya and the Tripoli-based administration in the west. This division in Libya further strengthened the armed groups, as of 2014, there were 1600 armed groups operating in Libya, one of them was ISIS.<sup>clxxix</sup>

In April 2019, when the Libyan National Army led by Haftar entered Tripoli, the Government of National Unity (GNA), which is recognized as the legitimate government by the UN, resisted by all its strength. Hundreds of civilians died during the conflict and more than 140,000 people were displaced.<sup>clxxx</sup>



The Economist

## **ii. Current Situation**

It is important to mention that the Libyan people have two rival governments that both claim that they are the legitimate administration of the country. The rivalry has been taking place since the civil war began. In 2015, with the United Nations' initiative, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was formed with the Libyan Political Agreement mentioning that GNA would be an interim but the legitimate government of Libya.<sup>clxxxii</sup> The Prime Minister of GNA, Fayeze al-Sarraj arrived in Tripoli in March 2016 with his cabinet. However the two rival parliaments of Libya, the Libyan House of Representatives and the General Congress engaged in division regarding the legitimacy of the GNA, even though the UN recognized the GNA as the main administrator of Libya until 2020, the Libyan House of Representatives demanded new elections.<sup>clxxxiii</sup> As of 2016, the GNA failed to provide unity among rival voices, and expired its term of office in 2020 within the provisions of the Libyan Political Agreement that was endorsed by the UNSC at the beginning.<sup>clxxxiv</sup> In 2021, with the efforts of the Libyan House of Representatives, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was established by approving Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh as the Prime Minister with the purpose of unifying the government with the rival government based in Tobruk.<sup>clxxxv</sup>

Today the division has not been exterminated, and the unity could not be fulfilled. That is not only because of the rival administrations in Libya, but because of the foreign forces interference in the politics of Libya. As of today, the Government of National Unity is supported by the United Nations, the European Union, Turkey, Qatar; and the Libyan National Army is recognized by the U.S., Russia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and France.

## **ii. Naval Operations**

Securing the international seas is an important mission for the European Union, especially if the mentioned areas are close to the EU borders. Considering that, the

European Union under the roof of CSDP initiated two important naval operations in the Southern Central Mediterranean applying the provisions of the United Nations Security Council. Especially the last two missions namely; EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia, and EUNAVFOR MED Irini have been conducted for migration problems and implementation of UN arm embargo on Libya respectively.

Operation Sofia was initiated in 2015, in order to identify the vessels on the Southern Central Mediterranean suspected of migrant smuggling or trafficking in order to prevent more loss of life in the sea.<sup>clxxxvi</sup> The same year as the EU ambassadors of the Political Committee agreed, the operation was enlarged to International Waters to identify and capture the vessels associated with human trafficking. Lastly in 2016, the Operation Sophia was extended until 2017, adding two more tasks to the operation, which are training the Libyan coast guards and navy; and implementing the UN embargoes on the Libyan coast. The operation headquarter was Italy, Rome with an approximate budget of 19 million euros.<sup>clxxxvii</sup> The operation strength was met by 25 contributing states, the task force consisting of 7 ships, 4 helicopters, and 3 air assets.<sup>clxxxviii</sup>

The next operation MED Irini that was launched in 2020 is a follow up operation to operation Sophia. The purpose of MED Irini is another CSDP-led crisis operation in the Mediterranean Sea aiming to contribute to the implementation of UN arms embargoes decided within the UNSC Resolution 2292 by using maritime, aerial and satellite means.<sup>clxxxix</sup> This mission was deployed on high seas off the Libyan coast and designed to monitor the vessels which are suspected to be carrying arms or related materials to or from Libya. The UNSC Resolution 2292, acting under UN charter chapter VII expresses the necessity and methodology of embargos as:

“ 1. *Condemns the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Libya in violation of the arms embargo, including to ISIL and other terrorist groups in Libya;*  
3. *Decides, with a view to addressing the threat posed by unsecured arms and ammunitions in Libya and their proliferation, to authorize, in these exceptional and specific circumstances for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, with appropriate consultations with the GNA, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo on Libya, to inspect, without undue delay, on the high seas off the coast of*

*Libya, vessels bound to or from Libya which they have reasonable grounds to believe are carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya...’’<sup>cxc</sup>*

The EU Naval operation, MED Irini has three other secondary tasks mainly;

- Supervises the illegal export of petroleum, crude oil and refined petroleum from Libya;
- Supports the training of the Coast guard and Navy of Libya;
- Assists on the detection of the business model that is used for human smuggling by gathering information, and patrolling.<sup>cxi</sup>

The headquarters of operation MED Irini is located in Rome, Italy, and will last until 31 March 2023 through the directions of the Political and Security Committee.<sup>cxcii</sup>

## **c. Ukraine**

### **i. Background**

Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation have deep cultural and historical ties, yet the dimension of those ties have been challenged due to different interests. Through the post-Union Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) period (after 1991), two of these sides had different ideas to draw their paths. The Ukrainian side implemented policies to create its independence, whereas, the Russian Federation was seeking out ways to control-rule the Soviet geography.<sup>cxciii</sup> The dilemma on the policies of those sides have been causing endless conflicts in geography which also affect international relations.

The most important reasons for the conflict are; first, Ukraine has strategic importance for Russia, since Ukraine shares borderline with both the European Union and Russian Federation. However, it is important to keep in mind that, once Ukraine was a part of the USSR, it has close social and cultural ties with Russia. Secondly, there is the territorial conflict between Russia and Ukraine specifically because of the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the ethnically Russian dominated Donbass region

(which comprises two parts Donetsk, and Luhansk). Eastern part of Ukraine has more people speaking Russian, and the majority of them are pro-Russian. Russia supports the eastern part where the people threaten (rebels, separatists) against Ukraine's national sovereignty. Ukraine cannot break the cultural ties with Russia, hence the Western liberal democracy giving the ideological support to Ukraine that opposes Russian culture.<sup>cxciiv</sup> During the times of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich (2010-2014) who was a favorable and pro-Russian candidate when elected. His policies such as signing an agreement with the Russian Federation giving the opportunity for the Russian fleet on Black Sea in return for a 30% price cut in natural gas; and amending the Constitution article 111 regarding President's removal made the public turn their back to Yanukovich. To get the favor of the people back, he associated with the EU association agreement which was supported by the vast majority of the Ukrainians, however, he withdrew his actions on the agreement after a while and caused the Euromaidan Movement. The Yanukovich administration worked on anti-government protests law in 2014, and at the same year he was fired from the office by the Parliament. During the movement Crimea and the Donbass region was under the rule of the Party of region, but due to the excessive force used on the public, the heat escalated in Crimea and Donbass. At that point Russia strategically invaded Crimea in 2014 claiming that people voted in favor of Russia at the referendum. At the end of 2014, three major events happened in Ukraine; Euromaidan came to an end, a new president Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) was elected, and the Crimea peninsula was lost to Russia. President Putin made a statement regarding the protection of the rights of people in Crimea and the Southeastern side of Ukraine causing the pro-Russian groups located in Ukraine (Donbass) to attach more to Russia. Eventually, the Donbass region turned into a battleground between the Ukrainian government and separatists groups who were backed by Russia. Towards the end of 2014, the Minsk Agreement was on the table in order to end the conflict in Donbass region with the participation of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Germany, and France. However, it failed the first time, and then in 2015, Minsk II was considered between the same parties, yet it failed again. The reason why both Minsk I, and Minsk II failed was due to the reason that both sides sought different results. The Ukrainian side wanted the ceasefire with the conditions of the withdrawal of the Russian heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian government control at the region, on the other hand, the Russian side wanted the autonomy of Donbass so they could militarily and politically influence the

region. During the time, Crimea was at the control of Russia, and Donbass was under the control of pro-Russian rebellion forces, and Ukraine's gaining its full stability meant that it would further associate with the EU, and Western liberal ideology.




Figure: Russian Annexation<sup>cxcv</sup>

In 2019, with the election of President Volodymyr Zelensky (2019-present), the Steinmeier Formula was agreed to be implemented. According to this formula, Ukraine has to grant self governing status to donbass, only after conducting local elections (would be recognized by OSCE)<sup>cxcvi</sup>. However this formula failed too due to the reason that President Zelensky brought the condition of full compliance on the ceasefire and full withdrawal of Russian weaponry. The Russian Federation's response was that they would accept everything in the condition that the election and autonomy of Donbass would be realized first. The dilemma here was that Ukraine could not accept the condition because the majority in the Donbass region was the Russian ethnic groups, and if the Ukrainian government would give special status to Donbass, then it could cause civil unrest likewise it happened in 2013 with Euromaidan. Due to the situation Ukraine faced, the international help from EU and NATO was sought out many times. However, neither the EU nor NATO could give membership to Ukraine, because the EU's giving membership meaning that the Ukrainian migration to the Europe, and in NATO side of the story, NATO would

have to deploy its military forces in Ukraine considering its Article 5- Collective defense (an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.)<sup>excvii</sup>.

## **ii. Cyber and Information Warfare**

The techniques of cyber and information warfare are highly used by the Russian Federation, and have been exemplifying different tactics in various countries.

A cybersecurity company called Palo Alto Networks found that the cyberespionage network, which it linked to Russia in 2017, has been active since 2013. However, another company revealed that another Russian-based cyber spy operation between 2013-2015 targeted the Ukrainian military and international security organizations.<sup>excviii</sup> The Ukrainian side attributed all these cyber espionage attempts to the Russian government. Although the degree of cyber-attacks mentioned continued in different areas, it did not cause great damage until 2015, but the severity of the situation changed when the attacks against the energy sector in 2015 caused a major power outage that would affect the entire population. In 2014, the BlackEnergy malware infected six different Ukrainian railway companies, and in August of the same year the computer systems of government agencies in the region. The attack, that can be assumed as having done the most damage, was carried out in 2017 through the virus called NotPetya (ransomware). It disabled 10% of computers in Ukraine, causing 0.5% of Ukraine's gross domestic product and over \$1 billion in financial losses worldwide.<sup>excix</sup> Eight months after the attack, not only Ukraine but also Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States blamed the Russian military intelligence service. DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, cyber hacks, use of malware in cyber attacks and information operations on Ukraine were carried out with the aim of cutting off communications, leaking government plans and documents, crashing public websites, and even trying to persuade Ukrainian military personnel to stand back via SMS. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of all this is that the timing of the attacks occurred during the Maidan protests, the Ukrainian Parliamentary elections, and the Russian forces' entry into Crimea.<sup>cc</sup> Throughout the process of the invasion, the Russian military disabled servers, seized cell phones, radio and TV towers, and rerouted internet exchange points through the Russian network node. In addition to all these physical destructions, the Russian army

used disinformation operations and electronic warfare tactics to determine the position of the Ukrainian soldier and to bombard the soldiers and their relatives with messages to demoralize and threaten them.<sup>cci</sup>

### **iii. Current Situation and Relations with the EU**

The EU highly condemns the Russian aggression in Ukraine, and Russia's recognition of the non-governmental led regions Donetsk and Luhansk.<sup>ccii</sup> The European Council and the Council of the European Union meet frequently and evaluate the situation in Ukraine from February 2022. Furthermore, the European Union is serious on taking action against the aggression, thus has been implementing sanctions on Russia. The EU has adopted five packages of sanctions which are to weaken the strength of Russia in an economic base;

First package (February 23, 2022):

- Individual sanctions on the ones who voted in favor for the recognition of the non-state actors in Donetsk, and Luhansk regions at the Russian State Duma,
- Economic restraints on non-state actors acting in Donbass region,
- Restrictions on Russia to limit its access to the EU's capital and financial markets.

Second package (February 25, 2022):

- Individual sanctions on Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, and some members of the State Duma,
- Economic sanctions to the areas that are including finance, energy, transport and technology sectors,
- Suspension of visa facilitation provisions<sup>cciii</sup>

Third package (February 28 and March 2, 2022)

- Restriction on all Russian aircraft to enter the EU airspace,
- Suspension on the exercises with the Russian Central Banks in terms of transactions,
- Bannings to some Russian Banks for limiting the actions on SWIFT,
- Preventing the euro-denominated banknotes to be accessible to Russia,


- Restrictions on the Russian originated outlets (Russia Today, and Sputnik) broadcasting in the EU.<sup>cciv</sup>

#### Fourth package (March 15, 2022)

- Constraints on investments in energy sector that could be located in Russia,
- Constraints on exports of luxury goods that are planned to be sent to Russia,
- Constraints on imports of iron and steel coming from Russia to the EU
- Constraints on arrangements regarding credit-rating services to none of the Russian citizens nor entities.<sup>ccv</sup>

#### Fifth package (April 8, 2022)

- Constraints on imports of coal, and fossil fuels coming from Russia to the EU,
- Preventions on the access of the Russian vessels to the EU ports,
- Preventions on the access of the Russian and Belarusian road transport operators to the EU,
- Constraints on imports of cement, liquor, seafood, and wood coming from Russia to the EU,
- Constraints on exports of jet fuel and other goods to Russia.<sup>ccvi</sup>



*figure: The EU Sanctions on Russia<sup>ccvii</sup>*

The European Union supports the legitimate government of Ukraine by discourses and actions that benefiting the Ukrainian citizens such as; establishing temporary protection mechanisms for refugees, making 93 million euros worth contribution to humanitarian aid, giving 17 billion euros worth support to member states hosting refugees, granting 1 billion euros to Ukrainian armed forces, devoting 1.2 billion euros in macro financial assistance to enable stability. Furthermore, the dialogues between the EU, and the Ukraine administration regarding the membership status of Ukraine continues, and the EU states that they feel positive to develop relations, enhance the dialogues on accelerating the process regarding the status of Ukraine.<sup>ccviii</sup>

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